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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study was to expand the present base of knowledge regarding two 
potentially destructive therapist reactions, secondary traumatic stress (STS) and 
countertransference, in a sample of mental health professionals currently treating traumatized 
clients who have also experienced a personal trauma themselves (i.e., survivor therapists). 
First, I examined the theoretical link between empathy, conceptualized through both 
cognitive and affective components, STS, and two types of countertransference 
(overinvolved and underinvolved). Next, the possible interaction between cognitive empathy 
and affective empathy was explored as a predictor of STS and countertransference. Finally, 
the Bowen Family Systems Theory construct differentiation of self, a salient factor for 
individuals in the helping professions, was examined as a moderator of these relationships. 
245 survivor therapists from multiple professional backgrounds (e.g., social workers, 
psychologists, counselors, etc.) participated in the survey. STS and both types of 
countertransference were positively related and analyzed together. Although cognitive 
empathy and differentiation of self did not act as two-way moderators of the relationship 
between affective empathy and therapist reactions, a three-way interaction between affective 
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empathy, cognitive empathy, and differentiation of self emerged. Survivor therapists with 
high empathy and low differentiation of self had increased risk of STS, and survivor 
therapists with low empathy and low differentiation of self reported increased risk of 
underinvolved countertransference. Therapists with high differentiation of self appeared to 
tolerate high cognitive and affective empathy without increased risk of therapist reactions, 
reporting the lowest levels of both STS and underinvolved countertransference. Clinical and 
theoretical indications are discussed. These findings have implications for trauma therapy 
training, supervision, and the management of inevitable STS and countertransference 
reactions. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Mental healthcare is a demanding profession, which draws a substantial amount of 
emotional and physical energy from those who provide this service. National surveys of 
mental healthcare workers, including social workers, counselors, psychologists, and mental 
health nurses demonstrate that psychological distress is a common problem within this 
professional community. For example, Kleespies and colleagues (2011) found that 18-29% 
of mental health therapists sampled reported struggling with suicidal ideation and the British 
Psychological Society (2017) reported that in a national survey of psychology practitioners, 
46% of psychologists and therapists suffered from depression and 70% reported high levels 
of work-related stress.  
Mental health practitioners such as psychologists, social workers, and therapists who 
work with traumatized individuals in particular are often subjected to repeated, detailed 
accounts of clients’ trauma. Trauma in this case refers to the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders-5 definition, “Exposure to actual or threatened death, serious 
injury, or sexual violence in one or more of the following ways: directly experiencing the 
traumatic event, witnessing in person the event as it occurred to others, learning that the 
traumatic event occurred to a close family member or close friend [in this case, the event 
must have been violent or accidental], or experiencing repeated or extreme exposure to 
aversive details of the traumatic events” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 271). 
Previous research has found that individuals who work with highly traumatized clients 
experience difficulty with trust, intimacy, and self-esteem (Way et al., 2004), intrusion and 
avoidance symptoms (Bober & Regehr, 2006), difficulty with interpersonal relationships 
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(Robinson-Keilig, 2014), worse health perceptions (Lee et al., 2018), and negative 
countertransference towards traumatized clients (Cavanagh et al., 2015; Follette, et al., 
1994). Clearly, professionals providing trauma care may experience a personal cost. It is no 
surprise, then, that mental healthcare workers, particularly those who work closely with 
victims of trauma, suffer professional costs like job-related burnout and turnover as well 
(Garcia et al., 2014).    
Empirical findings suggest that therapists who work with trauma survivors may run 
the risk of experiencing specific psychological, emotional, and cognitive effects as a result of 
continued exposure to traumatic material, helping to explain the significant levels of negative 
personal consequences in trauma treatment providers (Bercier & Maynard, 2015; Figley, 
1995, Pearlman & Saakvitne, 1995). Several researchers have coined the term Secondary 
Traumatic Stress (STS; Figley, 1995), which is often used interchangeably with Compassion 
Fatigue (Figley, 1995) and Vicarious Traumatization (Pearlman & Mac Ian, 1995), to 
describe these negative changes. STS is defined as a natural reaction that takes place after 
learning about a traumatizing event experienced by a significant other, such that the 
traumatized individual in this case is not directly experiencing the trauma, but rather 
experiences stress related to the indirect exposure to a traumatic event (Figley, 1995). The 
indirect exposure to trauma, combined with the individual’s empathic desire to help the 
traumatized, leads to a stress reaction that includes emotional disruption and similar 
symptom emergence as posttraumatic stress disorder (Bride et al., 2004).  
Additionally, all therapists are subject to countertransference feelings, or the 
therapist’s reaction to the client due in part to the therapist’s own unresolved psychological 
conflicts (Gelso & Hayes, 2007). Countertransference is also seen as a very natural 
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therapeutic phenomenon, but without appropriate management, unchecked 
countertransference can lead to negative outcomes for clients and therapists alike (Hayes et 
al., 2011). Unmanaged countertransference feelings have been related to therapist anxiety 
(Gelso, Latts, Gomez, & Fassinger, 2002), and counter-therapeutic behavior like avoidance 
and withdrawal from the client or overinvolvement and enmeshment in client difficulties 
(Connery & Murdock, 2019; Fauth & Hayes, 2006).  
Although STS has been defined as a phenomenon distinct from countertransference, 
there have been few attempts to examine these outcomes together to understand their 
possible relationship, despite conceptual overlap (Kanter, 2007). Examining STS and 
countertransference together may shed light on the connections between the two phenomena, 
which can help provide well needed clarity regarding effective ways to manage both 
experiences (Kanter, 2007). One important link between the two concepts is the importance 
of empathy in the emergence of these reactions. Within both STS and countertransference 
literature, empathy is seen as an essential ingredient for mental health treatment, especially 
for survivors of trauma (Figley, 1995; Peabody & Gelso, 1982). However, both conditions 
have been considered a “pathology of empathy,” whereby a therapist’s openness to client 
suffering, as is necessary to form a therapeutic relationship, can lead to personal distress if 
improperly managed (Van Wagoner et al., 1991; Lucick & Figley, 2016). Scholars in these 
respective areas of research (i.e., STS and countertransference) assert that well-managed 
empathy can protect therapists and mental health professionals from the deleterious effects of 
countertransference and STS alike (Hayes et al., 2011; Ludick & Figley, 2016; Van Wagoner 
et al., 1991). Social neuroscientific research offers a deeper understanding of empathic 
processing through both cognitive and affective dimensions, as well as directions regarding 
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the regulation of empathy (Batson, 2009; Blair, 2005); however, many studies examining 
STS and countertransference fail to include the different dimensions of empathy (e.g., 
affective and cognitive; Ludick & Figley, 2016), and far fewer attempt to explore what 
factors may help to regulate the empathic connection between therapist and client.  
It is likely that empathic regulation mechanisms are increasingly important for mental 
health professionals who have experienced traumas themselves, whom some have called 
survivor therapists (Pearlman & Mac Ian, 1995). Researchers studying the effects of trauma 
work on mental health therapists have found that many helping professionals are survivors of 
trauma themselves. For example, Adams and Riggs (2008) found that about 39% of their 
sample of 129 doctoral-level clinical and counseling students reported histories of personal 
trauma. In addition, Butler et al. (2017) found that within their sample of 195 graduate social 
work students, about 42% reported some experience with retraumatization as a result of their 
clinical field work. The prevalence of trauma in the therapeutic field is not surprising, 
considering the high likelihood that any individual will experience a traumatic event in their 
lifetime (Courtois & Gold, 2009). Personal experiences with trauma often lead individuals to 
pursue helping others with trauma-related concerns, but these personal traumatic experiences 
may increase the risk of STS and negative countertransference feelings (Butler et al., 2017; 
Brady, 2017; Hensel et al., 2015; Pearlman & Mac Ian, 1995; Wilson & Lindy, 1991).  
It is thought that by empathically engaging in work with a client’s trauma, the 
therapist’s own traumatic difficulties may be triggered (Pearlman & Saakvitine, 1995). 
However, in most studies examining reactions to working with traumatized clients, personal 
trauma history has been captured only as an ancillary demographic variable. Furthermore, 
some studies fail to find a link between therapists’ personal trauma history and STS 
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symptoms, suggesting that there is variation in the degree to which personal trauma affect 
therapists’ reactions (Bober & Regher, 2006; Kadambi & Truscott, 2004). There is likely 
variation amongst these survivor therapists regarding how they manage the empathic 
relationship with their survivor clients, which has implications for the emergence of STS 
symptoms and countertransference reactions. One construct that may help characterize the 
therapist’s ability to manage their empathic response and the accompanying stress is the 
Bowen family systems theory concept of differentiation of self (Bowen, 1978). 
Differentiation of self has been defined as one’s ability to behave in emotionally mature and 
self-aware ways in stressful situations, and characterizes one’s ability to manage appropriate 
emotional connection without enmeshment or avoidance (MacKay, 2017). Although studied 
extensively within romantic or familial dyads, triads, and other relationship configurations, 
differentiation of self is under-examined as a desirable therapist quality and skill.  
 In sum, there is a gap in the STS and countertransference literature exploring the 
complex relationship between aspects of therapist empathy and trauma therapist outcomes. 
Although personal trauma history is suspected to be a risk factor for STS and 
countertransference, few studies have specifically explored the population of survivor 
therapists and of the existing research, studies have only focused on graduate-level trainees 
(Adams & Riggs, 2008; Butler et al., 2017; Shannon et al., 2014). More research is needed to 
better understand how STS and countertransference might be related, how empathy plays a 
role in their development or mitigation, and what factors play a role in the management of 
empathy so that it does not lead to deleterious outcomes. The following literature review 
explores these concepts, and makes the case for potential modifiers of the proposed 
relationship between empathy and therapist reactivity. 
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Secondary Traumatic Stress and Related Constructs 
Secondary Traumatic Stress (STS) is a relatively new construct that has gained 
interest among researchers within the field of mental health service. It is a concept born out 
of systems theory detailing the impact of trauma survivor stress on family members (Figley, 
1983). Charles Figley first coined the terms secondary victimization and “secondary 
catastrophic stress reactions,” (Figley, 1995, p. 6) which shortly thereafter evolved into the 
concept of STS (Ludick & Figley, 2016). Figley and colleagues define STS as a natural 
reaction to the indirect exposure to trauma, often a function of the “dosage” of contact an 
individual has with the trauma survivor (i.e., direct conversation versus videotaped interview; 
Ludick & Figley, 2016, p. 2). Those who come into repeated contact with trauma survivors, 
including family members, medical personnel, mental health practitioners, and friends, can 
experience physical and emotional disturbances that resemble the posttraumatic stress 
disorder symptoms in the trauma survivor (Bride, 2007). Secondary traumatization has been 
hypothesized to include symptoms similar to PTSD, including intrusion of distressing client 
material, increased physiological arousal, avoidance, distressing emotions, and functional 
impairment (Chrestman, 1999; Elwood et al., 2011; Follett et al., 1994; Figley, 1995). This 
phenomenon has been researched across multiple human service professions, including 
forensic interviewers (Perron & Hiltz, 2006), law enforcement (Bourke & Craun, 2014; Perez 
et al., 2010), nursing (Raunik et al., 2015), and child protective services (Bride et al., 2007).  
Several other terms have arisen to describe similar experiences in clinicians, 
including Compassion Fatigue (Figley, 1995) and Vicarious Traumatization (Pearlman & 
Mac Ian, 1995). Compassion fatigue and STS are most often used interchangeably, but when 
used as different constructs, compassion fatigue refers to the empathic strain the helping 
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professionals experience when working with any distressed population, whereas STS refers 
specifically to work or experience with traumatized individuals and is not limited to the 
helping professions (Elwood et al., 2011; Ludick & Figley, 2016). Compassion fatigue is 
conceptualized as a broader condition that occurs when both STS and occupational burnout 
are present over a period of time; ergo, STS and burnout can lead to compassion fatigue if 
not intervened upon and treated (Figley, 1995).  
Vicarious trauma refers to the cumulative effects within the therapist as a result of 
their empathic engagement with clients’ traumatic experiences (Pearlman & Mac Ian, 1995). 
Although the terms vicarious trauma and STS are often used interchangeably as well, there 
are subtle differences in their conceptualization. Vicarious trauma focuses primarily on the 
cognitive and worldview changes involved with repeated exposure to secondary trauma over 
time, meaning that vicarious traumatization is usually not conceptualized as a phenomenon 
that can occur after one encounter (Pearlman & Mac Ian, 1995). These cognitive changes 
refer to distortions of one’s ways in experiencing self, others, and the world, usually 
measured through one’s beliefs about personal safety, intimacy with others, trust in others, 
power, and self-esteem (Pearlman & Mac Ian, 1995). Figley (1995), on the other hand, posits 
that STS can be a quick and often unexpected reaction to one or more instances of exposure 
to indirect traumatic material. STS encompasses the DSM-IV symptoms of post-traumatic 
stress disorder, including intrusion of trauma related material (i.e., nightmares), arousal (i.e., 
easily startled), and avoidance of trauma-related material (Bride et al., 2004). Though they 
are defined differently, there is little empirical evidence to support that vicarious trauma and 
STS are in fact different constructs (Bercier & Maynard, 2015; Craig & Sprang, 2010). It 
could be that the two concepts are different clusters of symptoms pertaining to the same 
  
8 
 
 
phenomenon, which would be suggested considering that DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for Post-
traumatic stress disorder changed to include cognitive distortions as represented by vicarious 
trauma measures (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). However, there is more 
compelling evidence for elevations of intrusion, avoidance, and arousal symptoms in mental 
health professionals as a result of trauma work than there is for cognitive distortions 
(Makadia et al., 2017; Robinson-Keilig, 2014). Therefore, in an effort to capture the 
experience of working with traumatized clients specifically, this study will utilize the 
construct of STS, but will be informed by literature related to compassion fatigue and 
vicarious trauma as well.  
Paths to Secondary Traumatic Stress 
Exposure and related variables. Although interest in STS has risen within 
psychotherapy research, there are mixed findings regarding when and how severely STS 
manifests for mental health professionals. Figley’s (1995) theory of trauma transmission 
hypothesizes that it is exposure to traumatic client material, in conjunction with the 
therapist’s empathic connection with the traumatized client, that produces STS reactions. 
Most studies examining STS focus on exposure to traumatic client material, with far fewer 
incorporating the therapist’s empathic connection as a predictor of STS (Ludick & Figley, 
2016). To measure exposure to secondary trauma, most studies focus on organizational or 
work-related factors like caseload, years of experience, and percentage of trauma cases.  
Findings regarding caseload are mixed, with some studies identifying a positive 
relationship between STS and caseload, and others finding no relationship. For example, in a 
meta-analysis of 17 potential risk factors for STS collected from 38 studies, Hensel and 
colleagues (2015) established that the traumatized caseload frequency (how often the 
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professional meets with traumatized clients in a specific period of time), volume (the number 
of traumatized clients encountered), and especially ratio (percentage of traumatized clients in 
total caseload) appeared to predict STS with small but significant average effect sizes (mean 
rs = .12-.19; Hensel et al., 2015). Other studies have not found a relationship between trauma 
caseload variables and STS (Adams et al., 2008; Devilly et al., 2009; MacRitchie & 
Leibowitz, 2010; Perron & Hiltz, 2006). With small effect sizes and inconsistent findings, it 
appears that exposure to traumatic client material may not be the only route through which 
STS emerges in helping professionals. Indeed, STS theory posits that both exposure and 
empathy are necessary for STS symptoms to occur (Figley, 1995; Ludick & Figley, 2016).  
The helper as a determinant of secondary traumatic stress. Dutton and Rubinstein 
(1995) proposed an Ecological Framework model detailing the emergence of STS reactions, 
hypothesizing that both personal and environmental factors may contribute to STS reactions. 
Whereas environmental factors refer to work load and work intensity, among personal factors 
include the therapist’s inner strengths and resources, personal and professional 
vulnerabilities, management of countertransference, and general satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with their professional and personal lives. Recent meta analyses suggest that 
demographic variables tend not to account for greater STS risk, however (Hensel et al., 
2015). Earlier studies suggested that women experience STS at higher rates than men, but 
this may be distorted by higher percentages in women in the helping professions (Sabin-
Farrell & Turpin, 2003). Some studies have found a relationship between age and STS risk, 
such that younger therapists are at a greater risk (Adams & Riggs, 2008; Elwood et al., 2011; 
Pearlman & Mac Ian, 1995; Robinson-Keilig, 2014); however, this relationship may be better 
explained by years of experience or some other variable entirely. This pattern is difficult to 
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clarify, as it could be that STS abates with experience or that those with higher STS drop out 
of the profession. Regardless, it is likely that within any analysis of STS, age, level of 
experience, and gender should likely be examined as covariates. 
 One therapist factor hypothesized to relate positively with STS is personal trauma 
history, identified as a personal vulnerability by Dutton and Rubinstein (1995), particularly if 
the helper’s own trauma bears a resemblance to that of the client’s (Baird & Kracen, 2006). It 
is thought that by empathically engaging in work with a client’s trauma, the therapist’s own 
traumatic difficulties may be triggered (Pearlman & Saakvitine, 1995). In a sample of 187 
child protective services workers, Bride and colleagues (2007) found a significant 
relationship between personal trauma history and STS. In a sample of 433 Internet Crimes 
Against Children personnel, Brady (2017) found a small but significant relationship between 
personal trauma and STS (r = .14, p < .05). In a sample of 99 sexual assault and domestic 
violence counselors, those with interpersonal trauma histories demonstrated significantly 
higher STS scores compared to those without such histories, but did not demonstrate 
significantly greater burnout or vicarious trauma scores (Jenkins & Baird, 2002). However, it 
appears that many other studies have found no such relationship. Kadambi and Truscott 
(2004), in a mixed sample of clinicians treating clients affected by cancer (N = 64), clinicians 
treating sexual violence survivors (N = 86), and general practitioners (N = 71) found no 
relationships between personal trauma history and a measure or STS symptoms nor a 
measure of clinician burnout. Likewise, among a sample of 129 psychology graduate 
students, Adams and Riggs (2008) found that personal trauma histories did not make a 
difference in trauma symptoms for helping professionals. These mixed findings suggest that 
a history of personal trauma is not necessarily sufficient to incite STS in mental health care 
  
11 
 
 
givers, and although a history of personal trauma may indeed heighten STS symptoms in 
some individuals, others do not experience the same effects. 
Perhaps another quality of the therapist, how they manage the stress related to trauma 
work and proximity to a traumatized individual, can better explain the emergence of STS. 
Several recent studies suggest that secondary stress reactions are not as much the result of 
amount of exposure to client traumatic material, but rather how the clinician connects with 
and reacts to that material (Devilly, et al., 2009; Geoffrion et al., 2016; Kadambi & Truscott, 
2004; Ortlepp & Friedman, 2002; Rzeszutek et al., 2015; Thomas & Otis, 2010). Because 
STS and vicarious trauma are theoretically induced when mental health professionals are 
exposed to clients’ traumatic material, Khadambi and Truscott (2004) predicted that 
providers treating sexual abuse would demonstrate more evidence of STS and burnout than 
professionals treating other populations (i.e., general population, psycho-oncology). Contrary 
to their hypothesis, providers did not differ significantly on self-report measures of distress 
captured in PTSD-like symptoms, vicarious trauma, and burnout. Proviers did differ, 
however, in their reports of how potentially traumatizing they perceived their work to be. For 
example, 83% of sexual abuse therapists rated their work as potentially traumatizing, 
compared to 50% and 36% of psycho-oncology and general practice clinicians, respectively 
(Khadambi & Truscott, 2004). 
Several possible explanations may exist for these findings. For one, professionals in 
psycho-oncology and general practice may indeed be seeing clients with significant trauma 
symptoms, given the likelihood that individuals will experience a trauma within their 
lifetime. It could also be that mental health providers self-select their specialty given their 
expertise, such that trauma-specific therapists may have a higher threshold for traumatic 
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reactions to client material. Alternatively, it could be that the theoretical explanations of STS, 
vicarious trauma, and compassion fatigue as a result of the amount of exposure to traumatic 
client material need to be reevaluated. The authors conclude that personal characteristics of 
the mental health provider may be the most important determinant of how he or she will be 
affected by their work with clients (Khadambi & Truscott, 2004). Therapist differences could 
instead be captured through the other necessary path to STS, the therapist’s empathic 
response; however few studies have examined the relationship between therapist empathy 
and STS symptom emergence in great detail. If STS is indeed a result of the empathic 
relationship developed between therapist and traumatized client, as Figley (1995) 
hypothesized, then a therapist’s ability to manage the therapeutic relationship (and the 
respective difficult emotional experiences) may be an important condition for STS to emerge. 
Countertransference 
 Many definitions of countertransference have been proposed in psychotherapy 
research. Freud’s (1910) classical view defined countertransference as an unconscious 
reaction to the client’s transference which hinders treatment, and should be eliminated by the 
therapist’s own participation in psychoanalysis. Emerging in the 1950s, the totalistic view 
identified all therapist reactions to the client as countertransference (Kernberg, 1965). Many 
practitioners adhering to the totalistic view believe that countertransference is inevitable and 
essential for meaningful therapeutic change to occur, as it can be used as a tool to understand 
the client’s reality (Berzoff & Kita, 2010). The third view of countertransference, deemed the 
complementary view, defines countertransference as a function of the client’s style of 
relating (Hayes et al., 2018). Professionals within the complementary camp assert that the 
client pulls the therapist in ways that replicate the client’s typical relational patterns. It is thus 
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the therapist’s responsibility not to react to these pulls but rather use them to understand the 
client.  
This study will utilize the widely accepted integrated conception of 
countertransference, which attempts to integrate aspects of the above three definitions into 
one pan-theoretical concept of countertransference (Hayes et al., 2018). The integrated view 
identifies countertransference as a result of the therapist’s unresolved conflicts, whether 
conscious or unconscious, and the client presentation (Gelso & Hayes, 2002). The integrated 
view emphasizes that the origins of the countertransference relate back to the therapist’s 
conflicts and does not include all reactions a therapist may have to a client. For example, a 
therapist experiencing frustration in response to a client continuously arriving late to sessions 
may not be considered countertransference, because this is likely a frustration any therapist 
would experience. However, a therapist becoming frustrated with a client’s way of speaking 
about their partner due to the therapist’s dynamic with their own partner would be considered 
countertransference, as this reaction is therapist-specific. Additionally, this view 
conceptualizes countertransference as inevitable, as all people have unresolved conflicts. The 
ability to manage these reactions is an important skill for maintaining any kind of therapeutic 
relationship, and it is the therapist’s responsibility to understand and manage these reactions 
(Hayes, 2004). 
Countertransference Reactions 
In general, countertransference reactions have largely been operationalized on a 
polarity between therapist avoidance and therapist enmeshment, and can be observed through 
therapist behaviors, cognitions, and emotional reactions. The most commonly used behaviors 
signaling countertransference are the therapist’s avoidance or withdrawal from threatening 
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client material, and therapist overinvolvement with the client and having their own needs met 
somehow within the therapeutic space (Hayes et al., 2018). Cognitively, countertransference 
is often detected via distorted appraisals of clients, for example perceiving a client to be 
hostile or “difficult” when they may not be, or inaccurate recall of session content (Fauth & 
Hayes, 2006; Hayes et al., 2018). The most commonly used affective indicator of 
countertransference is anxiety occurring in-session (Hayes & Gelso, 1991; Shamoon et al., 
2017; Yulis & Kiesler, 1968). In sum, countertransference can be characterized as the 
therapist’s avoidance of threatening client material or overidentification and overinvolvement 
with the client and their difficulties, as well as session-induced anxiety and distorted 
cognitions related to the client or the therapeutic work.  
Wilson et al. (1994) classified two different forms of countertransference responses 
that are particularly common in trauma work. Type I countertransference responses include 
avoidant disengagement, and detachment responses. The authors hypothesize that this 
particular set of countertransference responses is an attempt to protect the helper from the 
anxiety that comes with facing difficult client emotional content. The mental health 
professional may experience empathic distress in response to the client’s distress over having 
been victimized; as a result, the mental health professional may experience doubt about their 
own therapeutic efficacy to relieve the client’s (and subsequently their own) distress, which 
creates anxiety (Wilson et al., 1994, p. 43). The authors go on to say that the emergent 
anxiety then leads to defensive attempts to control the distressing affect through avoidance 
and reduce feelings of uncertainty. The result is a detachment of the therapist from an 
empathic stance with the client, which can look like denial of symptoms, minimization of 
  
15 
 
 
difficulties, avoidance of traumatic content, and forms of withdrawing from the therapeutic 
situation.  
The second form of typical countertransference reactions in trauma work, Type II, 
includes overidentification, enmeshment, and rescuer responses; these responses represent 
misguided attempts to maintain empathic engagement with the client, which can ultimately 
lead to a rupture of empathy and the diminishment of the therapist’s effectiveness (Wilson et 
al., 1994). This set of countertransference reactions may be especially prevalent for helpers 
who have unmet needs or unresolved difficulty, thus using their client’s treatment as a 
surrogate for their own needed growth. Wilson et. al (1994) indicate that these two forms of 
therapist reactions can occur concurrently in the same therapist, and are not mutually 
exclusive. Throughout the course of trauma therapy, it is likely that the therapist will 
experience a range of reactions and though they may have a tendency to experience either 
Type I or II reactions, may experience both. The primary difference between Type I and II 
countertransference reactions is that in Type I, the therapist is overwhelmed by the client’s 
pain and avoids empathic connection as a means of protecting themselves, whereas in Type 
II, the therapist actively seeks to help the client but loses the necessary role boundaries for 
maintaining the therapeutic relationship.  
To provide an example, imagine Therapist A working with a traumatized client. 
Therapist A has an unresolved trauma themselves, and when the client expresses heightened 
affect related to their traumatic experience, Therapist A begins to experience heightened 
anxiety. To relieve this anxiety, Therapist A watches the clock, and changes the subject in the 
session. Therapist A may also allow their mind to wander as the client speaks, effectively 
distancing themselves from the anxiety that has been triggered by their own unresolved 
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conflict. This can be described as underinvolved or avoidant countertransference, Type I as 
Wilson and colleagues (1994) define. Conversely, imagine Therapist B who also has an 
unresolved trauma. Therapist B also experiences anxiety when their traumatized client 
reflects on their own traumatic experience. Therapist B, however, begins to relate themselves 
to the client, fusing their experiences with the client’s. As a result, they self-disclose more 
often with this client, and may give this client more personalized attention, getting caught up 
with the client’s experience and going overtime with the session. Therapist B is experiencing 
overinvolved or enmeshment countertransference, Type II countertransference. As a result of 
Therapist B’s over-identification with the client, they overextend themselves, unconsciously 
attempting to therapize two parties for the price of one: their client, and themselves. Both 
reactions, if left unchecked, can result in a reduction in appropriate care for clients, and a fast 
track to burnout for the therapist. 
Countertransference and Secondary Traumatic Stress 
 At first glance, there appears to be significant overlap between countertransference 
and STS, including anxious reactions to client exposure, avoidance of or overinvolvement 
with client traumatic material, and resulting cognitive distortions as well. Figley (1995) 
attempted to differentiate STS from countertransference reactions by stating that 
countertransference is merely a reaction to the client’s transference, which only occurs in the 
therapeutic space. In contrast, secondary trauma is a reaction specifically to the client’s 
trauma, and which affects the therapist beyond the therapy room. At the same time, however, 
Figley suggested that STS may include but is not limited to some countertransference 
reactions; Dutton and Rubinstein (1995), however, within the same text asserted that 
countertransference and secondary stress reactions are separate phenomena. Additionally, 
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Figley (1995) stated that countertransference is an unwanted, negative phenomenon, which 
must be eliminated from therapy, whereas secondary trauma is a natural reaction, a normal 
byproduct of caring for someone with severe trauma. Kanter (2007), in a critical commentary 
on Figley’s conceptualization, proposed that there was a lack of conceptual clarity 
distinguishing compassion fatigue or STS reactions from countertransference reactions, and 
proposed that secondary traumatization was in fact a product of countertransference, rather 
than distinct from it. On the other hand, Berzoff and Kita (2010) responded to Kanter’s 
(2007) commentary by distinguishing conceptual differences between countertransference 
and compassion fatigue/STS, namely by asserting that countertransference theoretically 
occurs in every therapeutic relationship whereas STS does not. 
Despite this back and forth, there is a lack of empirical research supporting the 
separation of STS and countertransference as distinct constructs in relation to therapist 
reactions to client difficulty. To make matters worse, differing definitions of 
countertransference and misuse of the terms STS, vicarious trauma, and compassion fatigue 
further obscure conceptual clarity. It is not entirely clear whether STS is in fact a separate 
construct, or if it is a countertransference-like reaction that occurs as a result of the 
therapist’s inability to recognize and manage countertransference. Regardless, if 
countertransference refers to therapist reactions in the therapeutic space, and STS refers to 
therapist reactions that bleed beyond the therapeutic space, management of those initial client 
reactions may have implications for the development of therapist stress and counter-
therapeutic actions. To my knowledge, however, no published studies examine aspects of 
countertransference in relation to STS symptoms.  
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Empathy 
A major similarity between STS and countertransference is that they both share a 
theoretical connection with therapist empathy. Empathy is broadly defined as the ability to 
correctly interpret the emotions and perspectives of others and respond appropriately 
(Chrysikou & Thompson, 2016). Carl Rogers largely popularized the use and importance of 
empathy as a central component of effective therapy and described it as “the therapist's 
sensitive ability and willingness to understand the client's thoughts, feelings and struggles 
from the client's point of view. [It is] this ability to see completely through the client's eyes, 
to adopt his [sic] frame of reference…” (1980, p. 85, as cited in Elliott et al., 2011). Rogers’ 
definition hints that there are both cognitive and affective, understanding and feeling, 
components to empathy, which has been elaborated upon by more studies using 
neuroimaging and experimental methods (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Eisenberg & Eggum, 
2009; Lamothe et al., 2014).  
Most researchers of empathy agree that to empathize with an individual, three 
components are necessary: an affective component in which a person shares in the emotional 
experience of another, a cognitive component in which a person can conceptualize and 
understand another’s experience, and a regulatory mechanism by which self- and other-
feelings are kept distinct (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Eisenberg, 2000). Affective empathy is 
defined as the ability to feel as another individual feels, often involving an emotional reaction 
and regarded as “bottom-up” neurological processing (Batson, 2009; Lamonthe et al., 2014). 
Affective empathy is often referred to as emotional contagion, such that emotion spreads 
from one individual to another (Doherty, 1997; Hatfield et al., 1994). This “spreading” 
appears to be facilitated by the primitive, automatic process of emotional mimicry, which has 
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often been demonstrated via automatic facial mimicry in response to viewing another person 
expressing emotion. Imagine how a baby will begin to cry when seeing another infant cry, 
just by forming a similar face (Balconi & Canavesio, 2013; Balconi & Lucciari, 2007; 
Sonnby-Borgström et al., 2008).  
Cognitive empathy, on the other hand, is “top-down,” and involves taking on the 
perspective of the other and understanding their internal state (Batson, 2009; Blair, 2005; 
Elliott et al., 2011). This process requires more sophisticated imaginal processing by which 
an individual comes to understand and account for the perspective of another (Doherty, 
1997). Eisenberg and Eggum (2009) suggest that the total empathic response can evolve into 
either prosocial behaviors (i.e., empathic concern, the desire to help others), or personal 
distress, a “self-focused, aversive affective reaction to the apprehension of another’s 
emotion,” which often appears as anxiety or discomfort (Eisenberg & Eggum, 2009, p. 72). 
The regulatory mechanism determines whether or not empathy erupts into personal distress 
or is managed and channeled into pro-social concern and behavior. Within this study, I will 
examine STS and countertransference as aspects of personal distress that may occur from 
strained or unmanaged empathy. 
Secondary Traumatic Stress and Empathy 
According to STS theory, the more empathic a clinician, the more susceptible they 
are to STS (Figley, 1995; Ludick & Figley, 2016). However, as Ludick and Figley (2016) 
noted, there is a lack of thorough empirical exploration concerning the role of empathy in the 
process of secondary traumatization.  Thomas and Otis (2010) investigated the connection 
between compassion fatigue and aspects of empathy, mindfulness, and emotional separation 
in a sample of 171 clinical social workers. Using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; 
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Davis, 1983), they found that two proposed empathy factors positively predicted compassion 
fatigue; however, no aspects of empathy were associated with compassion fatigue when 
mindfulness skills and emotional separation were entered into the regression model, 
suggesting that emotion regulation skills may better account for variance shared between 
empathy and compassion fatigue (Thomas & Otis, 2010). In a national sample of 7,584 
practicing physicians, Gleichgerrcht and Decety (2013) found a positive and significant 
relationship between STS and the Emotional Concern and Personal Distress subscales of the 
IRI, considered by the authors to represent affective empathy, but a non-significant negative 
relationship between STS and the Perspective Taking subscale of IRI, considered a measure 
of cognitive empathy. These results suggest that affective and cognitive empathy may have 
differing effects on STS, and that perhaps alone cognitive empathy may not have a 
significant relationship to STS.  
One study in particular, cited heavily by Ludick and Figley (2016) in their 
reconceptualization of secondary trauma induction and resilience, attempted to distinguish 
between cognitive and affective components of empathy in their relationship to general 
practitioner burnout. Although the authors did not examine STS, burnout is a component of 
the more broadly defined concept of compassion fatigue and is both theoretically and 
empirically related to STS symptoms (Cieslak et al., 2014). Lamothe and colleagues (2014) 
performed a cross sectional survey of 294 French general practitioners and examined their 
perceptions of burnout as a factor of cognitive empathy, measured by the IRI subscale 
perspective taking, and affective empathy, implied from IRI subscale empathic concern. 
Expecting to find higher burnout in clinicians with higher affective empathy and lower 
cognitive empathy, the authors instead found that both cognitive empathy and affective 
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empathy were associated with less burnout, though cognitive empathy demonstrated a 
stronger relationship (rs -.24 and -.17, respectively, ps < .01). Another surprising finding was 
the interaction between empathic concern and perspective taking. For providers with low 
perspective taking, affective empathy did not predict burnout, but when perspective taking 
was high, affective empathy was negatively predictive of burnout. The physicians that were 
the least likely to report burnout had high cognitive and high affective empathy (Lamothe et 
al., 2014). These findings suggest that for general practitioners, a degree of affective empathy 
and cognitive empathy is helpful in protecting against burnout symptoms, however affective 
empathy seems to only benefit when cognitive empathy is high. The authors proposed that 
cognitive empathy (i.e., perspective taking) assisted with affective empathy regulation, and 
that at a certain point, affective empathy is likely to harm clinicians. This makes sense as 
affective empathic responses are more automatic, whereas cognitive perspective taking 
requires higher order theory of mind processing. Consistent with Lamothe and colleagues’ 
(2014) findings, several researchers have suggested that the recruitment of cognitive 
processing in the affective empathic experience can modulate the affective response 
(Heberleine & Saxe, 2005; Lamm et al., 2007).  
Whereas Lamothe et al. (2014) were the first to examine different aspects of empathy 
in combination with burnout in a sample of general practitioners, STS is a distinct reaction 
that occurs in helping professionals working with trauma specifically. For trauma care 
providers who have experienced trauma themselves, it may be difficult to differentiate one’s 
own experience from the client’s experience, even while engaging in more cognitively 
empathic skills. To date, the relationship between cognitive and affective empathy and STS 
remains unexamined. More research is needed in order to understand the relationship 
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between components of empathy and STS in professionals treating mental health difficulties 
as emotionally laden as trauma. 
Additionally, in each of the previous studies reviewed within this section, the IRI was 
used as a means of measuring cognitive and affective empathy. The IRI is by far the most 
widely used self-report measure of empathy and validated for use in multiple cultures and 
ages, for example with Chilean adults (Fernandez et al., 2011), Chinese students (Siu & 
Shek, 2005), and with Swiss prisoners (Lauterbach & Hosser, 2007); however, despite its 
prolific use, the IRI has been criticized for its lack of coherent factor structure and inclusion 
of subscales that may not be a valid representation of the empathy construct (Chrysikou & 
Thompson, 2016; Hojat et al., 2005; Pulos et al., 2004). Although many researchers use the 
IRI subscales as representations of cognitive and affective empathy, factor structure analyses 
of the scale do not support this interpretation, and the measure has been criticized for poorly 
capturing affective empathy in particular (Chrysikou & Thompson, 2016).  Consequently, the 
validity of findings from studies claiming to use the IRI as a measure of both cognitive and 
affective empathy are subject to question.  
Countertransference and Empathy  
Countertransference and empathy, although theoretically related, appear to have a 
complex and poorly understood relationship (Peabody & Gelso, 1982). According to 
psychoanalytic theory, empathy and countertransference are related in that they both involve 
the therapist (to some degree) identifying with the client (Reik, 1964, as cited in Peabody & 
Gelso, 1982). The process of identification allows the therapist to better understand what the 
client is experiencing, feeling, and thinking. However, countertransference reactions 
seemingly occur when something goes awry within the process of identification (Peabody & 
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Gelso, 1982). The theoretical relationships between empathic ability and countertransference 
would seem to assume that the more empathic the counselor is, the more likely they are to be 
reactive to the client’s emotional experience. However, theory and empirical findings also 
suggest that the more empathic the individual, the more attuned they are to their own feelings 
as well, providing an opportunity for the self-reflection and emotional understanding 
necessary to address their own countertransference reactions (Fish, 1970; Peabody & Gelso, 
1982).  
In their exploratory study of countertransference feelings and behavior in relation to 
counselor empathy, Peabody and Gelso (1982) hypothesized that empathy may leave a 
therapist more open to countertransference feelings, but helps therapists manage their 
countertransference behavior. The distinction here is that countertransference feelings 
include the affective response to the client that occurs as a result of the therapist’s unresolved 
conflicts, like anger, criticism, anxiety, or love. Countertransference behavior is how the 
therapist inappropriately acts on these feelings. For example, if they feel anxiety, a 
countertransference behavior would involve avoiding heightened affect or threatening 
subjects in therapy. In this case, Peabody and Gelso (1982) believed that openness and 
awareness to one’s countertransference feelings would allow for protection against 
unchecked countertransference behaviors, and that empathy assists therapists in this 
awareness. Openness to countertransference behaviors was measured via whether the 
counselor believed countertransference feelings can be helpful, the percentage of clients with 
whom they experience countertransference, and whether or not countertransference is 
experienced more within as opposed to outside the session (Peabody & Gelso, 1982).  Within 
their sample of 20 male counselors, Peabody and Gelso found that higher self-reported 
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empathic understanding scores related positively and significantly with openness to 
countertransference feelings, and negatively but not significantly with countertransference 
behaviors. These findings suggest that empathy may play a role in the development of 
countertransference feelings but not countertransference behavior. It is worth considering 
what qualities or skills may allow a therapist to become aware and appreciative of their 
countertransference feelings so that they may be properly managed. 
In their model of countertransference management, Hayes et al. (2018) stated that 
therapist empathy is in part necessary for proper countertransference reaction management. 
However, therapist empathy within this model is defined as “the ability to partially identify 
with and put one’s self in the other’s shoes,” (Hayes et al., 2018, p. 498, emphasis added). 
Thus, in describing countertransference management, Hayes and colleagues assert that the 
therapist’s empathy itself must be managed, such that there is a partial identification with the 
client as opposed to an over-identification or under-identification with a client. This 
perspective on empathy is consistent with Decety and Jackson’s (2004) and Eisenberg’s 
(2000) conceptualizations of empathy whereby empathy requires an ability to step in and step 
out of the emotional identification with another. Effectively doing so will prevent the 
empathizer from losing sight of their own sense of self or distancing completely from the 
other individual. A weakening of this ability to remain involved but separate from the client 
results in what some refer to as empathic strain (Slakter, 1987). Slakter (1987) and Wilson 
and Lindy (1991), in their reviews of empathy and countertransference, indicate that 
empathic strain within the therapeutic relationship often results in affective reactions within 
the therapist, and intense affective reactions can subsequently cause negative 
countertransference reactions. In this way, mismanaged or strained empathy can result in a 
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vulnerability to negative countertransference reactions. One can expect, then, that properly 
regulated empathy, which includes a knowledge of one’s partial identification with the client, 
would result in less vulnerability to negative countertransference reactions. It is important to 
keep in mind, however, that countertransference reactions have never been examined in 
relation to cognitive and affective measures of empathy; thus, it is difficult to predict how 
these related but distinct empathic processes may relate to countertransference reactions. 
Examining the relationship between countertransference reactions and both cognitive and 
affective empathy may help to clarify the link between empathy and countertransference. 
Empathy Regulation  
It is hypothesized that the empathizing individual’s level of emotional self-regulation, 
as well as their ability to distinguish their own feelings from another’s, determines whether 
empathy evolves into a manageable, sympathetic response or a personally distressed response 
(Eisenberg & Eggum, 2009; Decety and Lamm, 2009; Decety & Jackson, 2004). Regarding 
self-regulation, high scores on adults’ self-reported effortful control, otherwise known as 
one’s ability to use executive attention to control temperament and action, were positively 
related to reports of sympathy and negatively related to self-reported personal distress (Okun 
et al., 2000; Eisenberg & Okun, 1996). Relatedly, emotion regulation appears to allow 
physicians to down-regulate their pain response, effectively mitigating their distress in 
response to seeing pain in others (Decety et al., 2010). Decety and colleagues (2010) 
concluded that this ability to down regulate the emotional pain response frees up the 
cognitive resources necessary to complete their work. 
Explorations of self-other differentiation in empathic processing suggest that 
cognitive empathic processes can temper the affective response (Heberlein & Saxe, 2005; 
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Lamm, et al., 2007; Lamothe et al., 2014; Strayer & Eisenberg, 1987). For example, in an 
early study examining the effect of different types of perspective taking on participants’ 
psychological responses, Batson, Early, and Salvarani (1997) presented participants with a 
vignette of a girl named Katie who was struggling to cope with college after the death of her 
parents, but varied the instructions to understand Katie’s experience. One group of 
participants was asked to focus on Katie’s feelings and imagine her experience, which 
produced greater empathic concern and sympathy responses. However, the other group was 
asked to imagine themselves in Katie’s place to simulate a blurring of self-other 
differentiation, and they showed stronger signs of distress in comparison (Batson et al., 
1997).  
Similar results were found with regard to imagining physical pain in others. Lamm, et 
al. (2007) found that while watching a video of others experiencing pain, asking participants 
to imagine how they would feel in the same situation induced more personal distress than 
asking them to imagine what the individual in the video was experiencing. Although both 
conditions stimulated pain centers in the brain, those able to cognitively take the other-
oriented perspective experienced less distress while watching the pain response compared to 
those taking a self-oriented perspective (Lamm et al., 2007). It also appears that priming self-
other differentiation can facilitate cognitive empathic processes that help distance individuals 
from others’ pain (i.e., imagine how they feel versus imagine how you would feel in this 
situation). Given these findings, it seems important to consider regulatory mechanisms that 
allow an individual to feel for another and cognitively understand their perspective without 
becoming emotionally distressed or losing the distinction between themselves and others. It 
is likely that one’s inherent ability to down-regulate their emotional experience and clearly 
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differentiate themselves from another allows for increased recruitment of cognitive empathy 
responses as opposed to responding only with emotion (Decety et al., 2010). One variable 
that accounts for both supposed necessities for empathy management, emotion regulation and 
self-other distinction, is differentiation of self, a construct from Bowen Family Systems 
Theory (BFST). 
Differentiation of Self 
BFST is widely recognized as one of the most comprehensive explanations of how 
family-of-origin processes affect individuals in their future relationships (Charles, 2001; 
Murdock, 2017). The foundation of BFST rests on an individual’s ability to distinguish their 
sense of self in relation to their family-of-origin, as well as to distinguish thought from 
feeling, known as differentiation of self (Kerr & Bowen, 1988). Thus, differentiation of self 
has two components: the intrapersonal, distinguishing between thinking and feeling systems 
and regulating emotional responses, and the interpersonal, maintaining an autonomous sense 
of self in the context of emotional connection with others (Kerr & Bowen, 1988; Titelman, 
2015). According to Bowen, an individual’s level of differentiation of self is established 
within the family-of-origin and carried into that individual’s future relationships, making 
one’s level of differentiation a stable and persistent trait (Kerr & Bowen, 1988). Thus, one’s 
relationship with their caregivers and the family emotional system determines one’s ability to 
differentiate from others—healthy family functioning begets healthier levels of child 
differentiation, whereas abusive family dynamics often predicts dysfunction in the child’s 
future relationships (MacKay, 2012). Indeed, mothers with lower levels of differentiation of 
self are at higher risk for child maltreatment (Skowron, Kozlowski, & Pincus, 2010). 
Pertinent to the present study, although experiencing adverse childhood events can have a 
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negative impact on the child’s development of differentiation of self, negative family 
emotional processes (predicted by parental differentiation of self) appear to compound the 
effects of childhood trauma to predict lower levels of differentiation of self in adulthood 
(Swanberg-Hejelm, 2020). As a trait associated with interpersonal and intrapersonal 
functioning, differentiation of self has also been examined in a variety of contexts outside of 
the family of origin, including romantic relationships (Stapley & Murdock, 2020), stress 
management in college students (Murdock & Gore, 2012), and countertransference 
management in mental health therapists (Connery & Murdock, 2019) . 
Differentiation of self is broken down even further into four factors that measure the 
interpersonal (i.e., Emotional Cutoff and Fusion) and the intrapersonal (i.e., I-Position and 
Emotional Reactivity) dimensions (Skowron & Friedlander, 1998). Intrapersonal 
differentiation of self refers to one’s ability to distinguish emotional experiences from 
intellectual thought. Higher levels of differentiation of self, in this case, are characterized by 
less emotional reactivity, better stress management, and a stronger capacity to maintain one’s 
own sense of autonomy within stressful situations (i.e., I-position; Kerr & Bowen, 1988). 
Interpersonally, higher levels of differentiation are characterized by a greater comfort with 
intimacy while still being able to maintain personal independence; therefore, those with 
higher levels of differentiation of self are able to maintain appropriate boundaries with others 
especially during times of duress, without keeping too much distance and without enmeshing 
entirely with others (Kerr & Bowen, 1988; Skowron & Schmitt, 2003; Stapley & Murdock, 
2020). Thus, those with lower levels of differentiation of self have difficulty distinguishing 
between thinking and feeling systems, and are likely to become overwhelmed under stress. 
Without emotional control and a firm sense of self, they become prone to anxiety, which 
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leads them to cope with either overinvolvement with important others (i.e., fusion) or 
increased tendencies to emotionally cut-off in order to manage their anxiety (Bowen, 1978; 
Timm & Keiley, 2011).  
Capturing one’s ability to engage in intellectual and rational facilities versus 
emotional disarray, it is expected that greater differentiation of self would predict better self-
control, emotion regulation, and general stress management. Although the functioning of 
even highly differentiated individuals is reduced when under acute stress, functioning can be 
viewed along a differentiation of self-continuum. Those who can interpersonally and 
intrapersonally differentiate operate effectively on one end of the continuum, whereas those 
less able to differentiate function poorly at the other end and may see severe symptomatology 
as a result (MacKay, 2012). Indeed, a broad base of literature has formed using 
differentiation of self as an explanation for or modifier of self-regulation, including 
perceptions of distress, stress management, effortful control, and coping (Krycak et al., 2012; 
Peleg-Popko, 2002; Skowron & Dendy, 2004; Skowron et al., 2004; Wright, 2009). Studies 
differ on their interpretation of stress, and whether or not one overarching component of 
differentiation of self is used as opposed to the four subcomponents (i.e., I-position, Fusion, 
Emotional Reactivity, and Cutoff). Using full scale differentiation of self scores, Murdock 
and Gore (2004) found that differentiation moderated the relationship between perceived 
stress and psychological distress, such that less differentiated individuals with high perceived 
stress reported significantly more psychological distress compared to well differentiated 
individuals with similar levels of perceived stress. Additionally, although differentiation of 
self was predictive of more adaptive coping styles, coping itself was not found to predict 
psychological distress over and above differentiation of self, suggesting that coping style 
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may be subsumed in the more conceptually broader construct of differentiation of self. The 
authors suggest that perhaps differences in coping are merely manifestations in individuals’ 
inherent differences in levels of differentiation of self (Murdock & Gore, 2004).  
Skowron and Dendy (2004) examined the links between adult attachment styles and 
the various subscale components of differentiation, and found that higher levels of 
differentiation of self were related to more secure attachment styles, and was a better 
predictor of effortful control (i.e., self-regulation) than attachment style. Specifically, 
attachment anxiety was most closely related with emotional reactivity, and attachment 
avoidance with emotional cutoff. Over and above attachment styles, greater ability to take the 
I-position in relationships and less emotional reactivity both uniquely predicted greater 
effortful control, or the ability to focus and shift attention, inhibit undesirable behaviors, and 
engage with an activity despite the desire to avoid. Similarly, Skowron, Wester, and Azen 
(2004) found that differentiation of self mediated the relationship between college stress and 
psychological adjustment in a sample of 126 undergraduate students, and after examining the 
subcomponents, found that emotional reactivity and emotional cutoff specifically mediated 
this relationship. Krycak et al. (2012) found that all components of differentiation of self 
significantly predicted lower college stress, perceived stress, and psychological distress, but 
found that only I-position and emotional reactivity partially mediated the relationship 
between varying aspects of college stress and perceived stress.  
Differentiation of Self, STS, and Countertransference  
 Differentiation of self captures qualities that would likely aid mental health 
professionals in the formation and maintenance of an effective therapeutic relationship, 
especially in relation to countertransference reactions and STS. As discussed above, healthy 
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differentiation of self is related to effective anxiety and stress management in adults. 
Theoretically, an individual who is more highly differentiated should be able to distinguish 
their own experience from another’s, properly manage interpersonal boundaries so as not to 
become cutoff or fused with another, and more effectively manage affective reactions as they 
occur in relationships, qualities that likely could protect individuals from harmful secondary 
stress reactions, and would contribute to the proper management of countertransference.  
Connery and Murdock (2019), using an analog experimental design, examined the 
interactive effect between client presentation (a demanding client versus a submissive client) 
and therapist differentiation of self on countertransference feelings and behaviors. In this 
case, behavior was measured by the therapist’s chosen verbal response to client videotape 
segments. Higher differentiation of self significantly predicted less overinvolved and 
underinvolved countertransference feelings and less overinvolved countertransference 
behaviors (Connery & Murdock, 2019). Additionally, higher self-reported differentiation of 
self also predicted more appropriate therapist responses, over and above client condition. 
These findings were consistent with previous research conducted by Fatter and Hayes (2013), 
who found that I-positioning was related to fewer countertransference responses as measured 
by an observing supervisor. Together, these findings support differentiation of self as a 
possible protectant against harmful countertransference reactions, including both feelings and 
behaviors. To this end, therapists better equipped to manage closeness and distance pulls and 
affective intensity in the therapeutic relationship may be less likely to experience distressing 
countertransference reactions.  
Halevi and Idisis (2018) explored the related construct, vicarious trauma, and 
differentiation of self in a sample of 134 therapists. Both interpersonal and intrapersonal 
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components of differentiation of self significantly predicted lower evidence of vicarious 
trauma (-.29 and -.44 respectively, p < .01). Although examined within children of ex-
prisoners of war (ex-POWs) instead of therapists, Zerach (2015) hypothesized that 
differentiation of self mediated the relationship between ex-POW children’s exposure to their 
fathers’ stressful behaviors and symptoms of STS. Sampling both children of ex-POWs and 
children of veterans who were not POWs, Zerach (2015) found that the children of ex-POWs 
experienced more secondary trauma symptoms, and the relationship between group 
membership (ex-POW fathers versus non-POW veteran fathers) and secondary trauma was 
fully explained by the four differentiation of self components, with the majority of the shared 
variance attributed to emotional cutoff. Additionally, the relationship between exposure to 
father’s stressful behaviors and secondary trauma symptoms was partially mediated by 
emotional reactivity and emotional cutoff (Zerach, 2015). In both of these analyses, exposure 
to negative life events was controlled for, providing a picture of STS in adult children (mean 
age of 35.21) of ex-POWs unencumbered by general life stress and direct trauma. These 
results suggest that both intrapersonal dimensions of differentiation of self, especially 
emotional reactivity, and interpersonal dimensions of differentiation of self, namely 
emotional cutoff, help to explain the relationship between exposure to indirect trauma and 
STS.  
Zerach’s (2015) interpretation of these findings point to emotional cutoff as a 
protective coping mechanism for the child from the intensity of the ex-POW father’s trauma; 
however, with emotional cutoff comes greater isolation, and the potential for avoidance of 
others and avoidance of painful emotions, particularly if the child has higher levels of 
emotional reactivity. The lack of effective emotional differentiation may lead to the 
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expression of avoidant and intrusive secondary traumatic symptoms. I return now to Thomas 
and Otis’ (2010) survey of licensed clinical social workers, in which 171 social workers 
reported on compassion fatigue, burnout, compassion satisfaction, and various potential 
correlates. Although this study did not focus on differentiation of self per se, the authors 
found that the strongest predictor of the STS component of compassion fatigue (burnout 
removed as a separate scale), over and above social workers’ personal trauma, their years of 
work experience, their level of trait empathy, and mindfulness, was emotional separation, 
defined as one’s ability to differentiate others’ emotional experiences from their own 
(Corcoran, 1983). The relationship between emotional separation and compassion fatigue 
was strong (r = -.499, p < .001), and suggests that social workers’ ability to emotionally 
separate from their clients may protect them from STS symptoms.  
Differentiation of Self and Empathy Regulation  
There is enough evidence to suggest that differentiation of self contributes to the 
emergence of countertransference reactions and STS on its own; however, this study focuses 
on the regulation of empathy as it pertains to STS and countertransference reactions, and the 
role differentiation of self may play in the path between empathy and STS and 
countertransference. Empathy researchers have suggested that aspects of interpersonal self-
other differentiation, emotional regulation, and effortful control are necessary for the 
regulation of empathy so that empathic reactions can facilitate prosocial attitudes and 
behaviors as opposed to personal distress (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Eisenberg & Eggum, 
2009). Relatedly, Bowen (1978) predicted that managing the needs of others within 
emotional contexts necessarily increases anxiety. This increase in anxiety, as Ferrera (2014) 
described, produces predictable relationship patterns in accordance with Bowenian theory: 
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distancing from the individual whose relationship induces anxiety as a means to avoid the 
distress, or over-involvement with the relationship in an effort to “fix” the problem and 
eradicate the tension. These reactions are similar to clinician countertransference feelings and 
STS reactions (Bride, 2007; Hayes et al., 2018). If differentiation of self in relation to the 
family of origin allows an individual to effectively manage the interpersonal and 
intrapersonal anxiety associated with managing the needs of others, it is likely that the path 
between the empathic connection to STS and countertransference reactions may be altered by 
one’s level of differentiation of self.   
Several studies have provided evidence that cognitive empathy can moderate the 
effects of emotional concern and sensitivity (Lamm et al., 2007; Batson et al., 1997). Going 
further, it is worth considering what allows a person to engage in cognitively-focused 
empathic processing when they are in emotionally intense situations where emotional 
contagion is more likely. The previously reviewed studies provide evidence that 
differentiation of self may help to facilitate de Waal’s suggested “shift in perspective” that is 
needed to effectively empathize with another individual without losing sense of one’s self (de 
Waal, 2008; Ferrera, 2014). The concept of differentiation of self includes balancing 
interpersonal autonomy and togetherness, emotional and intellectual balance and regulation, 
and is predictive of greater effortful control in adults (Skowron & Dendy, 2004). The 
connection between differentiation of self and effortful control in particular establishes that 
individuals who are better differentiated are also more likely to engage in self-regulation and 
rational thinking as opposed to emotional reactivity. Differentiation of self may allow for a 
prioritizing of cognitive empathy responses, which may promote more effective management 
of affective empathy (Lamm et al., 2007; Lamothe et al., 2014). Put another way, 
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differentiation of self may enhance the moderating effects of cognitive empathic processing, 
protecting mental health professionals from overreactive affective empathy responses. To 
date, however, no studies have explicitly examined differentiation of self as a component of 
empathy regulation. 
Therapists with Personal Trauma 
 Within the STS literature particularly, there exists empirical support for the 
assumption that personal trauma increases one’s vulnerability to indirect traumatic reactions 
(Hensel et al., 2015; Pearlman & Mac Ian, 1995). This pattern has been expanded in several 
recent studies examining the indirectly traumatizing effects of trauma-specific training in 
counseling and clinical graduate clinicians (Adams & Riggs, 2008) as well as social work 
graduate programs (Butler et al., 2017; Shannon et al., 2014a; Shannon et al., 2014b). Of 
particular importance in each of these studies is the surprising rate of personal trauma in the 
trainee samples. For example, Butler et al., (2017), in a sample of 195 social work graduate 
trainees, found that 41.7% endorsed experiencing retraumatization effects from graduate 
training. Shannon et al. (2014a), although in a much smaller sample, found that in their 
consensual qualitative examination of 17 social work trainees’ reactions in a trauma-
treatment course, 47% of this sample reported having a trauma in their background. 
Relatedly, 38.7% of Adams and Riggs’ (2008) 129 doctoral and master’s-level clinical and 
counseling student sample reported a personal history of trauma, suggesting that these rates 
may be roughly equal across mental health related graduate programs. In a sample of 
professional therapists, including social workers, master’s-level clinicians, psychologists, and 
nurses, 60% reported having a personal trauma history (Pearlman & Mac Ian, 1995). 
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Shannon et al. (2014a) and (2014b) discovered that survivor therapist trainees 
appeared to be more likely to experience negative emotional reactions, avoidance, hyper-
arousal, and reexperiencing symptoms (e.g., nightmares, etc.) in response to course work 
content like reading traumatic case studies and books written by traumatized authors. Butler 
et al. (2017) found that participants’ report of retraumatization experiences significantly 
accounted for training-related STS, such that students experiencing more retraumatization 
were more likely also to endorse STS reactions to both coursework and fieldwork (r = .44, p 
< .001). These findings suggest that a significant proportion of social work trainees involved 
in trauma work may be experiencing retraumatization due to trauma-related training, and as a 
result may experience higher levels of STS. This pattern has been established in some 
professional groups outside of graduate-level training; for example Dworkin, Sorell, and 
Allen (2016) found rape crisis center workers with a history of sexual abuse or assault 
experienced significantly higher STS symptoms than workers who did not have a history of 
sexual trauma.  
 Although these findings support the theoretical assumption that personal trauma 
history is a risk factor for STS reactions, they also raise the question of whether STS is 
distinct from post-traumatic stress disorder in those with personal trauma histories (Elwood 
et al., 2011). Few studies partial out or control for PTSD symptoms related specifically to 
one’s personal trauma when examining secondary stress in response to client trauma, but 
instead merely control for a history of personal trauma. This is problematic, as a history of 
personal trauma does not guarantee the presence of PTSD in relation to that trauma. Thus, 
reactions to one’s personal trauma may be a better predictor of future reactions to client 
trauma (Elwood et al., 2011; Creamer & Liddle, 2005). Creamer and Liddle (2005), for 
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example, found that although having a personal trauma history was not predictive of current 
stress reactions, participant report of having previously received personal therapy for their 
trauma was, such that mental health professionals who sought personal therapy for their own 
trauma predicted greater current trauma symptoms. Additionally, several studies have failed 
to find a significant relationship between personal trauma and adverse clinician reactions, 
suggesting variability in the degree to which personal trauma contributes to reactions like 
STS and countertransference (Adams et al., 2008; Khadambi & Truscott, 2004; Ortlepp & 
Friedman, 2002).  Because few studies seek to exclusively recruit survivor therapists, the 
connection between personal trauma reactions and reactions to clients remains murky. In 
fact, in their review of STS in clinicians, Elwood and colleagues (2011) found no studies that 
attempted to examine reactions to both direct traumatic experiences (one’s own personal 
trauma) and indirect traumatic experiences (client trauma exposure). There is far less in the 
literature regarding countertransference with therapists with personal trauma, despite a 
longstanding call for studies examining the “wounded healer,” (Hayes 2002, 2004). Although 
it seems clear that clinicians with personal trauma histories are more vulnerable to distress in 
reaction to client trauma work, the route of these reactions are unclear due to a lack of focus 
on survivor therapists specifically. 
Purpose Statement 
Although most professionals are aware of the damage that STS and unchecked 
countertransference can cause, little movement has been made regarding how best to prevent 
or manage these experiences, outside of the typical “self-care and supervision” platitudes 
(Kanter, 2007). With the likelihood that professionals in the trauma psychology field have 
experienced trauma themselves, and the significant rates of burnout and psychological 
  
38 
 
 
distress in helping professionals treating trauma (Hector et al., 2014), it is of paramount 
importance that we understand therapists’ reactions to their work. This being said, little 
empirical evidence has sought to understand the relationship, if any, between 
countertransference reactions and STS. It is likely that these two reactions relate positively, 
such that the more countertransference one feels towards a client, the more affected and 
potentially secondarily stressed they are as a result of that client’s trauma. However, 
countertransference comes in many forms, and in relation to treating trauma, there tends to be 
a pull towards either overinvolved or underinvolved reactions (Wilson et al., 1994). Because 
overinvolved reactions result in a preoccupation with one’s client beyond what is expected of 
the typical therapeutic relationship, it may be that those experiencing greater 
overinvolvement will also experience more STS, due to their preoccupation with the client. 
On the other hand, avoidance as is the case with underinvolved countertransference, may 
lead to further psychological distress. Understanding the relationship between these 
constructs can help to clarify our understanding of how they emerge in clinicians. 
Without understanding the distinct paths leading to STS and countertransference, 
clearer interventions cannot be proposed. Figley himself notes the confusion surrounding the 
theoretical path between empathy and STS, and makes a call for more research relating the 
two (Ludick & Figley, 2016). Specifically, he calls for research examining STS and both 
affective and cognitive dimensions of empathy. Furthermore, it is not enough to simply 
assess cognitive and affective empathy as distinct constructs. Rather, to best understand the 
consequences of one’s empathic ability, it is necessary to consider how the cognitive and 
affective components may interact (Cuff et al., 2016). Given the previous findings that 
cognitive empathy components can alter the effect of emotional responses on personal 
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distress, it is reasonable to expect that cognitive empathy can mitigate the effect of affective 
empathy, or emotional contagion, on therapist responses to trauma therapy.  
Researchers have also posited broader regulatory mechanisms that can affect 
empathic processing, including self-other differentiation and emotional regulation (Eisenberg 
& Eggum, 2009). Differentiation of self may be a helpful trait in facilitating the connection 
between empathy and mental health professionals’ negative reactions to trauma care, because 
healthy differentiation of self in relation to the family of origin results in more effective 
management of interpersonal and intrapersonal anxiety (Krycak et al., 2012; Lampis et al., 
2017). Through a firm sense of self as separate from the client, maintenance of a balanced 
distance from the client (i.e., neither fused nor cut off), and effective regulation of their own 
emotional responses, the intensity of STS and countertransference pulls may be reduced. In 
this way, mental health professionals’ greater ability to differentiate may allow them to more 
effectively manage their empathic connection within an emotionally charged, traumatized 
therapeutic space. Therefore, it is also likely that differentiation of self may moderate the 
path between empathy, particularly affective empathy, and therapist reactions. That being 
said, the effect of differentiation of self on empathic processing is likely more complex. It 
could be that one’s sense of differentiation moderates not only affective empathy, but one’s 
engagement in cognitive processing during emotional situations. Previous studies have found 
that priming an individual to self-differentiate allows for a type of perspective taking that 
leads to less psychological distress (Batson et al., 1997; Lamm et al., 2007). It could be that 
one’s inherent level of differentiation of self allows for greater recruitment of cognitively-
focused empathic processing during times of emotional intensity, as may occur within trauma 
therapy. This possibility would be in line with Bowenian theory (Bowen, 1978). Therefore, it 
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is important to examine the ways in which clinician differentiation of self interacts with both 
cognitive and affective empathy to either produce or mitigate therapist reactions like 
countertransference and STS. 
Finally, there is evidence to suggest that therapists with personal trauma may be more 
vulnerable to STS symptoms than those without personal trauma (Bride et al., 2007; Hensel 
et al., 2015). Relatedly, it is assumed that unresolved personal trauma can lead to 
overinvolved or detached countertransference reactions, which can result in 
countertherapeutic work (Slatker, 1987; Wilson & Lindy, 1991). However, few studies have 
sought to examine specifically mental health professionals with personal trauma, and to my 
knowledge, none within the STS and countertransference literature. This neglect creates a 
gap in our understanding of the emergence of secondary trauma and potential 
countertransference. By failing to specifically sample mental health professionals with 
personal trauma, most researchers do not have reason to collect a measure of distress due to 
one’s own PTSD. This practice obfuscates the potential overlap between the therapist’s STS 
from relating to their client work and potential lingering post-traumatic stress from their 
direct trauma. Thus, previous studies fail to demonstrate that the assumed vulnerability of 
therapists with personal trauma is unique to STS, and not instead due to lingering PTSD 
symptoms unrelated to one’s clinical work. One of the aims of this study is to examine the 
emergence of STS and countertransference over and above the presence of one’s PTSD in 
relation to a personal trauma. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study was to expand the present base of knowledge 
regarding STS and countertransference in a sample of mental health professionals currently 
treating traumatized clients, who have also experienced a Criterion A trauma themselves as 
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defined by the DSM-V, specifically those with “Exposure to actual or threatened death, 
serious injury, or sexual violence in one or more of the following ways: directly experiencing 
the traumatic event, witnessing in person the event as it occurred to others, [and] learning 
that the traumatic event occurred to a close family member or close friend,” (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 271) referred to as survivor therapists. Adding to the 
current literature, I examined the relationship between STS and countertransference 
reactions, which has yet to be done. Additionally, this study utilized more complete 
definition of empathy with both cognitive and affective mechanisms, as well as their possible 
interaction, thereby helping to clarify the complex relationship between empathy and 
problematic reactions in the trauma therapist. Particularly important is the addition of the 
Bowen Family Systems construct differentiation of self as a potential regulatory mechanism 
for empathic processes, which is believed to bridge the gap between one’s empathic 
capabilities and the potential consequences of empathic strain. Furthermore, by sampling 
survivor therapists specifically, this study sheds light on a portion of the professional 
community that is understudied and neglected in the present literature. The findings from this 
proposed study have important implications for how we understand empathy in the trauma 
therapy relationship, and expands the utility of differentiation of self as a protective therapist 
quality. Ultimately, these findings have implications for trauma therapy training, and the 
prevention and/or management of STS and countertransference reactions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MANUSCRIPT 
Introduction and Review of the Literature 
Mental healthcare is a demanding profession, which draws a substantial amount of 
emotional and physical energy from those who provide it. National surveys of mental 
healthcare workers, including social workers, counselors, psychologists, and mental health 
nurses demonstrate that psychological distress is a common problem in this professional 
community, finding high rates of suicidal ideation, depression, and anxiety related to mental 
health care workers’ practice (British Psychological Society, 2017; Kleespies et al., 2011). 
Mental health practitioners who work with traumatized individuals in particular are often 
subjected to repeated, detailed accounts of clients’ trauma. Previous research has 
dmonstrated that  that individuals who work with highly traumatized clients may experience 
difficulty with trust, intimacy, and self-esteem (Way et al., 2004), intrusion and avoidance 
symptoms (Bober & Regehr, 2006), difficulty with interpersonal relationships (Robinson-
Keilig, 2014), worse health perceptions (Lee et al., 2017), and negative countertransference 
towards traumatized clients (Cavanagh et al., 2015; Follette et al., 1994). Furthermore, 
researchers studying the effects of trauma work on mental health professionals have found 
that many helping professionals are survivors of trauma themselves (Adams & Riggs, 2008; 
Butler et al., 2017; Khadambi & Truscott, 2004; Pearlman & Mac Ian, 1995). In much of this 
research, however, personal trauma history has been captured only as an ancillary 
demographic variable, and the handful of studies that have specifically examined 
retraumatization in trauma work have only done so with samples of graduate-level trainees 
(Adams & Riggs, 2008; Butler et al., 2017; Shannon et al., 2014). Thus, little is known about 
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the experiences of mental health professionals with personal trauma histories who work with 
traumatized clients, hereafter referred to as survivor therapists. 
Several researchers have coined the term Secondary Traumatic Stress (STS) to 
describe certain negative changes in professionals treating trauma (Figley, 1995). STS is 
defined as a natural reaction that takes place after learning about a traumatizing event 
experienced by a significant other, such that the traumatized individual in this case is not 
directly experiencing the trauma, but rather experiences stress related to the indirect exposure 
to a traumatic event and the desire to help the traumatized person (Figley, 1995). The indirect 
exposure to trauma, combined with the individual’s empathic desire to help, leads to a stress 
reaction that includes symptoms similar to those of posttraumatic stress disorder like 
intrusive thoughts related to clients’ trauma, avoidance, and hyperarousal (Bride et al., 2004; 
Figley, 1995). This phenomenon has been observed in  multiple human service professions, 
including forensic interviewers (Perron, 2006), law enforcement (Bourke & Craun, 2014; 
Perez, 2010), nurses (Raunik et al., 2015), and child protective service workers (Bride et al., 
2007). In the current study, I focused on the impact of STS in mental health professionals. 
Other terms have arisen to describe experiences similar to STS in clinicians, including 
Compassion Fatigue (Figley, 1995) and Vicarious Traumatization (Pearlman & Mac Ian, 
1995). Compassion fatigue is conceptualized as a broader condition that occurs when both 
STS and occupational burnout are present over a period of time, and is not specific to those 
who treat traumatized clients (Figley, 1995). Vicarious trauma focuses primarily on the 
cognitive and worldview changes involved with repeated exposure to secondary trauma over 
time (Pearlman & Mac Ian, 1995). Though they are defined differently, there is little 
empirical evidence to support that vicarious trauma and STS are in fact different constructs, 
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and many within the field consider the two terms to be different descriptors of the same 
phenomenon (Bercier & Maynard, 2015; Craig & Sprang, 2010; Stamm, 2009). In an effort 
to capture the experience of working with traumatized clients specifically, this study used  
the construct of STS, but also summarizes literature related to compassion fatigue and 
vicarious trauma as overlapping constructs. 
Additionally, all therapists are subject to countertransference, or the therapist’s 
reaction to the client due in part to the therapist’s unresolved psychological conflicts (Gelso 
& Hayes, 2007). Without management, countertransference can lead to negative outcomes 
for clients and therapists alike (Hayes et al., 2011). Unmanaged countertransference has been 
related to therapist anxiety (Gelso et al., 2002), and counter-therapeutic behavior such as 
avoidance and withdrawal from the client or overinvolvement and enmeshment in client 
difficulties (Connery & Murdock, 2019; Fauth & Hayes, 2006). Wilson and colleagues 
(1994) classify two different forms of countertransference responses that are particularly 
common in trauma work: Type I countertransference responses, which is categorized by 
avoidant and detachment responses, and Type II, which comprises overidentification, 
enmeshment, and rescuing responses. Wilson and colleagues (1994) hypothesized that Type I 
countertransference responses are an attempt to protect the helper from the anxiety that 
comes with facing difficult client emotional content. Conversely, Type II countertransference 
represents misguided attempts to maintain empathic engagement with the client, and may be 
especially prevalent for helpers who have unmet needs or unresolved personal difficulties 
(Wilson et al., 1994). Although STS has been defined as a phenomenon distinct from 
countertransference, it is still a reaction to client material, yet there have been few attempts to 
examine these outcomes together to understand their possible relationship. (Kanter, 2007). 
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Examining STS and countertransference together in a sample of survivor trauma therapists 
may shed light on the connections between the two phenomena, which can lead to clarity 
regarding the management of both experiences (Kanter, 2007).  
One important link between STS and countertransference is the role of empathy in the 
emergence of these reactions. Within both STS and countertransference literature, empathy is 
seen as an essential ingredient for mental health treatment, especially for survivors of trauma 
(Peabody & Gelso, 1982; Figley, 1995). Both countertransference and STS have been 
considered a “pathology of empathy,” whereby a therapist’s openness to client suffering that 
is necessary to form a therapeutic relationship, can lead to personal distress if improperly 
managed (Van Wagoner et al., 1991; Lucick & Figley, 2016). Scholars in these respective 
areas of research (STS and countertransference) assert that well-managed empathy can 
actually protect therapists and mental health professionals from the deleterious effects of 
countertransference and STS alike (Hayes et al., 2011; Ludick & Figley, 2016; Van Wagoner 
et al., 1991). However, many studies examining STS and countertransference fail to include a 
comprehensive examination of the different dimensions of empathy, cognitive and affective, 
as informed by social neuroscientific research (Ludick & Figley, 2016), and far fewer 
attempt to explore what factors may help to regulate the empathic connection between 
therapist and client.  
It is likely that empathic regulation mechanisms are particularly salient for survivor 
therapists. It is thought that by empathically engaging in work with a client’s trauma, the 
therapist’s own traumatic difficulties may be triggered, leaving survivor therapists more 
vulnerable to STS and countertransference reactions (Pearlman & Saakvitine, 1995). 
However, some studies fail to find a link between personal trauma history and STS 
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symptoms, suggesting that there is variation in the degree to which personal trauma affects 
therapists’ reactions (Bober & Regher, 2006; Khadambi & Truscott, 2004). There is likely 
variation amongst survivor therapists regarding how they manage the empathic relationship 
with their survivor clients, which has implications for the emergence of STS symptoms and 
countertransference feelings. 
One construct that may help characterize the therapist’s ability to manage their 
empathic response and the accompanying stress is the Bowen family systems theory concept 
differentiation of self (Bowen, 1978). Differentiation of self has been defined as one’s ability 
to behave in emotionally mature and self-aware ways in stressful situations, and characterizes 
one’s ability to manage appropriate emotional connection without enmeshment or avoidance 
(MacKay, 2017). Although studied extensively within romantic or familial dyads, triads, and 
other relationship configurations, differentiation of self is under-examined as a desirable 
therapist quality and skill.  
In sum, there is a gap in the STS and countertransference literature exploring the 
complex relationship between aspects of therapist empathy and the effects of trauma work on 
the survivor therapist. Although personal trauma history is thought to be a risk factor for 
these phenomena, few studies have explored the population of survivor-clinicians 
specifically and the handful of studies that have examined personal trauma and 
retraumatization in mental health professions did so only with samples of graduate-level 
trainees (Adams & Riggs, 2008; Butler et al., 2017; Shannon, et al. , 2014). More research is 
needed to better understand how STS and countertransference might be related, how empathy 
plays a role in the emergence of these therapist reactions, and what therapist factors influence 
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the management of empathy so that it does not lead to deleterious outcomes for both survivor 
therapists and clients. 
Empathy 
Empathy is broadly defined as the ability to correctly interpret the emotions and 
perspectives of others and respond appropriately, and is universally seen as an essential 
component of therapy (Chrysikou & Thompson, 2016; Elliott et al., 2011). Modern 
conceptualizations of empathy typically include three components: an affective component in 
which a person shares in the emotional experience of another, a cognitive component in 
which a person can conceptualize and understand another’s experience, and a regulatory 
mechanism by which self- and other-feelings are kept distinct (Decety & Jackson, 2004; 
Eisenberg, 2000; Ickes, 2003). Affective empathy is defined as the ability to feel as another 
individual feels, involving an emotional reaction and regarded as “bottom-up” neurological 
processing (Batson, 2009; Lamonthe et al., 2014). Affective empathy is often referred to as 
emotional contagion, emotion that spreads from one individual to another (Doherty, 1997; 
Hatfield et al., 1994). Cognitive empathy, on the other hand, is “top-down,” and involves 
taking on the perspective of the other and understanding their internal state (Batson, 2009; 
Blair, 2005; Elliott et al., 2011). This process requires more sophisticated imaginal 
processing by which an individual comes to understand and account for the perspective of 
another (Doherty, 1997). Eisenberg and Eggum (2009) suggest that the quality of an 
individual’s self-regulation determines whether the overall empathic response leads to 
prosocial behaviors (i.e., empathic concern, the desire to help others), or personal distress, 
which often appears as anxiety or discomfort (Eisenberg & Eggum, 2009; Batson, 1991). 
Secondary Traumatic Stress and Empathy 
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 According to STS theory, the more empathic a clinician is, the more susceptible they 
are to STS (Figley, 1995; Ludick & Figley, 2016). However, as Ludick and Figley (2016, p. 
4) noted, there is a lack of empirical exploration concerning the role of empathy in the 
process of secondary traumatization. Of the studies that do exist, it appears that empathy may 
have mixed effects on the emergence of STS or compassion fatigue. For example, Thomas 
and Otis (2010) found that aspects of trait empathy positively predicted compassion fatigue. 
When therapist ability to practice mindfulness and emotional separation was entered into the 
predictive model, empathy was no longer a significant predictor, suggesting that emotion 
regulation skills may better account for variance shared between empathy and compassion 
fatigue (Thomas & Otis, 2010). Gleigerrcht and Decety (2013) found a positive and 
significant relationship between STS and a measure of affective empathy, but a non-
significant negative relationship between STS and a measure of cognitive empathy. These 
results suggest that affective and cognitive empathy may have different effects on STS.  
Conversely, Lamothe and colleagues (2014) found a surprising interaction when 
examining empathy and physician burnout; high cognitive and high affective empathy 
interacted to predict lower burnout symptoms. They concluded affective empathy, when 
regulated by high cognitive empathy, could result in positive outcomes for the clinicians; 
thus, it is important to consider the ways in which cognitive and affective empathy may 
interact. Whereas Lamothe et al. (2014) were the first to examine different aspects of 
empathy in combination with burnout in a sample of general practitioners, STS is a distinct 
reaction that occurs in helping professionals working with trauma specifically. For survivor 
therapists especially, it may be difficult to differentiate one’s own experience from the 
client’s experience, even while engaging in more cognitively empathic skills.  
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Countertransference and Empathy 
Countertransference and empathy, although theoretically related, appear to have a 
complex and poorly understood relationship (Peabody & Gelso, 1982). According to 
psychoanalytic theory, empathy and countertransference are related in that they both involve 
an identification with the client (Reik, 1964, as cited in Peabody & Gelso, 1982). This 
identification allows the mental health professional to better understand what the client is 
experiencing, feeling, and thinking. However, countertransference reactions seemingly occur 
when something goes awry within this identification process (Peabody & Gelso, 1982). It 
would thus be reasonable to expect that the more empathic the professional is, the more 
likely they are to be reactive to the client’s emotional experience. However, findings also 
suggest that the more empathic the individual, the more attuned they are to their own feelings 
as well, providing an opportunity for the self-reflection and emotional understanding 
necessary to address their own countertransference reactions (Fish, 1970; Peabody & Gelso, 
1982). Although less focused upon in the countertransference literature, there is evidence to 
suggest that empathy is indeed involved in the development of countertransference feelings, 
but also may be helpful in the regulation of therapist behavior in response to these feelings 
(Peabody & Gelso, 1982). 
Hayes et al. (2018) stated that therapist empathy is in part necessary for proper 
countertransference management. However, therapist empathy within this model is defined 
as “the ability to partially identify with and put one’s self in the other’s shoes,” (Hayes et al., 
2018, p. 498, emphasis added). Thus, in describing countertransference management, Hayes 
and colleagues are asserting that the therapist’s empathy itself must be managed, such that 
there is a partial identification with the client instead of an over- or under-identification with 
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a client. This perspective on empathy is consistent with Decety and Jackson’s (2004) and 
Eisenberg’s (2000) conceptualizations, whereby empathy requires an ability to step in and 
out of the emotional identification with another so that the empathizer does not lose sight of 
their sense of self. A weakening of this ability to remain involved but separate from the client 
results in what some refer to as empathic strain (Slatker, 1987). Empathic strain within the 
therapeutic relationship often results in affective reactions within the therapist, and intense 
affective reactions can subsequently cause negative countertransference reactions (Slatker, 
1987; Wilson & Lindy, 1991). In this way, mismanaged or strained empathy can result in a 
vulnerability to negative countertransference reactions. One can expect, then, that properly 
managed empathy, which includes an awareness of one’s partial identification with the client, 
would result in less vulnerability to negative countertransference reactions.  
The Regulation of Empathy 
Several theorists have hypothesized that the empathizing individual’s level of 
emotional self-regulation, as well as their ability to distinguish their own feelings from 
another’s, determines whether empathy evolves into a manageable, sympathetic response or a 
personally distressed response (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Decety & Lamm, 2009; Eisenberg 
& Eggum, 2009). Considering emotional self-regulation as an empathy regulator, high scores 
on adults’ self-reported effortful control positively related to reports of sympathy and 
negatively related to self-reported personal distress (Eisenberg & Okun, 1996; Okun et al., 
2000). Relatedly, emotion regulation appears to allow physicians to down-regulate their pain 
response, effectively mitigating their distress in response to seeing pain in others (Decety, et 
al., 2010). Additionally, it appears that priming self-other differentiation can facilitate 
cognitive empathic processes that help distance individuals from others’ pain (i.e., imagine 
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how they feel versus imagine how you would feel in this situation), and also results in 
reduced personal distress when interacting with or witnessing others in pain (Batson et al., 
1997; Heberlein & Saxe, 2005; Lamm et al., 2007). Given these findings, it seems important 
to consider regulatory mechanisms that allow an individual to feel for another and 
cognitively understand their perspective without losing the distinction between themselves 
and others and becoming emotionally distressed. Given previous findings that cognitive and 
affective empathy can interact to produce different outcomes, it may be that one’s inherent 
ability to down-regulate their emotional experience and clearly differentiate themselves from 
another allows for increased recruitment and integration of cognitive empathy responses as 
opposed to responding only with emotion (Decety et al., 2010; Lamothe et al., 2014). One 
variable that accounts for both supposed necessities for empathy management, emotion 
regulation and self-other distinction, is differentiation of self, a construct from Bowen Family 
Systems Theory (BFST). 
Differentiation of Self as a Facilitator of Empathy 
 Differentiation of self refers to an individual’s ability to differentiate one’s self in 
relation to their family-of-origin, as well as to distinguish thought from feeling (Kerr & 
Bowen, 1988). Differentiation of self is broken down even further into four factors that 
measure interpersonal (i.e., Emotional Cutoff and Fusion) and intrapersonal (i.e., I-Position 
and Emotional Reactivity) dimensions (Skowron & Friedlander, 1998). Intrapersonal 
differentiation of self refers to one’s ability to distinguish emotional experiences from 
intellectual thought. Higher levels of differentiation of self, in this case, are characterized by 
less emotional reactivity, better stress management, and a stronger capacity to maintain one’s 
own sense of autonomy in stressful situations (i.e., I-position; Kerr & Bowen, 1988). 
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Interpersonally, higher levels of differentiation are characterized by a greater comfort with 
intimacy while still being able to maintain personal independence; therefore, those with 
higher levels of differentiation of self are able to maintain appropriate boundaries with others 
especially during times of duress, without keeping too much distance and without fusing 
entirely with others when stress and anxiety occur (Kerr, 1984; Kerr & Bowen, 1988; 
Skowron & Schmitt, 2003).  
According to Bowen, an individual’s level of differentiation of self is established 
within the family-of-origin and carried into that individual’s future relationships, making 
one’s level of differentiation a stable and persistent trait (Kerr & Bowen, 1988). Thus, one’s 
relationship with their caregivers and the family emotional system determines one’s ability to 
differentiate from others—healthy family functioning begets healthier levels of child 
differentiation, whereas abusive family dynamics often predicts dysfunction in the child’s 
future relationships (MacKay, 2012). Indeed, mothers with lower levels of differentiation of 
self are at higher risk for child maltreatment (Skowron, Kozlowski, & Pincus, 2010). 
Pertinent to the present study, although experiencing adverse childhood events can have a 
negative impact on the child’s development of differentiation of self, negative family 
emotional processes (predicted by parental differentiation of self) appear to compound the 
effects of childhood trauma to predict lower levels of differentiation of self in adulthood 
(Swanberg-Hejelm, 2020). As a trait associated with interpersonal and intrapersonal 
functioning, differentiation of self has been examined in a variety of contexts outside of the 
family of origin, including romantic relationships (Stapley & Murdock, 2020), stress 
management in college students (Murdock & Gore, 2012), and countertransference 
management in mental health therapists (Connery & Murdock, 2019). Indeed, a broad base of 
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literature has formed using differentiation of self as an explanation for or modifier of self-
regulation, including perceptions of distress, stress management, effortful control, and coping 
(Krycak et al., 2012; Peleg-Popko, 2002; Skowron & Dendy, 2004; Skowron et al., 2004; 
Wright, 2009). Notably, differentiation of self has been found as a protective factor against 
vicarious trauma (Halevi & Idisis, 2018; Zerach, 2014) and countertransference feelings 
(Connery & Murdock, 2019). 
To better understand the relationship between therapist differentiation of self and 
therapist reactions, this study focused on the regulation of empathy as it pertains to STS and 
countertransference reactions in survivor therapists, and the role that differentiation of self in 
the path between empathy and these reactions. Bowen (1978) predicted that managing the 
needs of others within emotional contexts necessarily increases anxiety. Once this anxiety 
reaches intolerable levels, Ferrera (2014) contended, predictable relationship patterns in 
accordance with Bowenian theory emerge: distancing from the individual whose relationship 
induces anxiety as a means to avoid the distress, or over-involvement with the relationship in 
an effort to “fix” the problem and eradicate the tension. These reactions are similar to 
clinician countertransference and STS reactions (Bride, 2007; Hayes et al., 2018). If 
differentiation of self in relation to the family of origin allows an individual to more 
effectively tolerate interpersonal and intrapersonal anxiety and maintain healthy relational 
boundaries, it is likely that the effect of empathy on STS and countertransference reactions 
may be altered by one’s level of differentiation of self—particularly if emotion regulation 
and self-other differentiation are needed for the recruitment of cognitive processing to temper 
the affective empathic response, as suggested by Decety and colleagues (2010). Put another 
way, differentiation of self may enhance the moderating effects of cognitive empathic 
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processing, protecting mental health professionals from overreactive affective responses. To 
date, however, no studies have explicitly examined differentiation of self as a component of 
empathy regulation. 
Present Study 
The purpose of this study was to expand the base of knowledge regarding STS and 
countertransference in a sample of mental health professionals currently treating traumatized 
clients, who have also experienced a trauma themselves, referred to as survivor therapists. 
Trauma in this case is defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder-
V’s Posttraumatic Stress Disorder criteria [i.e., “Exposure to actual or threatened death, 
serious injury, or sexual violence in one or more of the following ways: directly experiencing 
the traumatic event, witnessing in person the event as it occurred to others, [and] learning 
that the traumatic event occurred to a close family member or close friend,” (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 271)]. This study contributes to the gap in the literature in a 
number of ways. First, by sampling survivor therapists specifically, this study sheds light on 
a portion of the professional community that is understudied and neglected in the present 
literature. This is a notable limitation considering the ubiquity of trauma and the deleterious 
effects traumatic experiences can have on survivors psychologically, physiologically, and 
professionally. Second, I sought to examine the relationship between STS and common 
countertransference reactions to traumatized clients, which has yet to be done. Third, I 
examined cognitive and affective empathy as predictors of both countertransference and 
STS; although there is some empirical evidence regarding the link between empathy and 
STS, there are few empirical findings that test the relationship between empathy and 
countertransference reactions. To help clarify the complex relationship between empathy and 
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reactions in the trauma therapist, this study utilized a comprehensive definition of empathy 
with both cognitive and affective mechanisms, as well as their possible interaction. Lastly 
and particularly important is the addition of the Bowen Family Systems construct 
differentiation of self as a potential regulatory mechanism for empathic processes. The 
following research questions and hypotheses guided this study: 
Hypotheses 
1. STS will be positively related to overinvolved and underinvolved 
countertransference reactions.  
2. Affective empathy will be positively related to STS. Empirical findings regarding 
cognitive empathy and STS are mixed, with some researchers finding negligible 
relationships between the two (Gleichgerrcht & Decety, 2013). Therefore, no 
hypothesis was made regarding the relationship between cognitive empathy and 
STS.  
3. Differentiation of self will be positively related to cognitive empathy. Findings 
regarding affective empathy and differentiation of self are mixed; therefore no 
hypothesis was made regarding the relationships between affective empathy and 
differentiation of self. 
4. Differentiation of self will be negatively related to both STS and both types of 
countertransference reactions. 
5. Cognitive empathy, affective empathy, and differentiation of self will predict STS 
and countertransference reactions over and above relevant covariates (i.e., 
personal trauma PTSD levels, level of experience, trauma caseload exposure, age, 
and gender).  
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6. Cognitive empathy will moderate the positive relationship between affective 
empathy and STS and countertransference reactions in such a way that greater 
cognitive empathy will mitigate the effect of affective empathy on the outcome 
variables. 
7. Differentiation of self will moderate the positive relationship between affective 
empathy and STS and countertransference reactions in such a way that greater 
differentiation of self will mitigate the effect of affective empathy on the outcome 
variables. 
Research Questions 
1. Does STS relate more strongly to Type II (overinvolved) countertransference 
reactions than to Type I (underinvolved) countertransference reactions? 
2. Do cognitive and affective empathy relate to countertransference reactions? Are 
there differential relationships between cognitive and affective empathy and the 
two countertransference reaction measures. 
3. Does differentiation of self influence the degree to which cognitive empathy 
moderates the effect of affective empathy on survivor therapist reactions to 
trauma therapy (i.e., STS and countertransference reactions)? Please see Figure 1 
for a conceptual diagram of this research question. 
Method 
Participants 
 The obtained sample consisted of 245 participants that met the following eligibility 
criteria: (a) the participant has practiced independently (i.e., not a trainee) for at least one 
year, (b) the participant self-identifies as being exposed to a Criterion A direct trauma as 
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defined by the DSM-V (definition provided, limited to directly experiencing a traumatic 
event, witnessing in person a traumatic event as it happened to others, or learning about a 
traumatic event happening to a close family member or friend), and (c) the participant is 
currently treating at least one client with trauma as their presenting concern. G*Power 
analysis was used to estimate that a sample of 244 participants was needed to detect a small 
effect size (.05) with statistical power of β = .80 with 4 tested predictors and 8 total 
predictors (Faul et al., 2009). I succeeded in collecting the required minimum sample size.  
Participants ranged in age from 23 to 71, with an average age of 38.31 (SD = 10.40). 
They were able to write in their gender identity and sexual orientation; Two-hundred and 
twenty-four participants identified as female/woman (91.4%), twelve identified as male/man 
(4.9%), eight identified as non-binary, gender queer, or gender fluid (3.3%), and one 
participant did not respond (0.4%). One-hundred and eighty participants identified as 
heterosexual/straight (73.5%), thirteen identified as gay or lesbian (5.3%), twenty-seven 
identified as bisexual (11%), twelve identified as queer (4.9%), eight identified as pansexual 
(3.3%), two identified as asexual (0.8%), and three did not respond (1.2%). Regarding racial 
identity, two-hundred and twelve identified as Non-Hispanic White (86.5%), thirteen 
identified as Hispanic/Latinx (5.3%), twelve identified as multiracial/multiethnic (4.9%), 
four identified as Black/African American (1.6%), two identified as Middle Eastern (0.8%), 
and two identified as Native American, American Indian, or Indigenous (0.8%).  
Participants were asked how many years and months they had been practicing in the 
field professionally (i.e., outside of training) and for how many years and months they had 
been working with traumatized clients. Their answers were then calculated in relation to 
years (e.g., 7 years and 4 months = 7.33 years). The amount of time practicing in the mental 
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health field ranged from 1 year to 45.67 years, with an average length of 7.93 years (SD = 
7.23). The amount of time participants had been working with traumatized clients ranged 
from .08 years (approximately one month) to 45.42 years, with an average length of 7.55 
years (SD = 6.85). The majority of the sample (n = 239, 97.6%) practiced within the United 
States. Regarding professional affiliation, one-hundred and twenty responded that they were 
mental health counselors or therapists (included marriage and family therapists; 49%), 
seventy-nine participants identified that they were clinical social workers (32.2%), forty five 
responded that they were psychologists (18.4%), and one individual responded that they were 
a psychiatrist (0.4%). Psychologists and the psychiatrist were included together in 
demographic analyses to allow for comparison between professional groups. Regarding the 
timeframe of their own personal trauma, one-hundred and thirty-six indicated that they 
experienced traumatic events in both childhood and adulthood (55.5%), sixty-three 
participants indicated that their personal traumatic event happened in childhood only (before 
age 18; 25.7%), and forty-six indicated that the event happened in adulthood only (18.8%).  
Ninety-one participants reported that they were currently receiving therapy for their 
own personal trauma (37.1%), and two-hundred and ten participants reported that they 
received therapy for their personal trauma in the past (85.7%). One-hundred and fifty 
participants responded that they were currently receiving supervision (61.2%), sixty-six 
reported that they were currently attending a professional consultation group specific to 
trauma treatment (26.9%), and seventy-one participants reported that they currently provide 
supervision to other clinicians in training who treated clients with trauma (29%). Participants 
were asked to estimate the percentage of time that they have spent working with trauma 
during their regular practice within the past six months. Responses ranged from 5% to 100%, 
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with an average percentage of 65.38% (SD = 27.06). Participants were also asked to estimate 
the percentage of clients they currently treat with a DSM-5 defined Criterion A trauma as 
their presenting concern. Responses ranged from 5% to 100%, with an average percentage of 
28.42% (SD = 59.38). 
Participants were also asked to identify what kind of traumatic events they 
experienced, through use of the Life Events Checklist-5. Participants were able to choose as 
many events as applicable and were also able to select whether they experienced the event 
directly, witnessed it happening to someone else, or learned about it happening to a close 
family member or friend. Many participants experienced the same event across different 
means of transmission (i.e., experienced it directly and witnessed it happening to others). The 
percentages of traumas experienced by the sample are reported in Table 1. Some of the most 
directly experienced traumas included an unwanted or uncomfortable sexual experience 
(74.3% of the entire sample), sexual assault (61.2%), physical assault (52.7%), and serious 
transportation accident (41.6%). 
Procedures 
 I used a quantitative descriptive design with convenience sampling. Participants were 
recruited over the internet through postings on professional organization listservs relevant to 
the trauma therapy profession whom allowed for listserv recruitment. These include 
American Psychological Association divisions 17 (Society of Counseling Psychology), 18 
(Psychologists in Public Service), 19 (Society of Military Psychology), 29 (Society for the 
Advancement of Psychotherapy), 35 (Society for the Psychology of Women), 42 
(Psychologists in Independent Practice), and 43 (Society for Couple and Family Psychology). 
Participants were also recruited from the American Counseling Association (ACA) via online 
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posts to the ACA Connect page. Additional participants were recruited from reputable social 
media groups devoted to mental health practitioners. A snowball sampling method was 
encouraged by asking participants to refer the study to their networks and individuals who 
might be interested.  
 Prior to engaging in the study, participants were informed regarding the purpose, 
methods, and potential risks for participation in the study. Informed consent was obtained 
from all participants. In order to ensure participant confidentiality, no personally identifying 
information (e.g., names, addresses) was collected, and all data has been stored on university-
approved, password-protected, cloud-based storage system (i.e., Box), to which only primary 
research members have access. Given the sensitive nature of some survey questions, 
resources for the National Association of Mental Illness (NAMI) was provided prior to 
beginning the questionnaire. 
Measures 
 Demographic form. Participants meeting the eligibility criteria were first directed to 
a demographics form, which included relevant personal and professional questions regarding 
age, gender identity, racial identity, the country in which they practice, their income, highest 
degree obtained, professional affiliation, length of time in the field, length of time practicing 
trauma-specific therapy, what kind of trauma-specific training they have received, level of 
exposure to client traumatic material (percentage of time spent working with trauma, 
percentage of clients with a Criterion A trauma as their presenting concern), timeframe of 
their personal trauma (childhood, adulthood, both), if they are receiving personal therapy 
(yes, no), if they are currently supervised (yes, no), and if they are currently supervising 
clinicians in training who also treat traumatized clients. These demographic questions are in 
  
61 
 
 
line with previous who have found relationships between these characteristics and secondary 
traumatic stress, countertransference, or other related constructs (e.g., compassion fatigue 
and burnout; Adams & Riggs, 2008; Elwood et al., 2011; Hensel et al., 2015; Khadambi & 
Truscott, 2004; Pearlman & Mac Ian, 1995; Robinson-Keilig, 2014). 
 Measuring personal trauma. As a group consisting of survivor therapists, it is 
important to understand the degree to which the sample is currently traumatized, and the 
nature of their traumatic experiences. In order to measure personal trauma, this study used 
the Life Events Checklist for the DSM-V (LEC-5; Weathers et al., 2013) and the PTSD 
Checklist for the DSM-V (PCL-5; Weathers et al., 2013). Both questionnaires can be found 
in Appendix E. 
 Life Events Checklist for the DSM-V. To measure personal trauma exposure, this 
study used a modified version of the Life Events Checklist for the DSM-V (LEC-5; Weathers 
et al., 2013). The LEC was created in conjunction with the Clinician Administered PTSD 
Scale (CAPS) by the National Center for PTSD in Boston, Massachusetts as a means of 
assessing exposure to a Criterion A trauma across the lifespan for the purpose of PTSD 
diagnosis, as defined by the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (Gray et al., 2004). The LEC-5 
contains 17 potentially traumatizing events, each satisfying the Criterion A requirement for a 
diagnosis of PTSD [e.g., “Natural Disaster (for example, flood, hurricane, tornado, 
earthquake),” “Assault with a weapon (for example, being shot, stabbed, threatened with a 
knife, gun, bomb),” and “Sexual assault (rape, attempted rape, made to perform any type of 
sexual act through force or threat of harm)”]. In response to each event, participants are given 
the option to choose “Happened to me,” “Witnessed it,” “Learned about it [happening to 
close family or friend],” “Part of my job,” “Not sure,” and “Doesn’t apply.” As a means of 
  
62 
 
 
capturing direct personal trauma, this study focused on the traumatic events chosen as 
directly happening to the participant, the participant witnessed directly, or about which the 
participant learned happened to a close family member or friend. This measure will also 
serve as a validation point, screening out participants who do not endorse having experienced 
a traumatic event directly, witnessing it happen to another individual in person, or learning 
about a trauma happening to a close family member or friend. The LEC-5 has no formal 
scoring; rather, it will be used as a means of helping to describe the study sample.  
In a sample of 108 non-treatment seeking undergraduate students, the LEC-5 
demonstrated a mean kappa for .61 for all items, with a retest correlation of r = .82, p < .001, 
comparable to a well-studied measure of traumatic exposure (Traumatic Life Events 
Questionnaire; Gray et al., 2004). The LEC also demonstrated strong convergence with the 
Traumatic Life Events Questionnaire (TLEQ). The average kappa coefficient between 
individual items was .55, and the total scale correlation between the two measures was -.55, p 
< .001 (lower scores on the LEC represent more direct exposure to trauma; Gray et al., 2004). 
In this sample, the LEC was strongly and significantly related to two well-validated measures 
of PTSD symptoms in the expected direction (PTSD Checklist and Modified PTSD 
Symptom Scale; r = -.48 and -.44 respectively, p < .05). Additionally, in a sample of 131 
combat veterans seeking evaluation at the National Center for PTSD in Boston, the LEC was 
significantly correlated with diagnostic measures of PTSD, including the Mississippi Scale 
for Combat-Related PTSD (r = -.33, p < .001), the PTSD checklist (r = -.43, p < .01), and the 
CAPS (r = -.39, p < .01), demonstrating concurrent validity. The LEC has been used in 
previous studies assessing STS (Ivicic & Motta, 2017). 
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 PTSD Checklist for the DSM-V. In order to assess current level of post-traumatic 
stress disorder symptoms related to participants’ direct and personal trauma, I used the PTSD 
Checklist for the DSM-V (PCL-5; Weathers et al., 2013). The PCL-5 is a 21-item measure 
used to assess for the presence of diagnostically significant PTSD symptoms, as defined by 
the DSM-5. The measure is based on the 4-factor DSM-5 model of PTSD, which includes 
intrusion/reexperiencing symptoms (i.e., recurrent trauma-related dreams), avoidance 
symptoms (e.g., avoiding people or places that are reminders of the traumatic event), 
negative alterations in cognitions and mood (e.g., exaggerated negative beliefs about oneself, 
others, or the world), and hyperarousal symptoms (e.g., exaggerated startle response; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Blevins et al., 2015). Typically, however, the 
measure is used as a full scale score calculated by summing all items, and ranges from 0-80 
with higher scores indicating a higher frequency and severity of PTSD symptoms. A score of 
30 or above indicates the possibility of diagnosable PTSD (Blevins et al., 2015). Within the 
present sample 16% scored above 30 on the PCL-5, which is similar with other samples of 
this size (Olashore et al., 2018; Santiago et al., 2013). The measure has demonstrated strong 
internal consistency in a sample of 278 trauma-exposed undergraduate students (81 men, 197 
women), with a Cronbach’s alpha of .94 (Blevins et al., 2015). The PCL-5 total scores also 
demonstrated good test-retest reliability in 53 of the aforementioned participants over one 
week (r = .82, 95% CI [.71, .89]). The measure demonstrated convergent and discriminant 
validity, with strongest correlations with other well-validated measure of PTSD symptoms 
(rs ranged from .84-.85, p < .01), a moderate correlation with the often related but distinct 
construct depression as measured by the Personality Assessment Inventory (r = .60, p < .01), 
and correlating least strongly with less related constructs like antisocial personality features 
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(r = .39, p < .01) and mania (r = .31, p < .01), also measured with the Personality Assessment 
Inventory (Blevins et al., 2015). Congruent results were established in a second sample of 
558 separate undergraduate students (Blevins et al., 2015). The PCL-5 asks participants to 
indicate how much difficulty they are having with PTSD-congruent symptoms over the last 
month on a 5 point Likert scale (Not at all, a little bit, moderately, quite a bit, extremely). 
Items refer back to “the stressful experience,” with the goal of having participants respond to 
how often they experience these symptoms as a result of their trauma. To make clear that 
participants in the present study should answer regarding their own personal trauma (as 
opposed to indirect trauma they receive from doing therapy), the phrase “stressful 
experience” was replaced with “personal trauma.” Both Cronbach’s alpha and McDonald’s 
omega for the current study were .94. 
Measuring empathy. Measuring empathy is often tricky, as most self-report 
instruments by nature of reflection tend to capture mostly cognitive empathy, or are misused 
to represent affective empathy when the factor structure of the measure supports no such 
action (Chrysikou & Thompson, 2016). With regards to survey research, questionnaires are 
the dominant means of measuring empathy, and while questionnaires are easy to use and 
present some advantages, they do not typically elicit an empathic or affective response, 
making it difficult to truly capture affective empathy (Chrysikou & Thompson, 2016). Thus, 
I used both questionnaires and the Pictorial Empathy Test (Lindeman et al., 2018) which is 
easily administered over the internet to better assess the cognitive and affective dimensions 
of empathy. Both affective and cognitive empathy measures can be found in Appendix F. 
Affective empathy. Affective empathy was measured by the Pictorial Empathy Test. 
The development of the Pictorial Empathy Test (PET; Lindeman et al., 2018) was inspired by 
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the Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET; Dziobek et al., 2008), which is composed of 46 
photographs of differing contexts and distressed people in these contexts. Lindeman and 
colleagues (2018) describe that the use of photographs in an ecologically valid means of 
assessing affective empathy, as the facial expressions of emotions are central to generating 
the emotional resonance necessary for other-emotion recognition and empathic behavior. 
Indeed, viewing emotional faces has been found to elicit facial mimicry behavior, which 
occurred in conjunction with emotional cue recognition as measured by functional magnetic 
resonance imagery (fMRI; Balconi et al., 2011). Using fMRI technology, Balconi and 
colleagues (2011) also identified that both facial mimicry and emotional cue recognition 
were both facilitated by medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) activity; when the MPFC was 
inhibited via transcranial magnetic stimulation, performance on emotional recognition and 
facial mimicry was also inhibited, suggesting that emotional cue recognition and emotional 
facial mimicry are interrelated behaviors facilitated by conjunctive neural structures.  
In order to select the most emotionally salient photographs for use in their scale, 
Lindeman and colleagues (2018) collected 22 freely-licensed images of various adults and 
children in distress using the search terms such as “sad, scared, fear, fright, disabled persons, 
and war” (Lindeman et al., 2018, p. 432). These photographs were presented along with the 
question, “How emotionally moving do you find the photograph?” to 91 Finnish participants 
(age range from 23-71, 49% women). Participants were given the option to choose a response 
on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all, 2 = a little bit, 3 = it arouses some feelings, 4 = 
quite a lot, and 5 = very much; Lindeman et al., 2018). Based on these findings, 15 photos 
were eliminated for eliciting lower empathy ratings, and the 7 which remained demonstrated 
good internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .90). Responses to each item are averaged to 
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form a full scale score. Scores range from 1-5, with higher scores indicating greater affective 
empathy response. 
In a second study, the 7-photo PET was then used in a sample of 3,084 Finnish 
individuals to establish factor structure, and collect evidence of convergent and divergent 
validity. The authors ran Confirmatory Factor Analysis to test a measurement model in which 
each of the seven items loaded onto one latent affective empathy factor, with errors between 
conceptually similar photographs allowed to covary, in accordance with best practices as 
defined by Cole, Maxwell, Arvey, and Salas (1993) and Crawford and Henry (2004). Model 
fit statistics indicated good fit: X2 (5) = 45.34, p < .001, SRMR = .01, CFI = .99, and RMSEA 
= .053 (Lindeman et al., 2018). Factor loadings ranged from .64 to .90.  
Evidence of convergent and divergent validity was found in the strong relationship 
between the PET and the Empathy Quotient short scale total score (r = .48, p < .001); PET 
scores were  strongly correlated with the emotional reactivity subscale of the measure (r = 
.53, p < .001). The PET also showed a moderate positive relationship with intuitive thinking 
style (r = .21, p < .001) which has been previously shown to relate to affective empathic 
reactions and emotion appraisal, and a near zero relationship with analytical thinking style (r 
= -.08, p < .001; note that the large sample size likely affects the significance of this 
relationship despite its small effect size). The PET was also strongly and negatively 
correlated with symptoms of Autism Spectrum Disorder (-.32, p < .001), which was notable 
and expected by the authors. Although one study found that ASD is primarily characteristic 
of deficits in cognitive empathy (Dziobek et al., 2008), others have demonstrated deficits in 
both cognitive and affective empathy, particularly if the faces presented are unfamiliar to the 
observer, which is the case with the PET (Gillespie et al., 2014; Mathersul et al., 2013). 
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Finally, in a third random sample of 114 individuals from study 2 sent seven weeks after the 
first administration of the PET, the PET demonstrated good test-retest reliability (r = .77, p < 
.001). Lindeman et al. (2018) found support for convergent validity, correlating strongly and 
positively with affective empathy subscale of the Basic Empathy Scale in Adults (r = .46, p < 
.001) and less strongly with the cognitive empathy subscale of the same measure (r = .26, p < 
.005). Both Cronbach’s alpha and McDonald’s omega for the current study were .88. 
Cognitive empathy. Cognitive empathy was measured using the Cognitive Empathy 
dimension of the Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCAE; Reniers et al., 
2011). The QCAE was developed by combining items from other, well-validated measures of 
self-report empathy (EQ; Baron-Cohen et al., 2003; HES; Hogan, 1969; IVE; Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1978; and the IRI; Davis, 1983). Two subject matter experts rated each item as 
either measuring cognitive empathy, affective empathy, or neither (Reniers et al., 2011). 
After a series of exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, the final scale was a 31-item, 
4-point forced-choice Likert scale (strongly agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree, and 
strongly disagree). The QCAE is divided into 5 subscales with a higher order two-factor 
organization of cognitive and affective empathy. The cognitive empathy dimension contains 
the perspective taking (10 items) and online simulation (9 items) scales. Perspective taking 
refers to the ability to intuitively put oneself in another’s shoes and understand their 
perspective, and involves shared skills with theory of mind with a focus on emotional 
understanding and processing (e.g., “I can pick up quickly if someone says one thing but 
means another,”). Online simulation, on the other hand, refers to an effortful attempt to put 
oneself in another’s position by imagining the emotional experience of that person (e.g., “I 
try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision,”). Lindeman et al. 
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(2018) stated that this skill is likely used to generate future intentions. Responses on these 
subscales are summed to produce a full scale cognitive empathy score. Scores range from 19-
76 with higher scores indicating greater cognitive empathy.   
The Perspective taking and online simulation subscales demonstrated good reliability 
(Cronbach’s alphas of .85 and .83, respectively). Strong associations were found between the 
subscales and the higher-order cognitive empathy factor (.72 for perspective taking, .75 for 
online simulation, ps < .01). Evidence for convergent validity was found in a sample of 925 
European individuals (79% within the United Kingdom, age range 16-65, 69% women) that 
produced strong correlations between both the affective and cognitive subscales of the Basic 
Empathy Scale (r = .62, p < .001 and r = .76, p < .001, respectively). Evidence was also 
found for construct validity with a strong negative correlation with a measure of psychopathy 
(r = -.38, p < .001) and a moderate negative relationship with a measure of Machiavellianism 
(r = -.26, p < .001; Reniers et al., 2011). Additionally, the cognitive empathy scale negatively 
correlated with dysfunctional impulsivity (i.e., behavior involving acting with little foresight, 
which then leads to difficulty; r = -.33, p < .001). Lindeman and colleagues (2018) also 
examined differences between affective and cognitive empathy in their relationships with 
related measures, and found that cognitive empathy correlated negatively with dysfunctional 
impulsivity and secondary psychopathology more so than affective empathy, and that 
affective empathy correlated more strongly (positive) with affective anger and expressive 
aggression than did cognitive empathy, which is in line with previous hypotheses that 
emotional lability is likely to affect affective empathy more so than cognitive empathy 
(Jollife & Farrington, 2006; Tully et al., 2016). It should be noted that empathy scores tend to 
vary as a function of gender, and in their development and validation of the QCAE, the 
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authors found a significant difference between men and women such that women had 
significantly higher empathy scores. Because both lower order (use of subscales separately) 
and higher order (one cognitive empathy scale and one affective empathy scale) fit the 
author’s data, I performed an exploratory factor analysis to assess whether or not to use the 
full scale cognitive empathy score or analyze the Perspective Taking and Online Simulation 
scales separately. These results are discussed in the preliminary analysis section. Both 
Cronbach’s alpha and McDonald’s omega for the current study were .75 for the Perspective 
Taking subscale. Cronbach’s alpha for the Online Simulation subscale was .75 for the current 
study, while McDonald’s omega was .77. 
Differentiation of self. Differentiation of Self was measured via the Differentiation 
of Self Inventory-Short Form (DSI-SF; Drake et al., 2015), which is a 20-item self-report 
measure based on the 46-item Differentiation of Self Inventory Revised (DSI-R; Skowron & 
Schmitt, 2003). Participants responded to items on a 6-point Likert-like scale from (1) not at 
all characteristic of me to (6) very characteristic of me. The scale contains four subscales: 
Emotional Cutoff (EC, 3 items), Emotional Reactivity (ER, 6 items), Ability to take the I-
Position (IP, 6 items), and Fusion of Self with Others (FO, 5 items). Example items include 
"I tend to distance myself when people get too close to me" (EC), "At times, I feel as if I'm 
riding an emotional roller coaster" (ER), "I'm fairly self-accepting" (IP), and "I often feel 
unsure when others are not around to help me make a decision" (FO). In order to calculate 
subscale scores, appropriate items are reverse scored and averaged. Full scale scores are the 
average of subscale scores. Scores range from 1-6, and higher scores indicate higher levels of 
differentiation of self. Full scale scores will be used for main analyses, as Drake et al. (2015) 
demonstrated that full scale scores are reliable, retaining 96% of the internal reliability of the 
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DSI-R with only 43% of the items. Although the authors use full scale scores as well as 
subscale scores, no formal higher order factor analysis was explored with this scale. 
Therefore, the present study used exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to assure that the use of a 
full scale score is appropriate, discussed in the preliminary analysis section. Convergent 
validity has been found linking total and subscale scores of the DSI-SF with measures of 
perceived stress, depressive symptoms, and anxiety (negative relationships; Drake et al., 
2015). It was also found to positively relate with self-esteem and the Level of Differentiation 
of Self Scale (Drake et al., 2015). Drake et al. (2015) found a Cronbach’s alpha of .88 for the 
full scale, and alphas of .79, .80, .68, and .70 for the EC, ER, FO, and IP subscales, 
respectively. The DSI-SF is found in Appendix G. Cronbach’s alpha for the current study 
was .90, and McDonald’s omega was .91. 
Secondary Traumatic Stress. Secondary Traumatic Stress was measured by the 
Secondary Traumatic Stress Scale (STSS; Bride et al., 2004). The STSS is a widely used 
measure of secondary stress in relation to therapeutic work with traumatized clients. 
Participants were asked to indicate how frequently over the past seven days they have 
experienced 17 relevant symptoms on a five-point Likert scale, from Never (1) to Very Often 
(5). In order to accommodate clinicians whose traumatized clients may have canceled within 
the past week, the instructions were modified, asking participants to indicate how frequently 
over the past month they have experienced the listed symptoms. The measure is structured in 
three factors according to the DSM-IV criteria for PTSD, as demonstrated by confirmatory 
factor analysis: Intrusion (e.g., “Reminders of my work with clients upsets me”), Avoidance 
(e.g., “I wanted to avoid working with some clients”), and Arousal (e.g., “I felt 
jumpy”)(Bride et al., 2004). In a sample of 287 licensed social workers, the STSS evidenced 
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good internal reliability, with a full scale Cronbach’s alpha of .93 and subscale alphas of .80, 
.87, and .83 for Intrusion, Avoidance, and Arousal respectively (Bride et al., 2004). The 
STSS has also demonstrated convergent validity with strong, positive correlations with a 
measure of depression (r = .50, p < .002) and anxiety (r = .55, p < .002). STSS also 
demonstrated moderate correlations with a measure of the extent to which their client 
population is traumatized (r = .26, p < .002) and the frequency with which their work 
addresses traumatic stress (r = .23, p < .002; Bride et al., 2004). Bride et al. (2004) also 
concluded that the STSS demonstrates discriminant validity with non-significant 
relationships with demographic variables, including age, ethnicity, and income. Subscale 
scores are calculated by summing responses to items within the subscale, and full scale 
scores are calculated by summing all items. Scores range from 17-85 with higher scores 
indicating greater secondary traumatic stress. Full scale scores are used for main analyses. 
The STSS is found in Appendix H. Both Cronbach’s alpha and McDonald’s omega for the 
current study were .89. 
Countertransference. For the purposes of this study, countertransference was 
conceptualized via Type I and Type II reactions, as proposed by Wilson and Lindy (1991). 
Type I countertransference refers to avoidant reactions, which can be characterized as 
avoidant withdrawn, or detached reactions to therapeutic work and the client. Conversely, 
Type II refers to overidentification with the traumatized client, which can be characterized as 
overinvolved and enmeshment responses. I used selected subscales from the Therapist 
Response Questionnaire Revised Version (TRQ-R; Tanzilli et al., 2016), originally called the 
Countertransference Questionnaire (Betan et al., 2005; Zittel Conklin & Westen, 2003). The 
TRQ-R was developed using a practice network approach, in which responses from 181 
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clinicians from multiple theoretical orientations were pooled in order to generate common 
patterns of countertransference reactions (Betan et al., 2005). The authors found 8 factors of 
clinician countertransference reactions that were independent of theoretical orientation:  
Overwhelmed/Disorganized, or the clinician’s own affective flooding due to the client’s 
strong negative feelings; Helpless/Inadequate, or feelings of inadequacy, hopelessness, and 
incompetence in response to client difficulty; Positive, or perceptions of a positive working 
alliance between therapist and client; Special/Overinvolved, describing a sense of the client 
as special or distinct from other clients and difficulties maintaining appropriate boundaries 
(e.g., increased self-disclosure); Sexualized, or experiencing sexual feelings towards the 
client; Disengaged, or feeling distracted, bored, or annoyed in session; Parental/Protective, or 
desiring to nurture and protect the client in a parental manner; and Criticized/Mistreated, or 
feelings of being unappreciated and devalued by the client. Tanzilli, Colli, Del Corno, and 
Lingiardi (2016) then tested the factor structure of this measure in a separate, larger sample 
of 332 psychiatrists and psychologists of mixed theoretical orientations. They found a 
similarly stable factor structure, with the only added factor being Hostile/Angry, in which 
therapists felt anger or irritation towards their client. All other factors remained salient and 
stable through both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis (Tanzilli et al., 2016).  
The measure consists of statements about potential therapist reactions to clients, rated 
on a five-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all true) to 5 (very true). Reactions include both 
feelings (e.g., “I feel bored in session with my traumatized clients,”) and behavior (e.g., “I 
disclose my feelings with my traumatized clients more than with other clients,”). In 
accordance with instructions on the STSS, participants were instructed to provide how true 
the statements are in relation to their traumatized clients over the past month. Scores are 
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summed for each subscale, with higher scores indicating a greater presence for that particular 
type of reaction. Separate subscales are treated as separate but possibly related reactions. 
Tanzilli and colleagues (2016) reported that inter-factor correlations ranged from -.23 to .48, 
with a mean correlation of .28. The TRQ-R demonstrated significant and strong correlations 
with the previous scale version, with subscale correlations ranging from .78 to .98. 
Cronbach’s alphas for each subscale ranged from .78 to .90, demonstrating good internal 
reliability across each factor (Tanzilli et al., 2016). The selected subscales from the TRQ-R 
can be found in Appendix I. 
Type I. In accordance with Wilson et al.’s (1994) description of countertransference 
reactions (CTR) in response to trauma therapy, Type 1 CTRs are described as avoidant and 
disengaged. Therefore, Type 1 CTRs was measured with the five-item Disengaged subscale 
of the TRQ-R (e.g., “I don't feel fully engaged in sessions with my traumatized clients,”). 
The Cronbach’s alpha for this subscale was .78 in the development study, demonstrating 
acceptable internal reliability (Tanzilli et al., 2016). Scores on this subscale range from 5-25. 
This scale is referred to as TRQ-underinvolved in the current study. Cronbach’s alpha for the 
current study was .60, and McDonald’s omega was .62.  
Type II. Type 2 CTRs are described as overinvolved reactions to client concerns 
(Wilson et al., 1994). Therefore, Type 2 CTRs was measured with the six-item 
Overinvolved/Special subscale of the TRQ-R (e.g., “I self-disclose more about my personal 
life with my traumatized clients than with my other clients,”). This subscale demonstrated 
acceptable internal reliability, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .79 in the development study 
(Tanzilli et al., 2016). Scores on this subscale range from 6-30. This scale will be referred to 
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as the TRQ-overinvolved. Cronbach’s alpha for the current study is .65, and McDonald’s 
omega is .74. 
Results 
Data Screening 
A total of 362 participants accessed the survey. Of these participants, 31 completed 
less than 2% of the survey, akin to opening and immediately closing the survey. These 31 
participants were dropped from further analysis, leaving a sample of 331. Next, missing data 
were assessed at the scale level, utilizing the seven primary variables of interest (PTSD, 
cognitive empathy, affective empathy, secondary traumatic stress, differentiation of self, 
overinvolved countertransference, underinvolved countertransference). Results revealed that 
65 participants dropped out midway through the demographics form (first form of the 
survey), and failed to complete the seven primary variables of interest. Due to the large 
numbers of participant dropout during the demographic form, I assessed differences in 
completed demographic variables (age, gender, sexual orientation, and whether or not they 
practiced in the United States) between those missing all seven variables of interest (n = 65) 
and those not (n = 266). I used an independent samples t-test to assess for differences in age. 
Results revealed no significant differences between those who dropped out prematurely and 
those who did not in age: t(328) = -1.04, p = .30. I used the SPSS Crosstabs feature to 
perform a Chi-Squared test of independence to assess whether those who dropped out 
prematurely and those who did not significantly differed among the categorical demographic 
variables. Results revealed no significant differences between those who dropped out 
prematurely and those who did not regarding gender (χ2[2] = 4.09, p = .13), sexual 
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orientation (χ2[5] = 2.67, p = .75), or whether or not they practiced within the United States 
(χ2[2] = 2.71, p = .10). 
Six participants completed the PTSD Check-list and the Pictorial Affective Empathy 
Test, but failed to complete the Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy, the 
Differentiation of Self Inventory-Short Form, the Secondary Traumatic Stress Scale, and 
both measures (underinvolved and overinvolved) of the Therapist Response Questionnaire 
(missing 71.4% of the data). Four participants completed all measures but the Differentiation 
of Self Scale-Short Form, the Secondary Traumatic Stress Scale, and both measures 
(underinvolved and overinvolved) of the Therapist Response Questionnaire (missing 57% of 
the data). Four participants contained missing data for the Secondary Traumatic Stress Scale, 
and both measures (underinvolved and overinvolved) of the Therapist Response 
Questionnaire (missing 43%). Finally, a remaining five participants completed all measures 
besides the Therapist Response Questionnaire (missing 28.6%). 
I then assessed item-level missingness beyond the 65 participants who failed to 
complete any variable of interest. Across all items, an additional seven participants dropped 
out entirely at the Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy, three dropped out at 
the Differentiation of Self Inventory-Short Form, three dropped out at the Secondary 
Traumatic Stress Scale, and six dropped out at the Therapist Response Questionnaire. In 
total, 79 participants were missing over 20% of the data, skipping three surveys or more; six 
participants were missing 9.8% of the data, only skipping the Therapist Response 
Questionnaire, whereas 31 participants skipped between one (0.9% of total data) and three 
items (2.7% of total data) across the entire survey, including demographic items. Across all 
items and participants, Little’s MCAR test revealed that data were missing completely at 
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random, MCAR χ2(3179) = 3131.213, p = .724. Therefore, the 79 participants missing more 
than 20% of the data (akin to missing three or more full scales) were dropped from the 
sample, as is typically done in datasets of this size (Parent, 2013). Given that data are missing 
completely at random, I used the expectation-maximization algorithm to impute the 
remaining missing data. I performed item-level expectation-maximization imputation 
because item-level imputation provides greater conservation of statistical power (Gottschall 
et al., 2012; Mazza et al., 2015). The remaining sample after imputation was N = 252.  
 Three validity check questions were included in the survey in order to address 
inattentive responding. Participants had to answer two out of the three questions correctly in 
order to remain in the sample. Five participants failed to answer two out of three validity 
checks correctly, and thus were removed from the dataset. The sample came to N = 247. 
As this study employed multiple regression, preliminary analysis included assessment 
of univariate normality. All variables were within acceptable ranges of skewness and 
kurtosis, with the exception of the uninvolved countertransference Scale’s kurtosis value 
(16.24) and skewness (3.20). Thus, I checked the data for multivariate outliers using 
Mahalanobis Distance, Cook’s D, and leverage values. Two cases were identified as 
multivariate outliers due to significant Mahalanobis Distance (p < .001), Cook’s Distance 
(>4/N, = .016), and large leverage scores (> .20). Removal of these multivariate outliers 
brought the underinvolved countertransference scale within acceptable skewness (2.02) and 
kurtosis limits (4.92), see Table 2. Additionally, correlations between STS and underinvolved 
countertransference were significantly greater when the multivariate outliers were included in 
the sample (.48 versus .36). Observation of the two identified multivariate outliers revealed 
extreme underinvolved countertransference and STS scores that distinguished the cases from 
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the rest of the sample (Z-scores > 5 for underinvolved countertransference, > 3 for STS). 
Furthermore, inclusion of the two multivariate outliers led to a significant finding that was 
not significant when the outliers were removed, highlighting the undue influence of these 
cases. Given the changes in variable relationships, multiple indices indicating distance from 
the rest of the sample, and the effect on underinvolved countertransference kurtosis scores, 
these two cases were removed from analysis bringing the sample to 245. I then standardized 
each variable in order to assess for univariate outliers (Z-score +/- |3.30|). After removal of 
the two multivariate outliers, uninvolved countertransference contained five univariate 
outliers, Z = 3.42 (3 participants), 4.01, and 4.59. Overinvolved countertransference 
contained three univariate outliers, Z = 3.74. Univariate outliers were retained within the 
dataset. The final sample was N = 245. 
Next, I performed an exploratory factor analysis on the Differentiation of Self 
Inventory-Short Form (DSI-SF) and the Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy 
(QCAE) to ensure that full-scale use of these measures was appropriate. Though full-scale 
scores of the DSI-SF have been used in previous studies and all four subscales are 
theoretically thought to represent the overall construct of differentiation of self, the measure 
was intended for subscale use, therefore appropriate dimensionality must be assessed. I used 
principal axis factoring (PAF) because PAF is the preferred method of factor extraction to 
assess a priori hypotheses about factor structure, and promax rotation. KMO’s measure of 
sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s associated Test of Sphericity were assessed, indicating that 
the sample was large enough to produce factor extraction: KMO’s Sampling Adequacy was 
.88, and Bartlett’s Test significant, χ2(190) = 2221.92, p < .001. Theoretically, eigenvalues 
over one can be retained, but the use of the full scale structure would be supported if the first 
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eigenvalue is 3-4 times larger than the second eigenvalue (Slocum-Gori & Zumbo, 2011). 
This was the case, as the first eigenvalue suggesting a one-factor solution for the DSI-SF was 
7.29 and the second eigenvalue 1.96 before rotation. Factor loadings on a one factor solution 
ranged from .34 to .76. Thus, full scale DSI-SF scores were used in the main analyses. 
I followed the same procedure for the cognitive empathy subscales of the QCAE. 
KMO’s measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s associated Test of Sphericity were 
assessed, indicating that the sample was large enough to produce factor extraction: KMO’s 
Sampling Adequacy was .78, and Bartlett’s Test significant, χ2(171) = 1094.61, p < .001. 
Assessment of the eigenvalues and scree plot suggested that a two factor solution was more 
appropriate. The first eigenvalue for the factor structure of the cognitive dimension of the 
QCAE was 4.36, and the second eigenvalue was 2.17 before rotation; the first eigenvalue 
was only 2 times greater than the second eigenvalue. This pattern suggests that use of the two 
subscales would be more appropriate than calculating a full scale score. Analysis of the Scree 
Plot supported the two factor solution. Therefore, the Perspective Taking subscale and the 
Online Simulation subscale were analyzed separately, and are referred to as cognitive 
empathy-PT and cognitive empathy-OS, respectively. The bivariate correlations between 
these two scales was .34, p < .001. The moderate size of this correlation suggests that these 
two subscales are indeed related but distinct constructs, measuring different aspects of 
cognitive empathy and may perhaps interact with study variables differently. Therefore, the 
main analyses were conducted with subscale scores of the QCAE as opposed to one 
composite score. Factor loadings were acquired by then forcing a two factor solution while 
using PAF and Promax rotation. Loadings on factor one, corresponding to the Cognitive 
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empathy-OS subscale, ranged from .32 to .72. Loadings on factor two, corresponding to the 
Cognitive empathy-PT subscale ranged from .27 to .65.  
Cronbach’s alpha was used to assess the reliability of each measure (see Table 2). All 
measures demonstrated acceptable reliability, with the exception of the two 
countertransference measures, overinvolved (.56) and underinvolved (.58). Item-total 
statistics revealed that items could be removed from both measures to improve internal 
consistency. Beginning with the Overinvolved scale, removal of OI5, “I look forward to 
sessions with my traumatized clients,” improved Cronbach’s alpha to .63. However, internal 
consistency below .70 is still questionable. I performed an EFA (Principal Axis Factoring 
with Promax rotation) on both measures to assess whether factor structure could explain the 
poor reliability.  
EFA of the Overinvolved scale revealed a predominantly one-factor solution with an 
eigenvalue of 1.76, although four total factors were extracted. Examination of the Scree Plot 
confirmed a suggested one-factor solution. Unfortunately, multiple items loaded poorly onto 
the first factor. Item OI2, “I tell my traumatized clients I love them,” had a factor loading of 
.26, OI4, “I call my traumatized clients between sessions more than my other clients,” had a 
factor loading of -.06, OI5, as indicated by the reliability analysis, had a factor loading of .00, 
but loaded strongly on a second factor (.63), and OI6 loaded .16 on the first factor and .36 on 
the second factor. Item OI5 was removed and factor structure reassessed. After rerunning the 
EFA, item OI4 had the lowest  loading of -.02. This item was removed and EFA was 
analyzed again. Only one factor was extracted, with an eigenvalue of 1.89. Within the factor 
matrix, item OI1 “I disclose my feelings with my traumatized clients more than with other 
clients” had a factor loading of .83, item OI2 “I tell my traumatized clients I love them” had a 
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factor loading of .28, item OI3 “I self-disclose more about my personal life with my 
traumatized clients than with my other clients,” had a factor loading of .86, and item OI6 “II 
end sessions overtime with my traumatized clients more than with my other clients,” had a 
factor loading of .33. At this point, I ran another reliability analysis with these four items. 
Cronbach’s alpha equaled .62, but examination of item-total statistics revealed that removal 
of OI2, the item with the weakest factor loading, would increase reliability to .69. Therefore, 
item OI2 was dropped. 
A final EFA was assessed with OI1, OI3, and OI6, and a stable one-factor solution 
was extracted, explaining 63.1% of the variance. Cronbach’s alpha as a reliability indicator 
has been criticized for use with ordinal data, with many considering alpha to be an 
underestimate of true ordinal scale reliability (Zumbo et al., 2007). Therefore, I calculated 
McDonald’s Omega using the following formula (McDonald, 1999): 
 =
(∑ )

(∑ )

+  ∑ 

 
where   denotes the factor loading for an item on a single factor EFA, and 
  denotes the 
standard error of measurement, or 1 - , for each item. Using this formula, the internal 
reliability for the three-item Overinvolved measure is .74, which is acceptable. Omega has 
been presented as a more practical solution to the failings and underestimations of 
Cronbach’s alpha (Deng & Chan, 2017); therefore I have reported both Cronbach’s alpha and 
McDonald’s omega as indicators of reliability for each of my measures (Table 2).  
Next, I performed the same reliability analyses and EFA with the underinvolved 
scale. Item-total statistics revealed that removal of item UI1, “I begin sessions late with my 
traumatized clients more than with my other clients,” would improve Cronbach’s alpha from 
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.58 to .60. Principal Axis Factoring with Promax rotation extracted only one factor, with an 
eigenvalue of 1.94. Analysis of the Scree Plot confirmed the one-factor solution. Factor 
loadings indeed revealed that only item UI1 did not load adequately onto the factor, with a 
factor loading of .23. This item was dropped. As previously indicated, Cronbach’s alpha 
improved to .60, but item-total statistics did not indicate that reliability would be improved 
by dropping any additional items. Rerunning the EFA, the four-item underinvolved scale 
again extracted only one factor with an eigenvalue of 1.87, explaining 46.75% of the 
variance. Factor loadings all appeared adequate, ranging from .45 to .68. The four-item 
underinvolved scale included the following items: UI2 “I feel bored in session with my 
traumatized clients,” UI3 “My mind often wanders to things other than what my traumatized 
clients are talking about,” UI4 “I don’t feel fully engaged in sessions with my traumatized 
clients,” and UI5 “I watch the clock with my traumatized clients more than with my other 
clients.” McDonald’s omega for the underinvolved was .62. This value indicated that the 
underinvolved scale has questionable reliability, but as one of the main dependent variables 
in the study, it was retained for analysis. 
I assessed for collinearity using bivariate Pearson’s correlations. None of the 
correlations between variables were greater than |.90|, therefore collinearity does not appear 
to be a concern (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014). See Table 3 for bivariate correlations between 
all study variables. I created bivariate scatterplots to examine linearity, and all independent 
variables appeared to have linear relationships with the dependent variables (Secondary 
Traumatic Stress Scale, Therapist Response Questionnaire-overinvolved, and Therapist 
Response Questionnaire-underinvolved). Next, I assessed the standardized residual scatter 
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plots for the three dependent variables.  The standardized residuals appeared to be normally 
distributed, linear, and assumptions of homogeneity and homoscedasticity were met. 
Preliminary Analysis 
In order to determine necessary control variables, I compared demographic variables 
with the Secondary Traumatic Stress Scale, The TRQ-underinvolved, and the TRQ-
overinvolved. As continuous variables, the following were assessed via bivariate 
correlations: age, amount of years they have practiced professionally in the field, the amount 
of years working professionally with traumatized clients, the percentage of time spent 
working with traumatized clients over the last six months, the percentage of clients they 
currently see with a DSM-5 defined Criterion A trauma as their presenting concern, the 
amount of trauma-specific training the participants have received, income (measured as an 
ordinal variable ranging from 1-5), and personal PTSD scores. Percentage of current 
traumatized clients (r = .15, p = .020), and income (r = -.20, p = .002) were significantly 
related to the Secondary Traumatic Stress Scale. Age was significantly correlated with TRQ-
underinvolved (r = -.20, p = .002) and the Secondary Traumatic Stress Scale (r = -.15, p = 
.021). PTSD was significantly related to the Secondary Traumatic Stress Scale (r = .57, p < 
.001), TRQ-underinvolved (r = .14, p = .024), and TRQ-overinvolved (r = .22, p < .001). 
Therefore, personal PTSD scores, percentage of current traumatized clients, income, and age 
were included as control variables for the main analyses. 
As multicategorical variables, the following were assessed using one-way univariate 
analysis of variance: gender, sexual orientation, race, professional affiliation, and timing of 
personal trauma. Race appeared to be significantly associated with TRQ-underinvolved: 
F(244) = 4.33, p < .001. Assessment of the Tukey HSD posthoc test revealed that the only 
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significant difference was between individuals identifying as Middle Eastern and all other 
races (Black/African American, Non-Hispanic White, Hispanic/Latinx, 
Multicultural/Multiethnic, and Native American/American Indian/Indigenous). Results 
suggest that those identifying as Middle Eastern reported significantly higher TRQ-
underinvolved scores than other participants. However, only two participants identified as 
Middle Eastern in the sample, therefore this relationship may easily be spurious, and will not 
be included as a control variable. Otherwise, the only other categorical variable that 
significantly covaried with the Secondary Traumatic Stress Scale was professional affiliation: 
F(244) = 7.88, p < .001. Posthoc analyses revealed that clinical social workers reported 
significantly greater secondary traumatic stress than all other professional affiliations 
(counselors/therapists, and psychologists/psychiatrists). Mental health counselors/therapists 
and psychologists/psychiatrists did not significantly differ from each other. Therefore, a 
dummy code variable distinguishing social workers was included as a control variable in the 
multivariate regression analysis (1 = clinical social workers, 0 = all other professions).  
Independent-samples t-tests were utilized to assess whether any binary categorical 
variables covaried with the dependent variables. These included whether (a) the participant 
practiced within the United States (1= yes, 0 = no), (b) participants were currently receiving 
personal therapy for their trauma, (c) participants have received personal therapy for their 
trauma in the past, (d) participants were currently receiving professional supervision, (e) 
participants were currently involved in a professional consultation group, and (f) participants 
were currently providing supervision to other clinicians or clinicians-in-training. Two 
variables significantly covaried with secondary traumatic stress: currently receiving personal 
therapy (t[243] = 3.35, p < .001), and currently providing supervision to others (t[242] = -
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2.83, p = .005). Participants currently receiving personal trauma therapy reported 
significantly greater secondary traumatic stress, and participants currently providing 
supervision to others reported significantly lower secondary traumatic stress.  
In sum, the following six variables were identified as possible control variables in the 
main analyses: PTSD, percentage of current traumatized clients, income, age, the dummy 
code for identifying as a clinical social worker, the dummy code for currently receiving 
personal therapy, and the dummy code for currently providing supervision to others. PTSD, 
percentage of traumatized clients, age, and currently pursuing personal therapy have 
previously been identified as covariates to secondary traumatic stress in the literature (Adams 
& Riggs, 2008; Creamer & Liddle, 2005; Elwood et al., 2011; Hensel et al., 2015; Pearlman 
& Mac Ian, 1995; Robinson-Keilig, 2014). Dutton and Rubenstein (1995) theorized that 
personal and professional vulnerabilities, including dissatisfaction with professional and 
personal life, may leave a clinician more vulnerable to secondary traumatic stress and 
countertransference, providing support for the negative relationship between income and the 
dependent variables—individuals with lower income may experience more work-related 
stress, and subsequently more secondary traumatic stress and countertransference. 
Additionally, research suggests that secondary traumatic stress may vary by occupational 
groups due to varying levels of exposure and workplace support, providing support for 
utilizing social work identification as a relevant control (Hensel et al., 2015; Sprang et al., 
2011). Providing supervision to others would theoretically be associated with secondary 
traumatic stress in the positive direction, adding another path for exposure. However, I found 
a negative relationship between providing supervision to others and secondary traumatic 
stress. The relationship between providing supervision and secondary traumatic stress may 
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have more to do with progression in one’s career and a switch in clinical duties from direct 
client contact to indirect client contact through supervising other clinicians, lessening the 
exposure to traumatized clients Additionally, those who provide supervision to clinicians 
tend to be older and have a higher salary (see Table 3), qualities that are associated with less 
secondary traumatic stress. These six variables were included as control variables across the 
main analysis regression models (Hypotheses 5-7 and Research Question 3). 
Main Analyses 
Hypothesis 1: STS will be positively related to both types of countertransference 
reactions. Pearson product-moment correlations were examined between full scale STS 
scores and subscale countertransference scores on underinvolved and overinvolved 
countertransference reactions in order to test the hypothesis that greater countertransference 
is associated with greater STS. Both underinvolved (r = .36, p < .001) and overinvolved (r = 
.19, p = .003) countertransference was significantly positively correlated with STS, 
supporting Hypothesis 1. 
Research Question 1: Does STS relate more strongly to Type II (overinvolved) 
countertransference reactions than to Type I (underinvolved) countertransference 
reactions? In order to explore whether STS relates differently to different 
countertransference reactions, I evaluated the associated correlations for size based on 
Cohen’s effect size guidelines (small = .10, medium = .30, large = .50; Cohen, 2013). Based 
on these guidelines, it appears as though underinvolved countertransference is more strongly 
associated (r = .36) with STS than overinvolved countertransference (r = .19). The 
association between underinvolved countertransference and STS corresponds with a medium 
effect size, whereas the relationship between overinvolved countertransference and STS 
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corresponds with a small effect size. An r to z transformation using Steiger’s Z Test revealed 
that this difference in size was statistically significant: Z = 2.119, p = .017.  
Hypothesis 2: Affective empathy will be positively related to STS. Due to mixed 
findings, no hypothesis was made regarding the relationship between cognitive empathy 
and STS. Evaluation of Pearson correlations revealed that although affective empathy was 
related to STS in the positive direction, this relationship was not statistically significant (r = 
.08, p = .19). The dimensions of cognitive empathy, Cognitive empathy-PT (r = .07, p = .31) 
and Cognitive empathy-OS (r = -.04, p = .57), were not significantly related to STS. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2 is not supported. These findings differ from previous studies finding positive 
weak, but significant associations between affective empathy and therapist reactions like 
secondary traumatic stress (Gleichgerrcht & Decety, 2013), burnout (Cieslak et al., 2014), 
and compassion fatigue (Thomas & Otis, 2010), but are congruent with previous studies 
finding negligible associations between cognitive empathy and STS (Gleichgerrcht & 
Decety, 2013).  
Research Question 2: Do cognitive and affective empathy relate to 
countertransference reactions? Are there differential relationships between cognitive 
and affective empathy and the two countertransference reaction measures? Pearson 
Product-Moment correlations were also examined to answer Research Question 2. Results 
revealed that affective empathy was not significantly related to either underinvolved (r = -
.12, p = .36) or Overinvolved (r = .003, p = .96) countertransference. Although affective 
empathy appears to be negatively associated with underinvolved countertransference and 
negligibly, if slightly positively associated with overinvolved countertransference, the lack of 
statistical significance suggests that these differences in correlation directions may be 
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spurious, therefore interpretation of these directions is unwarranted. Similarly, Cognitive 
empathy-PT was differentially related to underinvolved (r = -.12, p = .07) and overinvolved 
(r = .06, p = .38) countertransference, though neither of these relationships were significant. 
Cognitive empathy-OS, on the other hand, was significantly negatively related to 
underinvolved countertransference (r = -.20, p = 002), but not significantly related to 
overinvolved countertransference (r = -.01, p = .92).  
Hypothesis 3: Differentiation of self will be positively related to cognitive 
empathy. No hypothesis will be made regarding the relationships between affective 
empathy and differentiation of self. Pearson product-moment correlations were examined 
in order to test the hypothesis that differentiation of self and cognitive empathy are positively 
related, and to examine the relationships between affective empathy and differentiation of 
self. Results revealed partial support for Hypothesis 3. Whereas Cognitive empathy-OS was 
weakly but significantly positively related to differentiation of self (r = .14, p = .030), 
Cognitive empathy-PT revealed a non-significant relationship in the other direction (r = -.03, 
p = .69). Given that the negative relationship between Cognitive empathy-PT and 
differentiation of self is not significant, the directional difference may be spurious. Affective 
empathy was negatively related to differentiation of self, though this relationship was not 
significant (r = -.04, p = .50). 
Hypothesis 4: Differentiation of self will be negatively related to both STS and 
both types of countertransference reactions. Pearson product-moment correlations were 
examined in order to test the hypothesis that differentiation of self is negatively related to 
STS and countertransference. Results revealed significant negative correlations between 
differentiation of self and STS (r = -.56, p < .001), underinvolved countertransference (r = -
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.25, p < .001), and overinvolved countertransference (r = -.22, p < .001), supporting 
Hypothesis 4. Using Cohen’s effect size guidelines, the relationship between differentiation 
of self and STS is large, while the relationships between differentiation of self and both 
underinvolved and overinvolved countertransference are small-to-medium. 
Hypothesis 5: Cognitive empathy, affective empathy, and differentiation of self 
will predict STS and countertransference reactions over and above relevant covariates. 
Hypothesis 5 was tested via SPSS multivariate General Linear Models (GLM). GLM was 
used so that all three dependent variables, STS, underinvolved, and overinvolved, could be 
analyzed together due to their conceptual and statistical overlap. All control and test variables 
were entered as covariates. Given that all control variables were either continuous or dummy 
coded, there was no need to enter any variable into factors to explore group differences. 
Please see Figure 2 for a complete layout regarding model specifications for Hypotheses 5-7, 
and Research Question 3. The analyses for Hypothesis 5 correspond with Model 1 in Figure 
2. I also selected to receive output regarding effect size and parameter estimates, which 
provide univariate results for each dependent variable. Results revealed a significant 
multivariate effect for differentiation of self: Hotelling’s Trace = .158, Wilk’s λ = .863; F(3, 
229) = 12.068, p < .001; multivariate η2 = .137. However, affective empathy [Hotelling’s 
Trace = .012, Wilk’s λ = .988; F(3, 229) = .911, p = .436; multivariate η2 = .012; Observed 
Power  = .248], Cognitive empathy-PT [Hotelling’s Trace = .005, Wilk’s λ = .995; F(3, 229) 
= .405, p = .749; multivariate η2 = .005; Observed Power = .130], and Cognitive empathy-OS 
[Hotelling’s Trace = .024, Wilk’s λ = .976; F(3, 229) = 1.862, p = .137; multivariate η2 = 
.024; Observed Power = .479] failed to account for significant variance in the three outcome 
variables over and above covariates in the sample. The following covariates remained 
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significant predictors of the three outcome variables, even when differentiation of self, 
affective empathy, and cognitive empathy were added to the model: PTSD [Hotelling’s Trace 
= .122, Wilk’s λ = .891; F(3, 229) = 9.292, p < .001; multivariate η2 = .109], and identifying 
as a social worker [Hotelling’s Trace = .039, Wilk’s λ = .963; F(3, 229) = 2.943, p = .034; 
multivariate η2 = .037]. Please see Table 4 for full results. Thus, Hypothesis 5 was partially 
supported, such that differentiation of self accounted for a significant proportion of variance 
in STS, underinvolved countertransference, and overinvolved countertransference over and 
above relevant personal and professional characteristics associated with STS and 
countertransference (PTSD scores, income, age, percentage of traumatized clients, 
professional affiliation, receiving personal therapy, and providing supervision to others); 
however, neither cognitive empathy nor affective empathy were significant predictors when 
controlling for the covariates and differentiation of self.  
Univariate results evaluating the model, with all control variables and the four tested 
variables (affective empathy, Cognitive empathy-PT, Cognitive empathy-OS, and 
differentiation of self), were evaluated using a corrected p-value of .017 (.05/3 outcomes). 
The overall model significantly predicted Secondary Traumatic Stress, F(11, 231) = 16.763, 
p < .001, and accounted for approximately 44% of the variance in STS scores (R2 = .444, 
adjusted R2 = .417). Of the four tested variables, only differentiation of self accounted for a 
significant amount of variance in STS: B = -4.723, β = -.358, p < .001, partial η2 = .123, a 
moderate effect size. Please see Table 4a. Regarding underinvolved countertransference, the 
overall model was significant: F(11, 231) = 3.078, p = .001, accounting for 13% of the 
variance (R2 = .128, adjusted R2 = .086). Of the four tested variables, only differentiation of 
self (B = -.392, β = -.212, p = .008, partial η2 = .030) remained a significant predictor, also 
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with a moderate effect size. Please see Table 4b. For overinvolved countertransference, the 
overall model approached significance: F(11, 231) = 1.795, p = .056, accounting for 8% of 
the variance in overinvolved countertransference (R2 = .079, adjusted R2 = .035).  
Hypothesis 6: Cognitive empathy will moderate the positive relationship between 
affective empathy and STS and countertransference reactions. To test this hypothesis, I 
performed another multivariate GLM analysis. Because I found evidence that the two 
cognitive empathy subscales may relate differently to other study variables, the analyses 
were carried out with Cognitive empathy-PT as a moderator of affective empathy first while 
controlling for Cognitive empathy-OS and differentiation of self, and then Cognitive 
empathy-OS as the moderator while controlling for Cognitive empathy-PT and 
differentiation of self. To organize these results, I separated Hypothesis 6 into 6A (Cognitive 
empathy-PT as the moderator) and 6B (Cognitive empathy-OS as the moderator). The steps 
of these analyses correspond with Model 2A and 2B in Figure 2. Affective empathy, 
Cognitive empathy-OS, Cognitive empathy-PT, and differentiation of self were mean-
centered prior to entering into the model in order to facilitate interpretation. Interaction 
variables were computed with mean-centered affective empathy, and mean-centered 
Cognitive empathy-PT and Cognitive empathy-OS, respectively. As with the testing of 
Hypothesis 5, GLM was used so that all three dependent variables, STS, underinvolved, and 
overinvolved, could be analyzed together due to their conceptual and statistical overlap. All 
control and test variables were entered as covariates and univariate results regarding effect 
size and parameter estimates were selected for additional output.  
6A: Cognitive empathy-PT as the Moderator. The two-way interaction term 
computed between Cognitive empathy-PT and affective empathy was not a significant 
  
91 
 
 
multivariate predictor of STS, underinvolved, and overinvolved countertransference: 
Hotelling’s Trace = .010, Wilk’s λ = .990; F(3, 228) = .761, p = .517; multivariate η2 = .010; 
Observed Power = .212. Within this multivariate model containing all relevant control 
variables, affective empathy, Cognitive empathy-PT, Cognitive empathy-OS, differentiation 
of self, and the interaction term between Cognitive empathy-PT and affective empathy, only 
identifying as a social worker [Hotelling’s Trace = .039, Wilk’s λ = .963; F(3, 228) = 2.941, 
p = .034; multivariate η2 = .037], personal PTSD scores [Hotelling’s Trace = .122, Wilk’s λ 
= .891; F(3, 228) = 9.254, p < .001; multivariate η2 = .109] and differentiation of self 
[Hotelling’s Trace = .157, Wilk’s λ = .865; F(3, 228) = 11.912, p < .001; multivariate η2 = 
.135] remained significant multivariate predictors. Hypothesis 6A is not supported. Please 
see Table 5a. 
6B: Cognitive empathy-OS as the Moderator. The two-way interaction term 
computed between Cognitive empathy-OS and affective empathy was not a significant 
multivariate predictor of STS, underinvolved, and overinvolved countertransference: 
Hotelling’s Trace = .010, Wilk’s λ = .990; F(3, 228) = .767, p = .514; multivariate η2 = .010; 
Observed Power = .213. Within this multivariate model containing all relevant control 
variables, affective empathy, Cognitive empathy-PT, Cognitive empathy-OS, differentiation 
of self, and the interaction term between Cognitive empathy-OS and affective empathy, only 
identifying as a social worker [Hotelling’s Trace = .039, Wilk’s λ = .963; F(3, 228) = 2.928, 
p = .034; multivariate η2 = .037], personal PTSD scores [Hotelling’s Trace = .121, Wilk’s λ 
= .892; F(3, 228) = 9.183, p < .001; multivariate η2 = .108] and differentiation of self 
[Hotelling’s Trace = .164, Wilk’s λ = .859; F(3, 228) = 12.488, p < .001; multivariate η2 = 
.141] remained significant multivariate predictors. Hypothesis 6B was not supported. Please 
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see Table 5b. Thus, the hypothesis that cognitive empathy interacts with affective empathy to 
affect STS and countertransference was not supported in this sample. 
Hypothesis 7: Differentiation of self will moderate the positive relationship 
between affective empathy and STS and countertransference reactions. To test this 
hypothesis, I performed another multivariate GLM analysis. The steps of this analysis 
correspond with Model 3 in Figure 2. Affective empathy, Cognitive empathy-OS, Cognitive 
empathy-PT, and differentiation of self were mean-centered prior to entering into the model 
in order to ease interpretation. An interaction variable was computed with mean-centered 
affective empathy and mean-centered differentiation of self. As with the testing of 
Hypotheses 5 and 6, GLM was used so that all three dependent variables, STS, 
underinvolved, and overinvolved, could be analyzed together due to their conceptual and 
statistical overlap. All control and test variables were entered as “Covariates,” and univariate 
results regarding effect size and parameter estimates were selected for additional output.  
The two-way interaction term computed between differentiation of self and affective 
empathy was not a significant multivariate predictor of STS, underinvolved, and 
overinvolved countertransference: Hotelling’s Trace = .006, Wilk’s λ = .994; F(3, 228) = 
.448, p = .719; multivariate η2 = .006; Observed Power = .139. Within this multivariate 
model containing all relevant control variables, affective empathy, Cognitive empathy-PT, 
Cognitive empathy-OS, differentiation of self, and the interaction term between 
differentiation of self and affective empathy, only identifying as a social worker [Hotelling’s 
Trace = .038, Wilk’s λ = .962; F(3, 228) = 3.010, p = .031; multivariate η2 = .038], personal 
PTSD scores [Hotelling’s Trace = .121, Wilk’s λ = .892; F(3, 228) = 9.164, p < .001; 
multivariate η2 = .108] and differentiation of self [Hotelling’s Trace = .157, Wilk’s λ = .864; 
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F(3, 228) = 11.956, p < .001; multivariate η2 = .136] remained significant multivariate 
predictors. Thus, Hypothesis 7 was not supported in this sample. Please see Table 6. 
Research Question 3: Does differentiation of self affect the degree to which 
cognitive empathy moderates the effect of affective empathy on trauma therapist 
reactions to trauma therapy (i.e., STS and countertransference reactions)? This research 
question was assessed by means of a three-way interaction term between cognitive empathy 
dimensions, affective empathy, and differentiation of self, and corresponds with Models 4A 
and 4B in Figure 2. In order to mathematically test a three-way interaction, all possible two-
way interactions on main effect variables must be entered into the model. Because the 
dimensions of cognitive empathy are being evaluated separately, Model 4A includes the 
following interaction terms: Cognitive empathy-PT x affective empathy, affective empathy x 
differentiation of self, Cognitive empathy-PT x differentiation of self, and Cognitive 
empathy-PT x affective empathy x differentiation of self. Model 4B, focusing on Cognitive 
empathy-OS, includes the following interaction terms: Cognitive empathy-OS x affective 
empathy, affective empathy x differentiation of self, Cognitive empathy-OS x differentiation 
of self, and Cognitive empathy-OS x affective empathy x differentiation of self. All test 
variables were mean centered prior to calculation of the interaction terms in order to ease 
interpretation. The analyses were conducted using the same procedure used to test 
Hypotheses 5-7. 
Model 4A: Three-Way Interaction between Cognitive empathy-PT, Affective 
Empathy, and Differentiation of Self. Multivariate results revealed that the three-way 
interaction term between Cognitive empathy-PT, affective empathy, and differentiation of 
self was not significant: Hotelling’s Trace = .031, Wilk’s λ = .970; F(3, 225) = 2.297, p = 
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.078; multivariate η2 = .030; Observed Power = .574. Of the main effect variables, only 
differentiation of self [Hotelling’s Trace = .135, Wilk’s λ = .881; F(3, 225) = 10.127, p < 
.001; multivariate η2 = .119] remained significant. Please see Table 7. 
Model 4B: Three-Way Interaction between Cognitive empathy-OS, Affective 
Empathy, and Differentiation of Self. Multivariate results revealed that the three-way 
interaction term between Cognitive empathy-OS, affective empathy, and differentiation of 
self was statistically significant: Hotelling’s Trace = .085, Wilk’s λ = .922; F(3, 225) = 
6.360, p < .001; multivariate η2 = .078. With the three-way interaction term in the model, age 
[Hotelling’s Trace = .036, Wilk’s λ = .966; F(3, 225) = 2.667, p = .049; multivariate η2 = 
.034], identifying as a social worker [Hotelling’s Trace = .038, Wilk’s λ = .963; F(3, 225) = 
2.861, p = .038; multivariate η2 = .037], personal PTSD scores [Hotelling’s Trace = .123, 
Wilk’s λ = .890; F(3, 225) = 9.234, p < .001; multivariate η2 = .110] and differentiation of 
self [Hotelling’s Trace = .177, Wilk’s λ = .849; F(3, 225) = 13.298, p < .001; multivariate η2 
= .151] remained significant. Please see Table 8. I then examined univariate results using a 
corrected p-value of .017 (.05/3 outcomes) in order to evaluate the model’s fit with each 
dependent variable. Results revealed that the three-way interaction accounted for a 
significant portion of variance in secondary traumatic stress and underinvolved 
countertransference, but not overinvolved countertransference. I organize the specific results 
below into sections for secondary traumatic stress, underinvolved countertransference, and 
overinvolved countertransference. 
Secondary Traumatic Stress. Please see Table 8a. The overall model predicting 
secondary traumatic stress was significant, F(15, 227) = 13.500, p < .001, and accounted for 
approximately 47% of the variance in STS scores (R2 = .471, adjusted R2 = .437). Of the 
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covariates, identifying as a social worker (B = 3.110, β = .129, p = .010, partial η2 = .029) and 
personal PTSD score (B = .310, β = .322, p < .001, partial η2 = .099) accounted for a 
significant amount of variance within secondary traumatic stress scores. Of the four tested 
variables and four interaction terms, differentiation of self (B = -4.858, β = -.368, p < .001 
partial η2 = .132, moderate effect size) and the three-way interaction term Cognitive empathy-
OS x affective empathy x differentiation of self (B = -.096, β = -.146, p = .005, partial η2 = 
.035, small effect size) accounted for a significant portion of variance within secondary 
traumatic stress. Specifically, differentiation of self accounted for 13.2% of variance within 
secondary traumatic stress, whereas the three way interaction accounted for an additional 
3.5% of the variance. To probe the interaction further, I analyzed this same model using 
SPSS PROCESS Macro, Model 3 (three-way interaction) using only Secondary Traumatic 
Stress as the outcome variable. PROCESS Macro produces data for visualizing the three way 
interaction. 
Figure 3 presents graphs of the simple slopes of the regression equation. Three graphs 
represent the interaction between Cognitive empathy-OS x affective empathy on secondary 
traumatic stress at -1 SD, average, and +1 SD values of differentiation of self, respectively 
labeled Low, Avg, and High Differentiation of Self. Figure 4 is also included for a more 
condensed view of the three-way interaction. Interpretation of these plots reveal that the 
interaction of Cognitive empathy-OS x affective empathy reverses direction based on the 
participants’ differentiation of self. For individuals with low differentiation of self (1 SD 
below the mean), those with low affective empathy and high Cognitive empathy-OS scores 
have the lowest secondary traumatic stress scores; however, individuals with high affective 
empathy and high Cognitive empathy-OS scores have the highest secondary traumatic stress 
  
96 
 
 
scores. It appears that for individuals with low differentiation of self and high Cognitive 
empathy-OS scores, secondary traumatic stress increases as affective empathy scores 
increase, resulting in a positive relationship between affective empathy and secondary 
traumatic stress. For individuals with low differentiation of self and low Cognitive empathy-
OS scores, secondary traumatic stress decreases as affective empathy scores increase, 
resulting in a negative relationship between affective empathy and secondary traumatic 
stress. This pattern of interaction suggests that for individuals with low differentiation of self, 
Cognitive empathy-OS is an antagonist on the relationship between affective empathy and 
secondary traumatic stress. For individuals with average levels of differentiation of self, there 
appears to be a unitary positive relationship between affective empathy and secondary 
traumatic stress, despite varying levels of Cognitive empathy-OS scores. 
For individuals with high differentiation of self, the role of Cognitive empathy-OS 
appears to reverse. For those with low Cognitive empathy-OS scores, secondary traumatic 
stress increases as affective empathy increases, resulting in a positive relationship between 
affective empathy and secondary traumatic stress. However, for those with high Cognitive 
empathy-OS scores, secondary traumatic stress decreases as affective empathy increases, 
resulting in a negative relationship between affective empathy and secondary traumatic 
stress. Ultimately, the mental health professionals in this sample who have high 
differentiation of self, high Cognitive empathy-OS scores, and high affective empathy report 
the lowest secondary traumatic stress. 
Underinvolved countertransference. Please see Table 8b. The overall model 
significantly predicted underinvolved countertransference: F(15, 227) = 3.740, p < .001, 
accounting for about 20% of the variance (R2 = .198, adjusted R2 = .145). None of the 
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covariates accounted for a significant amount of variance in underinvolved 
countertransference scores. Of the four tested variables and four interaction terms, 
differentiation of self (B = -.452, β = -.244, p = .002, partial η2 = .042, moderate effect size) 
and the three-way interaction term OS x affective empathy x differentiation of self (B = -
.023, β = -.253, p < .001, partial η2 = .066, moderate effect size) accounted for a significant 
portion of variance, whereas Cognitive empathy-OS approached significance (B = -.066, β = 
-.146, p = .029, partial η2 = .021). Specifically, differentiation of self uniquely accounted for 
4.2% of variance in underinvolved countertransference, whereas the three-way interaction 
accounted for an additional 6.6% of the variance. To probe the interaction further, I 
conducted the same procedure done for secondary traumatic stress: I analyzed this same 
model using SPSS PROCESS Macro, Model 3 (three-way interaction) using only 
underinvolved countertransference as the outcome variable, and collected data to visualize 
the three-way interaction. 
Please see Figure 5 for graphs of the simple slopes of the regression equation. Three 
graphs represent the interaction between Cognitive empathy-OS x affective empathy on 
underinvolved countertransference at -1 SD, average, and +1 SD values of differentiation of 
self, respectively labeled Low, Avg, and High Differentiation of Self. Figure 6 is also 
included for a more condensed view of the three-way interaction. Interpretation of these plots 
reveal that, for individuals with low differentiation of self, cognitive empathy attenuates and 
even reverses the relationship between affective empathy and underinvolved 
countertransference. Participants with low Cognitive empathy-OS scores and low affective 
empathy report the most underinvolved countertransference of those with low differentiation 
of self, and  of the entire sample. Likewise, those with high Cognitive empathy-OS scores 
  
98 
 
 
and low affective empathy report the lowest underinvolved countertransference out of those 
with low differentiation of self. For those with low differentiation of self and high cognitive 
empathy-OS, underinvolved countertransference increases as affective empathy increases, 
resulting in a positive relationship between these two variables. As affective empathy 
increases, however, those with low differentiation of self and high, average, or low Cognitive 
empathy-OS scores begin to report similar amounts of underinvolved countertransference. 
For individuals with low differentiation of self and low Cognitive empathy-OS scores, 
underinvolved countertransference actually decreases as affective empathy increases, 
resulting in a negative relationship between these two variables. For individuals with low 
differentiation of self, the difference in underinvolved countertransference scores between 
those with low, average, and high Cognitive empathy-OS scores decreases as affective 
empathy increases. Taken together these results suggest for mental health professionals 
reporting low differentiation of self and low to average Cognitive empathy-OS scores, 
underinvolved countertransference decreases as affective empathy increases. But for 
individuals reporting low differentiation of self and high Cognitive empathy-OS, 
underinvolved countertransference seems to increase as affective empathy increases. 
For mental health professionals with average levels of differentiation of self, affective 
empathy appears to have a slightly negative relationship with underinvolved 
countertransference across varying levels of Cognitive empathy-OS. Those with high 
Cognitive empathy-OS report lower underinvolved countertransference reactions than those 
with average and low Cognitive empathy-OS scores, though these differences are small. For 
individuals with high levels of differentiation of self, Cognitive empathy-OS again appears to 
attenuate and reverse the relationship between affective empathy and underinvolved 
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countertransference, however in the opposite direction than that observed for those with low 
differentiation of self. Individuals with high differentiation of self, high Cognitive empathy-
OS scores, and high affective empathy report the lowest amount of underinvolved 
Countertransference reactions out of the entire sample. For individuals with average and high 
Cognitive empathy-OS scores, underinvolved countertransference decreases as affective 
empathy increases. However, for those with high differentiation of self and low Cognitive 
empathy-OS scores, underinvolved countertransference increases slightly as affective 
empathy increases. For individuals with high differentiation of self, the difference in 
underinvolved countertransference scores between those with low, average, and high 
Cognitive empathy-OS scores increases as affective empathy increases, such that those with 
high Cognitive empathy-OS and high affective empathy see greater reductions in 
underinvolved countertransference reactions.  
Overinvolved Countertransference. The model predicting Overinvolved 
countertransference, was not statistically significant: F(15, 227) = 1.404, p = .147, 
accounting for about 9% of the variance in Overinvolved countertransference (R2 = .085, 
adjusted R2 = .024).  
Discussion 
The present study examined the roles of empathy and differentiation of self in the 
expression of secondary traumatic stress symptoms and countertransference in a sample of 
survivor therapists. These results indicated that differentiation of self is a strong predictor of 
secondary traumatic stress reactions and countertransference, even beyond the effects of 
therapist demographic and professional factors, personal PTSD scores, and empathy. 
Although neither cognitive nor affective empathy significantly related to secondary traumatic 
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stress and countertransference on their own, a three-way interaction between cognitive 
empathy, affective empathy, and differentiation of self emerged, suggesting that the effects 
of empathy on secondary traumatic stress and underinvolved countertransference change 
according to one’s level of differentiation of self. These results reveal a new understanding 
about the empathic experiences of survivor therapists, and how these empathic experiences 
may be managed while working with traumatized clients. Findings from the present study 
expand upon previous literature by examining the experiences of survivor therapists more 
closely, by breaking empathy down into its cognitive and affective components, by 
incorporating the level of differentiation the therapist brings into the therapeutic relationship, 
and most interestingly by examining how affective empathy, cognitive empathy, and 
differentiation of self work together to predict secondary traumatic stress and 
countertransference reactions. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that secondary traumatic stress would be positively related to 
both underinvolved and overinvolved countertransference. The present findings supported 
this hypothesis, and demonstrated a significant, positive relationship between secondary 
traumatic stress and both underinvolved and overinvolved countertransference. This result 
suggests that mental health professionals’ experience within the therapeutic relationship can 
have an impact on their wellbeing, beyond just the immediacy of the therapeutic interaction. 
These results also contribute to the ongoing debate regarding secondary traumatic stress and 
countertransference as distinct or overlapping constructs (Berzoff & Kita, 2010; Kanter, 
2007). Given the magnitude of the correlations between these variables, it seems reasonable 
to suggest that countertransference and secondary traumatic stress are related but distinct 
phenomena. It may be that secondary traumatic stress and countertransference are more 
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closely related in samples of survivor therapists compared to therapists without underlying 
personal trauma. This suggestion that secondary traumatic stress and countertransference 
occur more strongly together in samples of survivor therapists would match the assumptions 
of Wilson and colleagues (1994), who stated that traumatized therapists may inadvertently 
address their own unresolved trauma in the therapeutic session in the form of 
countertransference. However, the small to moderate relationship between 
countertransference and secondary traumatic stress in the present sample, and the finding in 
previous studies that secondary traumatic stress emerges in clinicians who do not have 
underlying personal trauma (Adams et al., 2008; Kadambi & Trsucott, 2004), supports 
Figley’s (1995) claim that secondary traumatic stress results from more than simply 
unresolved trauma. 
Research Question 1 asked if there were differences in the relationship between 
secondary traumatic stress and the two types of countertransference. Although my results 
cannot assume the timing of countertransference and secondary traumatic stress, if one 
happens before the other or if they occur simultaneously, the stronger relationship between 
secondary stress and underinvolved countertransference suggests that those who are reporting 
more detachment from and avoidance of their traumatized clients are also reporting greater 
secondary traumatic stress. It is likely that professionals reporting greater underinvolved 
countertransference may be avoiding strong emotions with their traumatized clients and 
detaching from the therapeutic process because they are overwhelmed with secondary 
traumatic stress. For mental health professionals experiencing greater secondary traumatic 
stress, it may be easier, and safer, to cope with this intense reaction by disengaging from the 
stressful therapeutic relationship.  
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The positive association between overinvolved countertransference and secondary 
traumatic stress suggests that those who report more enmeshment (i.e., self-disclosing more 
and going over session limits) with their traumatized clients also report greater secondary 
traumatic stress. Wilson and colleagues (1994) suggested that individuals may experience 
overinvolved countertransference as a result of overidentifying with the client, and having 
some unmet need fulfilled through work with that client. It could be that the preoccupation 
with one’s traumatized clients leads to overexposure to traumatic content or a strain on the 
mental health professional’s empathic connection with the client, resulting in increased 
secondary traumatic stress; however, the relationship between overinvolved 
countertransference and secondary traumatic stress was significantly weaker than the 
relationship between underinvolved countertransference and secondary traumatic stress. The 
opportunity for the mental health professional to have some personal needs met through 
disclosure and enmeshment may limit the relationship with secondary traumatic stress, as this 
may indicate a general openness to traumatic content even if at times problematic for the 
therapeutic relationship. Indeed, experiential avoidance has been associated with increased 
posttraumatic stress symptoms and worse mental health outcomes (Fledderus et al., 2010; 
Kashdan et al., 2006; Orcutt et al., 2020). The deleterious effects avoidance can have on 
wellbeing may help to explain why underinvolved countertransference was more strongly 
associated with secondary traumatic stress than overinvolved countertransference.  
Hypothesis 2 predicted that affective empathy would be positively related to 
secondary traumatic stress; due to mixed results in previous research, no hypothesis was 
made regarding the relationship between cognitive empathy and secondary traumatic stress. 
In the present study, the relationships between both affective empathy and cognitive and 
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secondary traumatic stress were negligible. These findings differ from previous studies that 
found weak positive, but statistically significant associations between affective empathy and 
therapist reactions like secondary traumatic stress (Gleichgerrcht & Decety, 2013), burnout 
(Cieslak et al., 2014), and compassion fatigue (Thomas & Otis, 2010), but are congruent with 
previous studies finding negligible associations between cognitive empathy and STS 
(Gleichgerrcht & Decety, 2013). This result indicates that affective empathy alone does not 
correspond with secondary traumatic stress within this sample of survivor therapists. An 
explanation for this finding could be that the previous studies finding a significant 
relationship between affective empathy and secondary traumatic stress/other related 
constructs predominantly use the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). The IRI has been 
criticized for its lack of coherent factor structure, and inclusion of subscales that may not be a 
valid representation of affective empathy in particular (Chrysikou & Thompson, 2016; Hojat 
et al., 2005; Pulos et al., 2004). For example, the IRI subscale most commonly related to 
secondary traumatic stress, compassion fatigue, and vicarious trauma is labeled Personal 
Distress. This subscale contains items that seem to reflect emotional and empathic regulation 
as opposed to pure affective empathy (e.g., “I tend to lose control in emergencies,” and “I 
sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation”; Davis, 1980). 
Indeed, more recent empathy researchers have questioned the construct validity of the 
Personal Distress scale, arguing that it simply measures sympathetic behavior and emotional 
responses to emergency situations (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006; Reniers et al., 2011). Thus, 
previous findings may actually be pointing towards empathic regulation as a significant 
predictor of secondary traumatic stress. The present findings support this thought, given the 
negligible association between affective empathy and secondary traumatic stress and 
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countertransference alone, but its significant effect within its interaction with cognitive 
empathy and differentiation of self. It appears that the affective empathic reaction alone is 
not sufficient to incite an increase in secondary traumatic stress. 
Due to a lack of previous literature on the topic, Research Question 2 inquired 
whether cognitive and affective empathy relate to countertransference, and if these 
relationships varied by type of countertransference. In general, neither empathy measure was 
significantly correlated with countertransference, with the exception of the negative 
relationship between the cognitive empathy-OS scale and underinvolved countertransference. 
Cognitive empathy-OS, otherwise known as Online Simulation, represents an effort to 
actively put oneself in another’s position in a future-oriented way (Reniers et al., 2011). This 
component of cognitive empathy differs from perspective taking, which refers to the intuitive 
ability to put oneself in another’s shoes (e.g., “I am good at predicting how someone will 
feel,”). Whereas the Perspective Taking scale measures trait cognitive empathy skills, the 
Online Simulation scale measures how one actually uses the skill before reacting (e.g., 
“Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I was in their place,”). 
This is an important distinction. Mental health professionals likely all see themselves as 
having the ability to perspective take, but how they actively use that ability appears to differ. 
Survivor therapists can better cognitively simulate others’ emotional experience and use this 
knowledge to dictate their next steps experienced less underinvolved countertransference in 
this study. It is likely that therapists who are actively using cognitive empathy skills in 
session are more likely to remain engaged with the client. It may be, too, that the active 
employment of cognitive empathy skills allows mental health professionals a productive way 
to work with the intense affect within the room, leading to a decrease in provider anxiety and 
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ultimately, less of a need to detach from the session in order to assuage that anxiety. The lack 
of associations between Perspective Taking and affective empathy with underinvolved 
countertransference reveals that trait cognitive empathy skills and affective empathy alone do 
not appear to have an immediate effect on a professional’s detachment experiences within the 
session. Similarly, the lack of significant associations between empathy variables and 
overinvolved countertransference suggests that the empathic experiences of therapists with 
personal trauma do not seem to have any bearing on their experiences of enmeshment and 
overidentification with the client. 
Hypothesis 3 examined the relationship between differentiation of self and cognitive 
empathy. Differentiation of self was expected to be positively related to cognitive empathy, 
and results revealed that differentiation of self was indeed positively related with Online 
Simulation, but not significantly related to Perspective Taking. This finding is in line with 
previous studies finding positive relationships between differentiation of self and effortful 
control (Skowron & Dendy, 2004; Palmer, 2017). In an unpublished thesis, Palmer (2017) 
found, in a sample of 184 adults, that differentiation of self was positively associated with 
multiple executive functioning indices, including behavior regulatory skills (e.g., inhibition) 
and meta-cognitive skills (e.g., working memory). Online Simulation has also demonstrated a 
significant negative relationship with impulsivity (r = -.32, p < .01) whereas Perspective 
Taking has not (r = -.03, p > .05), suggesting that individuals who engage in more Online 
Simulation may also be characterized as less impulsive and better regulated, but the same 
cannot be said for individuals who report high perspective taking skills (Reniers et al., 2011). 
Individuals who are better differentiated are more likely to engage in a balance of both 
rational and emotional processing, allowing for a more stable sense of self and behavioral 
  
106 
 
 
regulation. Thus, it makes sense that professionals who report greater differentiation of self 
also report a greater tendency to actively consider others’ perspectives and emotions before 
acting (i.e., Online Simulation). It may be that greater differentiation of self makes it easier to 
step into another person’s experience while contemporaneously reflecting on how this may 
affect one’s own actions.  
Still, it is surprising that there was no relationship between differentiation of self and 
Perspective Taking. Given the nature of therapeutic work, mental health professionals may 
identify as having strong perspective taking abilities and reporting such abilities may be 
socially desirable. It could be that mental health professionals typically have an intuitive 
ability to perspective take across varying levels of differentiation of self, but professionals 
with higher differentiation of self tend to actively use this perspective taking to inform future 
actions (i.e., Online Simulation). In fact, greater differentiation of self may keep 
professionals, especially those with personal trauma, from over-empathizing with clients, and 
instead maintain an appropriate balance of considering others and considering one’s own 
wellbeing. On this note, perhaps trait perspective taking can only help a professional so much 
without appropriate management and future-oriented action. 
Results from Hypothesis 4 revealed that differentiation of self was inversely related to 
both secondary traumatic stress (large effect size) and countertransference (small to medium 
effect sizes). As hypothesized, it appears that mental health professionals who are better at 
untangling their emotional experience from their client’s through a personal balance of the 
pulls of togetherness and separateness experience less secondary traumatic stress, a finding 
that is congruent with previous studies (Halevi & Idisis, 2018; Thomas & Otis, 2010; Zerach, 
2015). Halevi and Idisis (2018), in a sample of 134 mental health therapists, found strong 
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negative relationships between both the interpersonal and intrapersonal dimensions of 
differentiation of self and vicarious trauma. The authors concluded that mental health 
professionals with higher levels of differentiation of self likely have ample emotional and 
intellectual resources that enable clear but flexible boundaries. These boundaries then assist 
the professional in remaining separate enough from the client to reduce damage done by 
vicarious trauma and secondary traumatic stress. Individuals with high differentiation of self 
have a clear sense of self, allowing them to more easily traverse autonomy-intimacy pulls 
that are likely to be heightened in any therapy session. This ability is especially important for 
therapists with their own personal trauma: a clear identification of the self and the ability to 
balance rational and emotional processing may enable the traumatized therapist to avoid 
enmeshing themselves with the client and, subsequently, the client’s trauma.  
The negative relationship between differentiation of self and both underinvovled and 
overinvolved countertransference is also supported by previous findings (Connery & 
Murdock, 2019; Fatter & Hayes, 2013). Connery and Murdock (2019), using the same 
measures for underinvolved and overinvolved countertransference and differentiation of self, 
collected a sample of 262 professional therapists and trainees. They found a small but 
significant relationship between underinvolved countertransference and differentiation of self 
(r = -.19, p < .001), and a medium significant relationship between overinvolved 
countertransference and differentiation of self (r = -.44, p < .001). Connery and Murdock 
(2019) found group differences by training in overinvolved countertransference, such that 
trainees experienced significantly more overinvolved reactions than did the licensed 
professionals. Differences between trainees and professionals may explain the effect size 
difference between the two studies regarding the relationship between differentiation of self 
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and overinvolved countertransference, given that the present study only contained 
professionals and not trainees. Regardless, these results suggest that individuals who are 
more differentiated experience less overinvolved and underinvolved countertransference 
reactions. Differentiation of self can assist mental health professionals in navigating anxiety 
in the therapeutic space that may otherwise lead to countertransference reactions and 
behaviors—especially with clients who may, with strong affect or intense pathology, test the 
boundaries of the therapeutic relationship. Just as differentiation of self allows individuals to 
neither cut off from nor enmesh with others in intimate relationships, so too does 
differentiation of self allow for the same distance/closeness balance in the therapeutic 
relationship. Furthermore, professionals who are better differentiated likely know themselves 
and their reactions and can remain vigilant to their internal conflicts that emerge within the 
therapeutic space (Hayes et al., 2018).  
Hypotheses 5-7 and Research Question 3 assessed how affective empathy, cognitive 
empathy, and differentiation of self work together to predict secondary traumatic stress and 
both types of countertransference. As established in Hypothesis 5, only differentiation of self 
had a multivariate, negative effect on secondary traumatic stress and countertransference, 
over and above therapist personal and professional characteristics and personal PTSD scores. 
This finding was not surprising considering the lack of bivariate relationships between the 
empathy variables and outcome variables, with the exception of cognitive empathy-OS and 
Underinvolved countertransference. Notably, assessment of observed power revealed that the 
lack of statistically significant relationships between empathy variables and the outcome 
variables may be a result of not having adequate statistical power necessary to detect true 
effects. Considering these results, particularly the lack of association between affective 
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empathy and the outcome variables, it was also not surprising that none of the two-way 
interactions significantly predicted secondary traumatic stress or countertransference. The 
inability of both cognitive empathy and differentiation of self to moderate the effect of 
affective empathy differs slightly from previous studies. For example, Lamothe et al. (2014) 
found that cognitive empathy and affective empathy interacted to predict burnout in a sample 
of 295 French general practitioners, with high affective empathy and high cognitive empathy 
predicting lower burnout. Similarly, Lamm et al. (2007) found that manipulating self-other 
differentiation in a sample of 17 healthy adults modified feelings of distress in response to 
seeing another individual experience pain, such that those primed to self-differentiate 
experienced less distress than those primed to personalize the pain (i.e., imagine what this 
person feels versus imagine if this were happening to you). However, with the addition of the 
three-way interaction term between affective empathy, cognitive empathy-OS, and 
differentiation of self, the interaction between affective empathy and cognitive empathy did 
indeed emerge after accounting for varying levels of differentiation of self. The three-way 
interaction provides support for Decety and Jackson’s (2004) and Eisenberg’s (2000) theory 
of empathy, such that three pieces are necessary for effective empathy: an affective 
component in which a person shares in the emotional experience of another, a cognitive 
component in which a person can conceptualize and understand another’s experience, and a 
regulatory mechanism by which self- and other-feelings are kept distinct. 
The three-way interaction revealed that for individuals with low differentiation of 
self, high cognitive empathy-OS exacerbates a positive relationship between affective 
empathy on secondary traumatic stress. However, for individuals with high differentiation of 
self, Cognitive empathy-OS appears to buffer and even reverse the relationship between 
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affective empathy and secondary traumatic stress, such that affective empathy when 
modulated by high cognitive empathy does not increase and even trends towards reducing 
secondary traumatic stress—a finding similar to Lamothe et al. (2014). It appears that a high 
level of differentiation of self is necessary for survivor therapists to optimally utilize both 
aspects of empathy—they seem to be able to tolerate both high affective empathy and high 
cognitive empathy without experiencing an increase in secondary traumatic stress. 
Meanwhile, survivor therapists with low differentiation of self but high affective and 
cognitive empathy experienced the most secondary traumatic stress within the entire sample. 
As Decety et al. (2010) suggested, one’s ability to down-regulate emotion and clearly 
differentiate themselves from another may allow for increased recruitment of cognitive 
processing while engaging in affective empathy, increasing the clinician’s tolerance for 
strong empathic processing without a corresponding increase in personal distress. Indeed, 
intrapersonal differentiation of self is associated with an advanced ability to integrate rational 
and emotional processing (Bowen, 1978; Timm & Keiley, 2011). For individuals with high 
differentiation of self, the recruitment of cognitive processing like Online Simulation appears 
to temper distress caused by the emotional sharing indicative of strong affective empathy. 
Although strong cognitive empathy and affective empathy may occur concurrently in 
individuals with low differentiation of self, the failure to integrate these processes may result 
in a compounding effect of the two empathic processes: without high levels of differentiation 
of self, having high levels of both cognitive and affective empathy appears to overwhelm the 
survivor therapist, leaving them more vulnerable to secondary traumatic stress. Furthermore, 
differentiating interpersonally from the client allows the survivor therapist to remain close to 
but fundamentally separate from the client’s experience (Halevi & Idisis, 2018). High levels 
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of cognitive and affective empathy allow the therapist this closeness, while high 
differentiation of self allows the therapist to step into this closeness without walking away 
with pain that is not their own. In this way, greater empathy without the ability to 
differentiate one’s own experience from the client’s results in a toxic closeness, and a sharing 
of traumatic symptoms.   
The three-way interaction between affective empathy, cognitive empathy-OS, and 
differentiation of self revealed, in general, a neutral-to-negative relationship between 
affective empathy an underinvolved countertransference. This is most clearly identified for 
individuals with low cognitive empathy and low differentiation of self, and individuals with 
high cognitive empathy and high differentiation of self. The survivor therapists reporting the 
greatest amount of underinvolved countertransference reactions had low affective empathy, 
low cognitive empathy, and low differentiation of self. It is likely that, with such low 
empathy scores, these professionals are more prone to cut off from their traumatized clients 
when anxiety arises within the session. Professionals need some capacity to intimate with the 
client in order to keep from cutting off, whether that be high affective empathy or high 
cognitive empathy; however, under low differentiation of self conditions, having high levels 
of cognitive empathy results in an increased risk for underinvolved countertransference as 
affective empathy increases, again suggesting that higher levels of differentiation of self is 
needed to tolerate strong cognitive and affective empathic responses. It may be that 
individuals with low differentiation of self practice less empathy as a compensatory 
mechanism to keep their sense of self intact. For survivor therapists especially, limited 
empathy in session may mean less self-other blurring, and thus less of an opportunity for 
retraumatization or secondary trauma. Unfortunately, however, having little cognitive and 
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affective empathy likely results in emotional cutoff and a distanced therapeutic relationship. 
For survivor therapists with high differentiation of self, the interaction between cognitive 
empathy and affective empathy looks similar to secondary traumatic stress: high cognitive 
empathy and high affective empathy interact to predict the lowest report of underinvolved 
countertransference within the sample. Again, clinicians with high differentiation of self can 
more easily tolerate high affective and cognitive empathy, integrating both into healthy 
relationship building with their clients without cutting off in response to anxiety. 
Notably, these results elucidate ‘for whom’ increased empathy is useful. For example, 
high affective empathy will not necessarily lead to increased secondary traumatic stress: 
when combined with high differentiation of self and high cognitive empathy, affective 
empathy appears to have a negative relationship with secondary traumatic stress and may be 
useful for the therapeutic relationship. For underinvolved countertransference especially, 
affective empathy can be helpful in keeping the provider from cutting off entirely, and 
keeping the therapist engaged with the client. However, individuals with low differentiation 
of self do not benefit from high cognitive and affective empathy, and instead see increases in 
secondary traumatic stress and, while less underinvolved countertransference than survivor 
therapists with low empathy, more underinvolved countertransference compared to survivor 
therapists with high differentiation of self. Thus, for individuals with low differentiation of 
self, empathy becomes a double-edged sword: too much, and these therapists run the risk of 
increased secondary traumatic stress—too little, and they run the risk of cutting off from their 
client and possibly damaging therapeutic progress. 
The three-way interaction including cognitive empathy-PT approached significance 
but ultimately did not account for additional variance within the outcome variables. This 
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finding supports the earlier interpretation that perhaps the inherent trait of perspective taking 
is insufficient to temper the effects of affective empathy, or have a major impact on 
secondary traumatic stress and countertransference. Ultimately, the relationship between 
empathy, differentiation of self, secondary traumatic stress, and countertransference appears 
to be best understood when considering active cognitive empathy behaviors as opposed to 
trait cognitive empathy. Surprisingly, none of the models were able to account for a 
significant amount of variance within overinvolved countertransference scores. It appears 
that the overinvolved countertransference response, as it stands within the present sample, is 
poorly understood. Returning to Connery and Murdock’s (2019) study, trainees tend to 
experience more overinvolved countertransference than do professionals in the field. It is 
likely that enmeshment responses are quite difficult to maintain for professionals, given high 
caseloads and demands for time and attention that trainees do not necessarily experience in 
clinical settings. When anxiety, the precipitating experience to countertransference, emerges 
within the therapeutic space, detaching and avoiding may be an easier (and perhaps more 
energy-effective) defense for professionals than preoccupation.  
Theoretical Contributions 
The present study contributed to the extant literature in many ways. First and 
foremost, survivor therapists are an understudied group within the professional community, 
despite the high likelihood of a trauma history within mental health professionals and calls 
for research in this area (Butler et al., 2017; Hayes, 2002, 2004; Zerubavel & Wright, 2012). 
This study contributes to our understanding of how survivor therapists from an array of 
professional affiliations manage therapeutic relationships with traumatized clients, 
highlighting the importance of self-other differentiation in tolerating high levels of empathy.  
  
114 
 
 
Previous studies have also theorized the overlap between secondary traumatic stress 
and countertransference, but no study to date has attempted to examine both constructs 
together to assess empirical overlap. The present study does so and provides support for 
claims that secondary traumatic stress and at least underinvolved and overinvolved 
countertransference are related but distinct concepts (Berzoff & Kita, 2010; Figley, 2005). 
Assessing these constructs together captures a broader therapist experience and opens the 
door for future research to refine our understanding about the overlapping emergence of 
secondary trauma and countertransference. Furthermore, the present study underscores the 
importance of empathy and differentiation of self in both therapist reactions. Differentiation 
of self, as well as the interaction between differentiation of self, affective empathy, and 
cognitive empathy predicted secondary traumatic stress beyond traumatic exposure variables. 
In fact, traumatized caseload was no longer a significant predictor of secondary traumatic 
stress when all other variables were entered into the model, supporting claims of previous 
researchers that emergence of secondary traumatic stress has more to do with therapist 
personal factors than exposure to traumatic content (Devilly, et al., 2009; Geoffrion et al., 
2016; Kadambi & Truscott, 2004; Ortlepp & Friedman, 2002; Rzeszutek et al., 2015). On the 
other hand, it may simply be that the secondary traumatic stress model originally proposed 
by Figley (1995), such that the primary transmission of secondary traumatic stress is 
exposure to clients’ traumatic stories, is better fit for therapists who have not already been 
exposed to their own personal trauma. Indeed, an unexpected result of trauma exposure can 
be posttraumatic growth and resilience (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2006). 
Countertransference has previously been conceptualized as a disruption of empathy, 
but exactly how empathy is disrupted has been unclear (Peabody & Gelso, 1982). Based on 
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the present findings, it appears that underinvolved countertransference specifically is 
predicted by low differentiation of self, and a lack of, or perhaps an exhaustion of, both 
cognitive and affective empathy. Literature exploring countertransference management 
acknowledge that empathy and self-integration (similar to differentiation of self) are essential 
for good countertransference management (Hayes et al., 2018; Perez-Rojas et al., 2017). The 
present findings provided support for these qualities as underinvolved countertransference 
management tools, and suggest that the two must be present together to perhaps allow for the 
self-reflection necessary for countertransference management (Peabody & Gelso, 1982). 
Additionally, rather than conceptualizing empathy as one-dimensional, the present study 
supports the assessment of empathy as a multidimensional construct, which may provide new 
directions for countertransference management research.  
Another contribution of this study is the examination of empathy in greater detail, not 
just assessing for both cognitive and affective empathy but also examining two distinct 
components of cognitive empathy. This careful analysis revealed the importance of active 
cognitive empathy behaviors, as opposed to trait cognitive empathy, in altering the effects of 
affective empathy. The addition of the Bowen Family Systems Theory construct of 
differentiation of self gave needed context for the interaction between cognitive and affective 
empathy and provided support for Decety and Jackson’s (2004) and Eisenberg’s (2000) 
theorized model of empathy. Specifically, the present findings demonstrate that cognitive 
empathy can indeed moderate the effects of affective empathy, but that this moderation is 
based on the therapist’s level of differentiation of self. Empathy researchers have previously 
hypothesized that self-other differentiation may be needed to manage empathy, and the 
  
116 
 
 
integration of Bowen Family Systems Theory provides an answer as to how individuals 
develop this ability: from the family system.  
Contributing to Bowen Family Systems Theory, the present study demonstrates the 
ways in which differentiation of self facilitates empathy. Although empathy is seen as an 
innate human quality necessary for social functioning, it is likely that empathy is molded in 
the context of one’s family-of-origin based on the child’s ability to experience and balance 
both intimacy with the emotional system and appropriate autonomy from it (Ferrera, 2014). 
Based on the results of the present study, manifestations of emotional cutoff or fusion, which 
are the interpersonal ways in which an undifferentiated individual manages the anxiety that 
occurs in close relationships, can be understood as mismanaged empathy. Namely, high 
empathy coupled with low differentiation of self results in a greater sharing of trauma, or 
perhaps fusion with the client’s trauma, and greater secondary traumatic stress. Lower 
empathy and low differentiation of self results in greater emotional cutoff from the client’s 
experience, and thus underinvolvement with the client. These findings underscore the 
importance of differentiation of self in mental health professionals, and provides support for 
the utility of differentiation of self in relationship management in professional therapeutic 
relationships as well as in family or intimate relationships.  .  
Clinical Implications 
The present study provides many practical implications for mental health 
professionals, particularly regarding supervision and training. Given the ubiquity of trauma 
in our clients’ lives and our own, the present study bolsters the need for trauma-informed 
care as a guide for educators, agency leaders, and supervisors into safe training about 
secondary traumatic stress, countertransference, and the effects of clinicians’ own trauma 
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(Knight, 2018). Whereas trauma-informed practice is a popular method promoted among 
mental health programs to create an atmosphere of safety, trust, collaboration, choice, and 
empowerment with traumatized clients, trauma-informed care asserts that these same 
principles are needed for healthy workplace environments among staff as well (Knight, 2018; 
Wolf et al., 2014). Central to trauma-informed care is trauma-informed supervision, which 
provides a framework for supervisors to address issues of primary and secondary trauma 
without crossing boundaries into “quasi-therapy” with the supervisee (Knight, 2018, p. 18). 
The present findings suggest that differentiation of self and empathy may be helpful topics to 
include in trauma-informed supervision, particularly with regards to experiencing secondary 
traumatic stress and countertransference.  
The findings underscore the importance of the mental health professionals’ ability to 
differentiate themselves from their client. Failing to do so is associated with increased risk of 
secondary traumatic stress and countertransference, which will harm not just the therapist but 
the client as well (Hayes et al., 2011). Supervisors and supervisees alike may find it 
beneficial to assess their levels of differentiation of self. Bowen (1978) asserted that, before 
assisting clients, therapists have a responsibility to address their own family dynamics and 
their own means of dealing with the intimacy-autonomy strain that is present in close 
relationships. Just as individuals bring their own family dynamics into their future 
relationships, so too will therapists into their therapeutic relationships. Training programs 
initiating clinicians on their professional journey should also consider integrating the 
importance of self-other differentiation into counseling method curricula. Kerr and Bowen 
(1988) suggest family genogram study as a means of assessing intergenerational family 
dynamics, which can help provide a visual for patterns of differentiation of self within a 
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family’s emotional system. Such visual tools have proved useful in clinical settings, and may 
be just as useful for clinicians in training to become more mindful of the relational dynamics 
they may bring into the therapeutic or supervision space (Aten et al., 2008; Magnuson & 
Shaw, 2003).  
It would also behoove supervisors to pay close attention to their supervisees’ 
expressions of empathy and create active dialog around empathy management and the role of 
differentiation of self. Of particular importance is the role of Online Simulation in empathy 
management, as these are active behaviors that supervisors can model and teach to 
supervisees with the expressed purpose of improving affective empathy management. For 
example, a supervisor may ask their supervisee the following: “Imagine your client’s feelings 
here. How does their emotion affect your own? How might this understanding influence your 
next decision?” Doing so actively allows the supervisee to empathically simulate their 
client’s experience, and become more aware of their own reactions in order to proceed more 
thoughtfully with the self-other barrier intact. Another example may be, “How are you 
understanding your client’s experience in this moment? Whose feelings are you 
experiencing, your own or your client’s? How do you know? How close or distant do you 
feel from the client, and how might this affect your decisions moving forward?” Practicing 
these self-other reflective behaviors, informed by the clinician’s levels of differentiation of 
self and empathy, may allow for therapeutic engagement while reducing the risk of 
secondary traumatic stress; doing so in supervision allows for an assessment of 
countertransference as well. For clinicians with personal trauma and lower levels of 
differentiation of self, the findings of the present study suggest that strong empathy may be 
difficult to manage without negative consequences. Attention should be paid to improving 
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clinicians’ awareness around their level of differentiation of self first, and perhaps gradually 
building in empathic simulation exercises like the ones mentioned above.  
The findings in the present study show that personal trauma does not necessarily 
preclude survivor therapists from protecting themselves against secondary traumatic stress 
and countertransference. In fact, survivor therapists likely have a large well of empathy from 
which to draw for their clients, and when coupled with high differentiation of self, these 
therapists appear to remain well and engaged. Supervisors should thus emphasize the 
strengths of these therapists, rather than assuming that personal trauma equates increased 
vulnerability. Underscoring these strengths may more effectively empower deeply empathic 
clinicians to remain attuned not only to their clients, but their own wellbeing as well.  
Less central to the study purpose but worth noting, the present findings also 
demonstrated differences in secondary traumatic stress by professional affiliation. Clinical 
social workers reported significantly greater secondary traumatic stress than any other 
professional group in the current sample. This finding is in line with previous studies finding 
elevated rates of both secondary traumatic stress and PTSD in social workers (Bogstrand et 
al., 2016; Bride, 2007; Carangi et al., 2017; Choi, 2011). This finding may be due to 
workload differences between social workers and other mental health professionals. For 
example, social workers are often responsible for clinical work and case management, and 
may be employed in clinical settings with increased exposure to their clients’ struggle like 
home-based care, child and family services, and the criminal-legal system (U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2020). In previous studies as well as present findings, workload and in 
particular trauma caseload has been associated with increased secondary traumatic stress 
(Hensel et al., 2015). On another note, a systemic review of United States social work 
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supervision demonstrated that negative experiences in supervision were associated with 
social worker burnout and emotional exhaustion (Carpenter et al., 2013). Notably, according 
to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2020), social workers experience one of the highest 
rates of injury or illness out of all occupations. Whatever the cause, social workers with 
personal trauma appear to be particularly vulnerable to secondary traumatic stress. Social 
work educators, supervisors, and managers should take care in addressing job stress and 
secondary traumatization, perhaps through supervision or agency training, with social work 
trainees and clinicians.  
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions 
 Beyond the important theoretical and clinical implications of the present findings, this 
study had many strengths. Through online surveys, I was able to capture a wide professional 
audience, such that the findings reflect the experiences of social workers, counselors, and 
psychologists, improving the generalizability of the findings across professional groups and 
highlighting the importance for social workers in particular. Using an anonymous online 
format, participants may have felt safer disclosing symptoms of secondary traumatic stress 
and potentially stigmatized countertransference experiences that they may not otherwise 
disclose in professional settings. In sampling survivor therapists specifically, the present 
study was also able to account for personal trauma in greater detail than previous studies by 
inquiring about traumatic events, timing of the trauma, and personal PTSD scores. By doing 
so, I can more confidently present secondary traumatic stress findings beyond the effects of 
personal trauma, a needed inclusion in the present literature (Elwood et al., 2011; Molnar et 
al., 2017). Furthermore, Zerubavel and Wright (2012) lamented that the failure of the mental 
health professional field to discuss the prevalence of “wounded healers” further reinforces 
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silence and shame for survivor therapists balancing their own adversity and that of their 
clients. Perhaps one of the greatest strengths of the present study is the normalization of 
personal trauma in mental healthcare professionals, and the exploration of factors that allow 
these professionals to protect themselves from secondary traumatic stress and 
countertransference. 
The present study also took a more comprehensive approach in assessing empathy, 
which allowed for the examination of the novel interaction between affective empathy, 
Online Simulation, and differentiation of self. By assessing both dimensions of empathy, and 
exploring the differences between trait and active cognitive empathy (i.e., Perspective Taking 
vs. Online Simualtion), I answered Ludwick and Figley’s (2016) call for a closer 
examination of the role of empathy in secondary traumatic stress transmission. The present 
findings also provided needed context regarding the relationships between cognitive 
empathy, affective empathy, and countertransference. To my knowledge, only one other 
study has attempted to assess both dimensions of empathy in relation to countertransference 
management (Talbot et al., 2019), and no other studies besides the present have attempted to 
assess both dimensions of empathy and actual countertransference reactions.  
Despite many strengths, several factors limit the generalizability of these findings and 
inform future directions of study. Because these measures were given in survey form at one 
time, causality cannot be assumed. Although theory would dictate that empathy and 
differentiation of self develop before and contribute to secondary traumatic stress and 
countertransference, there is little to determine whether secondary traumatic stress and 
countertransference occur simultaneously or if one precedes the other. Now that we know 
that secondary traumatic stress and countertransference are indeed empirically related, future 
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work should more closely examine the temporal relationship between secondary traumatic 
stress and countertransference. A longitudinal study examining the emergence of 
countertransference and secondary traumatic stress reactions in therapists over time, perhaps 
through journaling and evaluation of recorded sessions by independent raters, is needed to 
more fully answer whether one reaction occurs as a result of another. Regardless of the 
temporal relationship between secondary traumatic stress and countertransference, 
differentiation of self was the strongest predictor of all three therapist reactions in each of the 
examined models. I encourage future studies to examine the subcomponents of 
differentiation of self to determine whether the interpersonal or intrapersonal dimensions 
drive these associations, or if the interpersonal and intrapersonal dimensions of 
differentiation of self have different relationships with secondary traumatic stress and the 
different types of countertransference. 
Experimental or quasi-experimental studies may be useful in empirically 
demonstrating the cause and effect sequence of empathic processing, self-other 
differentiation, and emergence of therapist reactions. For example, Ivicic and Motta (2017) 
developed an emotional Stroop protocol as a performance-based test of secondary traumatic 
stress. This test could be used with experimental methodology to evaluate whether certain 
client characteristics or primes actively predict changes in secondary traumatic stress in 
therapist samples. Additionally, because the present study utilized self-report, there is a risk 
of social desirability bias. Within the mental health world especially, empathy is seen as a 
socially desirable trait and central to the therapeutic process (Elliott et al., 2011). Although 
the Pictorial Empathy Test is seen as an improvement to other self-report affective empathy 
questionnaires that may more obviously introduce social desirability bias, future studies may 
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find it beneficial to instead use performance-based indicators of both cognitive and affective 
empathy to confirm the present findings. Comparison of the assessed model with a group of 
non-survivor therapists would also be beneficial to assess whether the relationships between 
differentiation of self, empathy, and therapist reactions are ubiquitous or specific to survivor 
therapists. 
I also had difficulties with the reliability of the countertransference outcome 
measures. Contrary to previous studies using the Therapist Response Questionnaire-R 
(Connery & Murdock, 2019; Tanzilli et al., 2016), the present study found that both the 
uniderinvolved and overinvolved countertransference scales had to be altered to achieve 
acceptable reliability. This may be due to the breadth of professional affiliations included in 
the present sample as compared to others using this measure. For example, Betan and 
colleagues (2005) developed the original measure through a sample of psychologists and 
psychiatrists, and Tanzilli and colleagues (2016) revised the measure with a similar sample. 
It could be that clinical social workers and mental health counselors, who make up the 
majority of the present sample, experience countertransference differently than psychologists 
and psychiatrists. Additionally, the sample reported relatively low countertransference, both 
underinvolved and overinvolved, with limited variability. This may be a result of social 
desirability bias, being that professionals may feel shame around experiences of 
countertransference and may thus underreport, or they may simply be poor historians of their 
own countertransference experiences (Fatter & Hayes, 2013). Unfortunately, restricted 
sample variance can also limit scale reliability (Lakes, 2013). Although low reliability may 
have attenuated relationships between the countertransference measures and other study 
variables, underinvolved countertransference scores behaved in expected ways and still 
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revealed significant outcomes. Nevertheless, caution should be taken when interpreting 
results. 
The inability of the hypothesized model to predict overinvolved countertransference 
is intriguing and presents an avenue for future studies. Additional research is needed to 
determine whether overinvolved countertransference is indeed a problem for professionals, 
and if professionals with different training experience overinvolvement differently, or if the 
experience of overinvolved countertransference is better predicted with a model including 
client characteristics (Murdock & Connery, 2019). For example, Betan and colleagues (2005) 
found that overinvolved countertransference was experienced most often by clinicians 
treating clients with Borderline Personality Disorder. Tanzilli et al. (2016) also found 
positive associations between overinvolved countertransference and both Borderline 
Personality Disorder and Avoidant Personality Disorder client diagnoses. Again, however, 
both of these studies utilized psychologist and psychiatrist samples only. Dependent sample 
studies including both therapist and client characteristics across multiple professional 
affiliations may help to clarify when mental health professionals cross the line between 
engaged and overinvolved. Future studies would also do well to limit the use of self-report to 
assess countertransference, given the possibility for bias and error (Hayes, 2004). 
One of the most notable limitations of the present study is the lack of generalizability 
to non-White, non-heterosexual, and non-cisgender female therapists. Although the sample 
reflects the majority of workers in the mental health field to date, the field is continually 
diversifying, thus it is important for studies to reflect the varying experiences of intersecting 
identities (Buche et al., 2016). Although understudied within the mental health profession 
specifically, evidence shows that individuals with marginalized identities experience 
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significant workplace stress and discrimination (Filut et al., 2020; Dietert & Dentice, 2009). 
These negative experiences affect the wellbeing for clinicians with non-dominant cultures 
and identities, and may contribute to secondary traumatic stress and countertransference 
experiences. Furthermore, secondary traumatic stress and related constructs compassion 
fatigue and vicarious trauma have been predominantly studied with majority White, 
cisgender, heterosexual samples. It is unclear whether the secondary traumatic stress model 
best describes the experience of therapists who are Black, Indigenous, or People of Color, 
differently-abled, or therapists identifying as LGBQIA or Trans, for example. Future studies 
assessing the utility of the secondary traumatic stress model within more diverse samples is 
needed.  
Although the present study contributed to the literature by accounting for the 
influence of family dynamics on empathy, one’s experience of empathy is also culturally 
informed. There is evidence that a collectivistic worldview, defined as placing the needs of 
one’s in-group above the needs of oneself, relates more positively to both affective and 
cognitive empathy than an individualistic worldview, in which one’s own needs are placed 
above the needs of one’s in-group (Duan et al., 2008). Therapists with more collectivistic 
worldviews may have a higher tolerance for empathic experiences given the other-oriented 
nature of the culture. Individualism is seen as the prevailing worldview for White Americans 
and Western cultures; therefore, the present findings may only be generalizable to therapists 
from these backgrounds. On the other hand, several researchers advocate that individualism 
and collectivism are not opposite endpoints on a single continuum, but are instead 
bidimensional constructs, and that even cultures deemed more collectivistic (e.g., Japanese 
culture) can also produce individualistic worldviews perhaps due to the globalization of 
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Western ideology (Hamamura, 2011; Heinke & Louis, 2009; Oyserman et al., 2002). 
Regardless, how an individual relates to another is not just determined by one’s relationship 
to their caregivers, but also to one’s relationship with broader social systems. I encourage 
future studies to seek therapist samples with diverse worldviews and explore the impact that 
cultural worldview may have on the relationship between empathy and therapist reactions.  
The methodology for recruitment may have also unintentionally biased the sample. In 
order to standardize inclusion, traumatized clients were defined as those who met DSM-5 
criteria for a PTSD Criterion A trauma, but whether these experiences sufficiently encompass 
the breadth of traumatic experiences is hotly contested among professionals (Briere & Scott, 
2015; Weathers, 2017). Experiences of racial trauma, for example, are not included in the 
DSM-5 despite associations with PTSD symptomology, mental health difficulty, and declines 
in wellbeing (Carter, 2007; Comas-Diaz et al., 2019; Pieterse et al., 2012). Although the 
DSM-5’s definition served as a useful operationalization for trauma in creating a more 
homogenous sample, the strict criteria may exclude a broader clinician experience.  
Additionally, the Life Events Checklist-5 was used to help describe the traumatic 
experiences of the sample and helped to serve as a validity check for evidence of traumatic 
experience by asking whether participants directly experienced an event, witnessed it happen, 
or learned about it happening to a loved one. It is likely, however, that certain traumatic 
events have a greater impact than others based on the degree of life threat or violation and the 
proximity to the person experiencing the event (e.g., directly experiencing sexual assault 
versus witnessing a car accident happen to others). Although the current study utilized the 
PTSD Checklist-5 in order to account for severity of current PTSD symptoms, I did not  
assess whether the intensity of the traumatic event itself had an additional impact on therapist 
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reactions. This would likely be very difficult to account for, because traumatic events are 
highly subjective, and the lingering effect of a traumatic event is due to a number of factors 
beyond the perceived intensity of the trauma (Briere & Scott, 2015). Still, future studies may 
approach this question by specifically assessing objective measures of trauma intensity, 
perhaps via degree of life threat and proximity (directly experiencing versus witnessing), as 
well as subjective perceptions of trauma severity. Trauma intensity may be more salient 
when assessing survivors of specific experiences, for example therapists who have 
experienced sexual assault currently treating sexual assault survivors (Baird & Kracen, 
2006).  
Conclusion 
 Trauma-focused therapy is challenging for clients and therapists alike, but is 
incredibly important work. Research on the needs of mental health professionals who mend 
the psychological damage of trauma is needed, particularly survivor therapists who have 
personally witnessed the effects of trauma in their own lives (Hayes 2002, 2004). The present 
findings highlight the importance of differentiation of self as a protective factor against 
difficult therapist reactions like secondary traumatic stress and underinvolved 
countertransference. Furthermore, the findings demonstrate how differentiation of self, 
cognitive empathy, and affective empathy interact to predict secondary traumatic stress and 
countertransference. Specifically, survivor therapists with high levels of differentiation of 
self appear to be able to tolerate both high cognitive empathy and high affective empathy, 
whereas survivor therapists with low differentiation of self experienced increased secondary 
traumatic stress with increased empathy (both cognitive and affective), and increased 
underinvolved countertransference with decreased empathy (both cognitive and affective). 
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However, these variables were unable to account for variance in overinvolved 
countertransference. Mental health professionals are encouraged to utilize differentiation of 
self in supervision and training, and to consider how differentiation of self helps to determine 
one’s efficacy in managing their empathic responses. Approaches geared towards improving 
clinicians’ awareness of their level of differentiation of self are recommended, as well as 
practicing cognitive empathic processing in the therapeutic space. By building clinicians’ 
knowledge about their own ability to differentiate and empathize cognitively and affectively 
with their clients, risk of both secondary traumatic stress and disengagement from the 
therapeutic relationship can be reduced. 
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Table 1. 
 
Traumatic Experiences Present in the Sample, Percentage(n) 
 
Event Happened to me Witnessed it Learned about it 
happening to close 
family or friend 
Natural disaster (for example, 
flood, hurricane, tornado, 
earthquake) 
27.3% (67) 10.2% (25) 16.7% (41) 
Fire or explosion 11.4% (28) 9.4% (23) 14.7% (36) 
Transportation accident (for 
example, car accident, boat 
accident, train wreck, plane 
crash) 
41.6% (102) 21.2% (52) 25.7% (63) 
Serious accident at work, 
home, or during recreational 
activity 
11.0% (27) 6.9% (17) 18.8% (46) 
Exposure to toxic substance 
(for example, dangerous 
chemicals, radiation) 
0.8% (2) 2.9% (7) 6.9% (17) 
Physical assault (for example, 
being attacked, hit, slapped, 
kicked, beaten up) 
52.7% (129) 35.9% (88) 37.1% (91) 
Assault with a weapon (for 
example, being shot, stabbed, 
threatened with a knife, gun, 
bomb) 
16.3% (40) 13.9% (34) 25.3% (62) 
Sexual assault (rape, attempted 
rape, made to perform any type 
of sexual act through force, 
threat of harm, or coercion) 
61.2% (150) 7.8% (19) 40.4% (99) 
Other unwanted or 
uncomfortable sexual 
experience 
74.3% (182) 15.9% (39) 33.4% (82) 
Combat or exposure to a war-
zone (in the military or as a 
civilian) 
1.6% (4) 4.9% (12) 24.9% (61) 
Captivity (for example, being 
kidnapped, abducted, held 
hostage, prisoner of war) 
5.7% (14) 1.2% (3) 10.2% (25) 
Life-threatening illness or 
injury 
20.8% (51) 31.0% (76) 28.6% (70) 
Severe human suffering 10.6% (26) 15.9% (39) 17.6 (43) 
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Sudden violent death (for 
example, homicide, suicide) 
3.7% (9) 11.0% (27) 32.2% (79) 
Sudden accidental death 2.4% (6) 10.6% (26) 29.8% (73) 
Serious injury, harm, or death 
you caused someone else 
3.3% (8) 3.3% (8) 6.9% (17) 
Any other very stressful event 
or experience 
56.3% (138) 24.5% (60) 23.7 (58) 
Percentages are reported as the percentage out of the 245 final sample. Participants were able to choose multiple experiences 
and multiple modes of experience (i.e., ‘It happened to me,’ and ‘I witnessed it happen to someone else’), therefore 
percentages can add up to over 100%. 
  
  
156 
 
 
Table 2. 
 
Variable Descriptive Statistics, N =245 
 Minimum Maximum Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Cronbach’s 
α 
McDonald’s 
ω 
PCL-5 .00 54.00 16.46 11.69 0.71 -0.16 .94 .94 
DSI-SF 1.90 5.85 3.87 0.86 -0.09 -0.54 .90 .91 
PET 1.00 5.00 3.34 0.81 -0.29 -0.43 .88 .88 
QCAE-
Perspective 
Taking 
QCAE – 
Online 
Simulation 
24.00 
 
 
22.00 
40.00 
 
 
36.00 
34.81 
 
 
30.43 
3.42 
 
 
3.52 
-0.64 
 
 
-0.33 
-0.10 
 
 
-0.80 
.75 
 
 
.75 
.75 
 
 
.77 
STSS 16.83 68.00 36.35 11.42 .56 0.01 .89 .89 
TRQ-UI 2.95 13.00 5.11 1.59 2.02 4.92 .60 .62 
TRQ-OI 3.00 15.00 5.11 2.29 1.32 1.73 .65 .74 
PCL-5 = PTSD Check List-5; DSI-SF = Differentiation of Self Inventory-Short Form; PET = Pictorial Empathy Test; 
QCAE = Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy; STSS= Secondary Traumatic Stress Scale; TRQ-UI = 
Therapist Response Questionnaire-Underinvolved; TRQ-OI = Therapist Response Questionnaire-Overinvolved. 
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Table 3. 
 
Correlations between Study Variables and Covariates, N = 245 
      
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. PTSD for Personal Trauma --              
2. Affective Empathy .07 --             
3. Cognitive Empathy – 
Perspective Taking 
.09 .03 --      
      
4.   Cognitive Empathy – Online 
Simulation 
-.03 -.01 .34** --     
      
5.   Differentiation of Self -.57** -.04 -.03 .14* --          
6.   Secondary Traumatic Stress .57** .08 .07 -.04 -.56** --         
7. Countertransference – 
Underinvolved  
.14* -.06 -.12 -.20** -.25** .36** --  
      
8. Countertransference – 
Overinvolved  
.22** .00 .06 -.01 -.22** .19** .12 -- 
      
9. Annual Household Income -.23** .02 .10 -.02 .27** -.20** -.09 -.08 --      
10. Age -.12 -.04 .08 .03 .24** -.15* -.20** .01 .36** --     
11. Percentage of Current Trauma 
Clients 
.10 -.03 .05 -.02 -.04 .15* .07 .03 -.13* -.16* --    
12. Identify as Social Workersa .16* .01 .11 -.01 -.16* .23** -.01 .06 -.10 -.11 .04 --   
13. Currently in Therapya .39** -.05 -.01 -.07 -.20** .21** .05 .12 -.01 -.08 .11 .12 --  
14. Provide Supervision to Othersa -.16* -.14* -.01 -.10 .07 -.18** -.06 -.08 .34** .22** .02 -.08 -.04 -- 
M 16.46 23.38 34.81 30.43 3.87 36.35 5.11 5.11 4.00 38.31 59.38 .32 .37 .29 
SD 11.69 5.69 3.42 3.52 .86 11.42 1.59 2.29 1.24 10.40 28.42 .47 .48 .46 
aBinary variable, *p < .05, **p < .01.       
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Table 4.  
Model 1: Multivariate Effects on Secondary Traumatic Stress, Underinvolved 
Countertransference, and Overinvolved Countertransference, N =245 
Variable Wilk’s λ (Hoteling’s 
Trace) 
F (3, 229) Partial η2 Obs. Power 
(Intercept) .754 (.327) 24.932*** .246 1.000 
Age .969 (.032) 2.422 .031 .599 
Income .997 (.003) .239 .003  .095 
LCSW .963 (.039) 2.943* .037 .694 
% Clients with Trauma .983 (.018) 1.344 .017 .355 
Personal Therapy .998 (.002) .166 .002 .080 
Provide Supervision .982 (.018) 1.402 .018 .370 
PTSD .891 (.122) 9.292*** .109 .997 
Affective Empathy .988 (.012) .911 .012 .248 
Cognitive Empathy - 
PT 
.995 (.005) .405 .005 .130 
Cognitive Empathy - 
OS 
.976 (.024) 1.862 .024 .479 
Differentiation of Self .863 (.158) 12.068*** .137 1.000 
Note: variables were not mean centered prior to analysis. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; PT = Perspective Taking, OS = 
Online Simulation 
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Table 4a. 
Model 1: Univariate Effects on Secondary Traumatic Stress, N = 245 
Variable 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
  
B Std. Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Partial 
η2 
Obs. 
Power 
(Intercept) 43.631 7.710  5.659*** 28.440 58.821 .122 1.000 
Age .018 .059 .017 .311 -.098 .135 .000 .061 
Income .245 .526 .027 .466 -.791 1.281 .001 .075 
LCSW 2.943 1.220 .122 2.413 .540 5.346 .025 .671 
% Clients with 
Trauma 
.040 .020 .101 2.003 .001 .080 .017 .514 
Personal Therapy -.015 1.271 -.001 -.012 -2.520 2.490 .000 .050 
Provide Supervision -2.436 1.341 -.098 -1.817 -5.077 .206 .014 .440 
PTSD .316 .063 .327 5.010*** .191 .440 .098 .999 
Affective Empathy .484 .699 .035 .693 -.893 1.861 .002 .106 
Cognitive Empathy - 
PT 
-.005 .178 -.002 -.031 -.355 .345 .000 .050 
Cognitive Empathy - 
OS 
.010 .172 .003 .057 -.330 .349 .000 .050 
Differentiation of Self -4.723 .828 -.358 -
5.702*** 
-6.354 -3.091 .123 1.000 
R2 = .444         
Adj R2 = .417         
Note: variables were not mean centered prior to analysis. *p < .017, **p < .01, ***p < .001; PT = Perspective Taking, OS = Online Simulation   
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Table 4b. 
Model 1: Univariate Effects on Underinvolved Countertransference, N = 245 
Variable 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t p 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval 
  
B Std. Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Partial 
η2 
Obs. 
Power 
(Intercept) 10.652 1.357  7.848*** .000 7.978 13.327 .210 1.000 
Age -.022 .010 -.144 -2.103 .037 -.042 -.001 .019 .553 
Income .073 .093 .057 .792 .429 -.109 .256 .003 .124 
LCSW -.189 .215 -.056 -.879 .380 -.612 .234 .003 .141 
% Clients with 
Trauma 
.003 .004 .045 .717 .474 -.004 .009 .002 .110 
Personal Therapy -.086 .224 -.026 -.386 .700 -.527 .355 .001 .067 
Provide Supervision -.204 .236 -.059 -.866 .387 -.669 .261 .003 .139 
PTSD .005 .011 .034 .413 .680 -.017 .026 .001 .070 
Affective Empathy -.148 .123 -.075 -1.202 .230 -.390 .094 .006 .224 
Cognitive Empathy - 
PT 
-.027 .031 -.058 -.855 .393 -.088 .035 .003 .136 
Cognitive Empathy - 
OS 
-.067 .030 -.148 -2.215 .028 -.127 -.007 .021 .597 
Differentiation of 
Self 
-.392 .146 -.212 -2.690** .008 -.680 -.150 .030 .764 
R2 = .128          
Adj R2 = .086          
Note: variables were not mean centered prior to analysis. *p < .017, **p < .01, ***p < .001; PT = Perspective Taking, OS = Online Simulation   
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Table 5a.  
Model 2A: Multivariate Effects of Affective Empathy x Cognitive Empathy-PT Interaction 
on Secondary Traumatic Stress, Underinvolved Countertransference, and Overinvolved 
Countertransference, N =245 
Variable Wilk’s λ (Hoteling’s 
Trace) 
F (3, 228) Partial η2 Obs. Power 
(Intercept) .581 (.720) 54.714*** .419 1.000 
Age .970 (.031) 2.347 .030 .584 
Income .997 (.003) .218 .003  .091 
LCSW .963 (.039) 2.941* .037 .693 
% Clients with 
Trauma 
.984 (.016) 1.199 .016 .320 
Personal Therapy .998 (.002) .147 .002 .077 
Provide Supervision .982 (.018) 1.411 .018 .372 
PTSD .891 (.122) 9.254*** .109 .996 
Affective Empathya .988 (.012) .914 .012 .249 
Cognitive Empathy - 
PTa 
.994 (.006) .470 .006 .144 
Cognitive Empathy - 
OSa 
.976 (.024) 1.860 .024 .479 
Differentiation of 
Selfa 
.865 (.157) 11.912*** .135 1.000 
Aff x PTa .990 (.010) .761 .010 .212 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; a = Variables were mean centered prior to analysis; PT = Perspective Taking, OS = 
Online Simulation; Aff x PT = Affective Empathy x Perspective Taking Interaction Term. 
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Table 5b.  
Model 2B: Multivariate Effects of Affective Empathy x Cognitive Empathy-OS Interaction 
on Secondary Traumatic Stress, Underinvolved Countertransference, and Overinvolved 
Countertransference, N =245 
Variable Wilk’s λ (Hoteling’s 
Trace) 
F (3, 228) Partial η2 Obs. 
Power 
(Intercept) .583 (.716) 54.425*** .417 1.000 
Age .972 (.029) 2.212 .028 .556 
Income .997 (.003) .194 .003  .086 
LCSW .963 (.039) 2.928* .037 .691 
% Clients with Trauma .982 (.018) 1.356 .018 .359 
Personal Therapy .998 (.002) .169 .002 .081 
Provide Supervision .981 (.019) 1.475 .019 .387 
PTSD .892 (.121) 9.183*** .108 .996 
Affective Empathya .988 (.012) .931 .012 .253 
Cognitive Empathy - 
PTa 
.995 (.005) .384 .005 .125 
Cognitive Empathy - 
OSa 
.978 (.023) 1.743 .024 .452 
Differentiation of Selfa .859 (.164) 12.488*** .141 1.000 
Aff x OSa .990 (.010) .767 .010 .213 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; a = Variables were mean centered prior to analysis; PT = Perspective Taking, OS = 
Online Simulation; Aff x OS = Affective Empathy x Online Simulation interaction term. 
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Table 6.  
Model 3: Multivariate Effects of Affective Empathy x Differentiation of Self Interaction on 
Secondary Traumatic Stress, Underinvolved Countertransference, and Overinvolved 
Countertransference, N =245 
Variable Wilk’s λ (Hoteling’s 
Trace) 
F (3, 228) Partial η2 Obs. 
Power 
(Intercept) .580 (.724) 55.061*** .420 1.000 
Age .970 (.031) 2.371 .030 .589 
Income .997 (.003) .243 .003  .096 
LCSW .962 (.040) 3.010* .038 .705 
% Clients with Trauma .983 (.017) 1.284 .017 .341 
Personal Therapy .998 (.002) .166 .002 .081 
Provide Supervision .981 (.020) 1.487 .019 .391 
PTSD .892 (.121) 9.164*** .108 .996 
Affective Empathya .989 (.011) .867 .011 .238 
Cognitive Empathy - 
PTa 
.995 (.005) .404 .005 .130 
Cognitive Empathy - 
OSa 
.976 (.025) 1.881 .024 .484 
Differentiation of Selfa .864 (.157) 11.956*** .136 1.000 
Aff x DoSa .994 (.006) .448 .006 .139 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; a = Variables were mean centered prior to analysis; PT = Perspective Taking, OS = 
Online Simulation; Aff x DoS = Affective Empathy x Differentiation of Self interaction term. 
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Table 7.  
Model 4A: Multivariate Effects of Affective Empathy x Cognitive Empathy-PT Interaction 
on Secondary Traumatic Stress, Underinvolved Countertransference, and Overinvolved 
Countertransference, N =245 
Variable Wilk’s λ (Hoteling’s 
Trace) 
F (3, 225) Partial η2 Obs. 
Power 
(Intercept) .572 (.747) 56.021*** .428 1.000 
Age .962 (.039) 2.937* .038 .693 
Income .996 (.004) .317 .004  .111 
LCSW .959 (.043) 3.210* .041 .735 
% Clients with Trauma .985 (.015) 1.122 .015 .300 
Personal Therapy .999 (.001) .112 .001 .070 
Provide Supervision .983 (.017) 1.297 .017 .344 
PTSD .893 (.119) 8.954*** .107 .995 
Affective Empathya .985 (.016) 1.165 .015 .311 
Cognitive Empathy - 
PTa 
.996 (.004) .329 .004 .113 
Cognitive Empathy - 
OSa 
.975 (.025) 1.884 .025 .484 
Differentiation of Selfa .881 (.135) 10.127*** .119 .998 
Aff x PTa .989 (.011) .803 .011 .222 
Aff x DoSa .996 (.004) .316 .004 .111 
PT x DoSa .984 (.016) 1.222 .016 .325 
Aff x PT x DoSa .970 (.031) 2.297 .030 .574 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; a = Variables were mean centered prior to analysis; PT = Perspective Taking, OS = 
Online Simulation, Aff x PT = Affective Empathy x Perspective Taking interaction term, Aff x DoS = Affective Empathy 
x Differentiation of Self interaction term, PT x DoS = Perspective Taking x Differentiation of Self interaction term, Aff x 
PT x DoS = Affective Empathy x Perspective Taking x Differentiation of Self 3-way interaction term. 
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Table 8.  
Model 4B: Multivariate Effects of Affective Empathy x Cognitive Empathy-OS Interaction 
on Secondary Traumatic Stress, Underinvolved Countertransference, and Overinvolved 
Countertransference, N =245 
Variable Wilk’s λ (Hoteling’s 
Trace) 
F (3, 225) Partial η2 Obs. 
Power 
(Intercept) .564 (.772) 57.919*** .436 1.000 
Age .966 (.036) 2.667* .034 .646 
Income .987 (.014) 1.022 .013  .276 
LCSW .963 (.038) 2.861* .037 .680 
% Clients with Trauma .984 (.016) 1.226 .016 .326 
Personal Therapy .998 (.002) .166 .002 .081 
Provide Supervision .976 (.025) 1.857 .024 .478 
PTSD .890 (.123) 9.234*** .110 .996 
Affective Empathya .983 (.018) 1.319 .017 .349 
Cognitive Empathy - 
PTa 
.992 (.008) .618 .008 .178 
Cognitive Empathy - 
OSa 
.978 (.023) 1.726 .022 .448 
Differentiation of Selfa .849 (.177) 13.298*** .151 1.000 
Aff x OSa .996 (.004) .318 .004 .111 
Aff x DoSa .996 (.004) .281 .004 .104 
OS x DoSa .975 (.026) 1.952 .025 .500 
Aff x OS x DoSa .922 (.085) 6.360*** .078 .966 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; a = Variables were mean centered prior to analysis; PT = Perspective Taking, OS = 
Online Simulation, Aff x OS = Affective Empathy x Online Simulation interaction term, Aff x DoS = Affective Empathy 
x Differentiation of Self interaction term, OS x DoS = Online Simulation x Differentiation of Self interaction term, Aff x 
OS x DoS = Affective Empathy x Online Simulation x Differentiation of Self 3-way interaction term. 
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Table 8a. 
Model 4B: Univariate Effects on Secondary Traumatic Stress, N = 245 
Variable 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t p 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
  
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Partial 
η2 
Obs. Power 
(Intercept) 26.933 2.968  9.073*** .000 21.084 32.782 .266 1.000 
Age .013 .059 .012 .220 .826 -.104 .130 .000 .055 
Income .558 .533 .061 1.048 .296 -.492 1.608 .005 .181 
LCSW 3.110 1.204 .129 2.583* .010 .737 5.483 .029 .730 
% Clients with Trauma .038 .020 .095 1.914 .057 -.001 .077 .016 .478 
Personal Therapy -.071 1.252 -.003 -.057 .955 -2.538 2.396 .000 .050 
Provide Supervision -2.680 1.328 -.108 -2.019 .045 -5.296 -.064 .018 .520 
PTSD .310 .062 .322 5.002*** .000 .188 .433 .099 .999 
Affective Empathya .619 .700 .044 .885 .377 -.760 1.999 .003 .143 
Cognitive Empathy - PTa -.012 .176 -.004 -.069 .945 -.359 .335 .000 .051 
Cognitive Empathy - OSa -.026 .174 -.008 -.151 .880 -.370 .317 .000 .053 
Differentiation of Selfa -4.858 .828 -.368 -5.869*** .000 -6.489 -3.227 .132 1.000 
Aff x OSa .043 .200 .011 .218 .828 -.350 .437 .000 .055 
Aff x DoSa -.595 .763 -.039 -.780 .436 -2.099 .909 .003 .121 
OS x DoSa -.197 .191 -.052 -1.034 .302 -.573 .179 .005 .177 
Aff x OS x DoSa -.673 .236 -.146 -2.853** .005 -1.138 -.208 .035 .811 
R2 = .471          
Adj R2 = .437          
*p < .017, **p < .01, ***p < .001; a = Variables were mean centered prior to analysis; PT = Perspective Taking, OS = Online Simulation, Aff x OS = Affective 
Empathy x Online Simulation interaction term, Aff x DoS = Affective Empathy x Differentiation of Self interaction term, OS x DoS = Online Simulation x 
Differentiation of Self interaction term, Aff x OS x DoS = Affective Empathy x Online Simulation x Differentiation of Self 3-way interaction term. 
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Table 8b. 
Model 4B: Univariate Effects on Underinvolved Countertransference, N = 245 
Variable 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t p 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval 
  
B Std. Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Partial 
η2 
Obs. 
Power 
(Intercept) 5.614 .514  10.922*** .000 4.601 6.627 .344 1.000 
Age -.024 .010 -.158 -2.347 .020 -.044 -.004 .024 .647 
Income .153 .092 .119 1.654 .100 -.029 .334 .012 .377 
LCSW -.120 .209 -.036 -.578 .564 -.531 .290 .001 .089 
% Clients with Trauma .002 .003 .038 .622 .535 -.005 .009 .002 .095 
Personal Therapy -.085 .217 -.026 -.392 .696 -.512 .342 .001 .068 
Provide Supervision -.292 .230 -.084 -1.270 .205 -.745 .161 .007 .244 
PTSD .002 .011 .018 .231 .818 -.019 .024 .000 .056 
Affective Empathya -.174 .121 -.088 -1.434 .153 -.413 .065 .009 .298 
Cognitive Empathy - PTa -.037 .030 -.079 -1.210 .228 -.097 .023 .006 .226 
Cognitive Empathy - 
OSa 
-.066 .030 -.146 -2.194 .029 -.126 -.007 .021 .589 
Differentiation of Selfa -.452 .143 -.244 -3.150** .002 -.734 -.169 .042 .880 
Aff x OSa .028 .035 .051 .810 .419 -.040 .096 .003 .127 
Aff x DoSa .030 .132 .014 .228 .820 -.230 .291 .000 .056 
OS x DoSa .054 .033 .102 1.636 .103 -.011 .119 .012 .371 
Aff x OS x DoSa -.164 .041 -.253 -4.014*** .000 -.244 -.083 .066 .979 
R2 = .198          
Adj R2 = .145          
*p < .017, **p < .01, ***p < .001; a = Variables were mean centered prior to analysis; PT = Perspective Taking, OS = Online Simulation, Aff x OS = Affective 
Empathy x Online Simulation interaction term, Aff x DoS = Affective Empathy x Differentiation of Self interaction term, OS x DoS = Online Simulation x 
Differentiation of Self interaction term, Aff x OS x DoS = Affective Empathy x Online Simulation x Differentiation of Self 3-way interaction term. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual Diagram of the Possible Three-Way Interaction between Cognitive 
Empathy, Affective Empathy, and Differentiation of Self on Therapist Reactions to Client 
Trauma (i.e., Overinvolved Countertransference, Underinvolved Countertransference, and 
Secondary Traumatic Stress). 
  
Affective 
Empathy 
Cognitive 
Empathy  
 
Differentiation of 
Self 
 
Therapist 
Reactions 
  
169 
 
 
Model 1: Covariates, cog emp (PT and OS), aff emp, DoS  Outcomes 
Model 2A: Covariates, PT, OS, aff emp, DoS, PTxaff  Outcomes 
Model 2B: Covariates, PT, OS, aff emp, DoS, OSxaff  Outcomes 
Model 3: Covariates, PT, OS, aff emp, DoS, DoSxaff  Outcomes 
Model 4A: Covariates, PT, OS, aff emp, DoS, PTxaff, PTxDoS, affxDoS, PTxaffxDoS  
Outcomes 
Model 4B: Covariates, PT, OS, aff emp, DoS, OSxaff, OSxDoS, affxDoS, OSxaffxDoS  
Outcomes 
Figure 2. Steps of Multivariate Multiple Linear Regression 
Covariates = PCL-5 scores, age, income, percentage of traumatized clients, identifying as a social worker, currently 
receiving personal trauma therapy, and currently providing supervision to others; cog emp = cognitive empathy as measured 
by the Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCAE); PT = Perspective Taking subscale of the QCAE; OS = 
Online Simulation subscale of the QCAE; aff emp = affective empathy as measured by the Pictorial Empathy Test; DoS = 
differentiation of self as measured by the Differentiation of Self Inventory-Short Form; Outcomes Secondary Traumatic 
Stress Scale, Therapist Response Questionnaire-Underinvolved, and the Therapist Response Questionnaire-Overinvolved. 
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Figure 3. Conditional Effects of the Cognitive empathy-OS x Affective Empathy Interaction 
on Secondary Traumatic Stress, at +/- 1 SDs and Average Differentiation of Self: A Three-
Way Interaction 
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Figure 4. Conditional Effects of the Cognitive empathy-OS x Affective Empathy Interaction 
on Secondary Traumatic Stress, at +/- 1 SDs and Average Differentiation of Self: A Three-
Way Interaction Condensed. 
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Figure 5. Conditional Effects of the Cognitive empathy-OS x Affective Empathy Interaction 
on Underinvolved Countertransference, at +/- 1 SDs and Average Differentiation of Self: A 
Three-Way Interaction 
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Figure 6. Conditional Effects of the Cognitive empathy-OS x Affective Empathy Interaction 
on Underinvolved Countertransference, at +/- 1 SDs and Average Differentiation of Self: A 
Three-Way Interaction Condensed.  
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APPENDIX A 
Demographics Form 
1. Please indicate your age: 
2. Please indicate your gender identity: 
3. Please indicate your sexual orientation: 
4. Do you practice within the United States? (yes, no) 
a. If no, where? 
5. Please identify your race/ethnicity/cultural identity: 
a. Asian/Pacific Islander 
b. Black/African American 
c. Non-Hispanic Caucasian/White/European American 
d. Hispanic/Latino/Latina/Latinx 
e. Middle Eastern 
f. Multicultural/ethnic 
g. Native American/American Indian 
h. If the above terms do not adequately describe your race/ethnicity/cultural 
identity, please describe in your own words: 
6. Please indicate your professional affiliation: 
a. Clinical social worker (Master’s degree minimum) 
b. Mental health counselor/therapist (Master’s degree minimum) 
c. Psychologist (Ph.D., Ed.D., or Psy.D. minimum) 
d. Psychiatrist (M.D.) 
e. If the above professional affiliations do not adequately describe your 
occupation, please describe in your own words: 
7. What is your household annual income? 
a. Less than $20,000 
b. $20,000-39,999 
c. $40,000-74,999 
d. $75,000-99,999 
e. $100,000-149,999 
f. $150,000 or more 
8. Please indicate whether you have received the following training in trauma, PTSD, or 
trauma-specific therapy (select as many as is appropriate): 
a. Graduate coursework in trauma and/or approaches for treating traumatized 
clients 
b. CEUs in trauma and/or approaches for treating traumatized clients 
c. Certification training for trauma-focused treatments (e.g., Cognitive 
Processing Therapy, Prolonged Exposure, Eye Movement Desensitization and 
Reprocessing, Narrative Exposure Therapy, etc.) 
9. Please indicate how long you have been practicing in the field, in years and/or 
months: 
10. Please indicate how long you have been working with traumatized clients, in years 
and/or months: 
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11. Please estimate the percentage of time that you spend working with trauma during 
your regular practice within the past 6 months: 
12. Please estimate the percentage of clients you currently see with a Criterion A trauma 
as their presenting concern (Criterion A trauma is defined as “Exposure to actual or 
threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence in one or more of the following 
ways: directly experiencing the traumatic event, witnessing in person the event as it 
occurred to others, learning that the traumatic event occurred to a close family 
member or close friend [in this case, the event must have been violent or accidental], 
or experiencing repeated or extreme exposure to aversive details of the traumatic 
events” [American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 271]): 
13. Regarding your own personal trauma, please indicate when you experienced this 
trauma(s): 
a. Childhood 
b. Adulthood 
c. Both 
14. Are you currently receiving personal therapy for your own personal trauma? (yes, no) 
15. Have you in the past received personal therapy for your own personal trauma? (yes, 
no) 
16. Do you currently receive supervision? (yes, no) 
a. If no, do you attend a professional consultation group specific to trauma?  
17. Do you provide supervision to other clinicians in training who treat clients with 
trauma? (yes, no) 
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APPENDIX B 
PTSD Measures 
 
Life Events Checklist – 5 (LEC-5, modified for present study; Weathers et al., 2013) 
 
Instructions: Listed below are a number of difficult or stressful things that sometimes happen 
to people. For each event, click to indicate if the event: (a) happened to you personally; (b) 
you witnessed it happen to someone else; or (c) you learned about it happening to a close 
family member or close friend. 
 
Be sure to consider your entire life (growing up as well as adulthood) as you go through the 
list of events. 
 
Event Happened to me Witnessed it Learned about it 
happening to close 
family or friend 
Natural disaster (for example, 
flood, hurricane, tornado, 
earthquake) 
   
Fire or explosion    
Transportation accident (for 
example, car accident, boat 
accident, train wreck, plane 
crash) 
   
Serious accident at work, 
home, or during recreational 
activity 
   
Exposure to toxic substance 
(for example, dangerous 
chemicals, radiation) 
   
Physical assault (for example, 
being attacked, hit, slapped, 
kicked, beaten up) 
   
Assault with a weapon (for 
example, being shot, stabbed, 
threatened with a knife, gun, 
bomb) 
   
Sexual assault (rape, attempted 
rape, made to perform any type 
of sexual act through force, 
threat of harm, or coercion) 
   
Other unwanted or 
uncomfortable sexual 
experience 
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Combat or exposure to a war-
zone (in the military or as a 
civilian) 
   
Captivity (for example, being 
kidnapped, abducted, held 
hostage, prisoner of war) 
   
Life-threatening illness or 
injury 
   
Severe human suffering    
Sudden violent death (for 
example, homicide, suicide) 
   
Sudden accidental death    
Serious injury, harm, or death 
you caused someone else 
   
Any other very stressful event 
or experience 
   
 
 
PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5; Weathers et al., 2013) 
 
Instructions: Below is a list of problems that people sometimes have in response to a very 
stressful experience. Please read each problem carefully and then circle one of the numbers 
to the right to indicate how much you have been bothered by that problem in the past month. 
 
In the past month, 
how much were you 
bothered by: 
Not at all 
(0) 
A little bit 
(1) 
Moderately 
(2) 
Quite a bit 
(3) 
Extremely 
(4) 
Repeated, disturbing, 
and unwanted 
memories of your 
personal trauma? 
     
Repeated, disturbing 
dreams of your 
personal trauma? 
     
Suddenly feeling or 
acting as if the 
trauma were actually 
happening again (as 
if you were actually 
back there reliving 
it)? 
     
Feeling very upset 
when something 
reminded you of your 
personal trauma? 
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Having strong 
physical reactions 
when something 
reminded you of your 
personal trauma (e.g., 
heart pounding, 
trouble breathing, 
sweating)? 
     
Avoiding memories, 
thoughts, or feelings 
related to your 
personal trauma? 
     
Avoiding external 
reminders of your 
personal trauma (for 
example, people, 
places, conversations, 
activities, objects, or 
situations)? 
     
Trouble remembering 
important parts of 
your personal 
trauma? 
     
Having strong 
negative beliefs about 
yourself, other 
people, or the world 
(for example, having 
thoughts such as: I 
am bad, there is 
something seriously 
wrong with me, no 
one can be trusted, 
the world is 
completely 
dangerous)? 
     
Blaming yourself or 
someone else for 
your personal trauma 
or what happened 
after it? 
     
Having strong 
negative feelings 
such as fear, horror, 
anger, guilt, or 
shame? 
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Loss of interest in 
activities that you 
used to enjoy? 
     
Feeling distant or cut 
off from other 
people? 
     
Trouble experiencing 
positive feelings (for 
example, being 
unable to feel 
happiness or have 
loving feelings for 
people close to you)? 
     
Irritable behavior, 
angry outbursts, or 
acting aggressively? 
     
Taking too many 
risks or doing things 
that could cause you 
harm? 
     
Being “superalert” or 
watchful or on 
guard? 
     
Feeling jumpy or 
easily startled? 
     
Having difficulty 
concentrating? 
     
Trouble falling or 
staying asleep? 
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APPENDIX C 
Empathy Measures 
Pictorial Empathy Test (Lindeman et al., 2018) 
Instructions: please review each photo and indicate how emotionally moving you find each 
photograph. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all A little bit 
It arouses 
some 
feelings 
Quite a lot 
Very 
much 
 
 
How emotionally moving do you find the photograph? 
 
 
 
File name: “Julien Bryan – Life – 50893.jpg.” Copyright information: This work is in the 
public domain (Wikimedia Commons). 
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File name: “2012 East Azerbaijan earthquakes. By Mardetanha 1527.jpg.” 
 
Copyright information: GNU Free Documentation License [GFDL 
(http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html) or CC-BY-SA-3.0-2.5-2.0-1.0 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)] (Wikimedia Commons). Author: 
Mardetanha. 
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File name: “Rahima Banu.jpg”. 
Copyright information: This work is in the public domain (Wikimedia Commons). Author: 
CDC/ World Health Organization Stanley O. Foster M. D., M. P. H. 
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File name: “Tratamiento epidermolisis bullosa.jpg.” 
Copyright information:: GNU Free Documentation License [GFDL 
(http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html) or CC-BY-SA-3.0-2.5-2.0-1.0 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)] (Wikimedia Commons). Author: 
Yovanna.Gonzalez. 
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File name: “V rekonstrukcja Bitwy o Mławę, miasto 0992.jpg.” 
Copyright information: Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Poland license 
(Wikimedia Commons). Author: Adam Kliczek, http://zatrzymujeczas.pl (CC-BY-SA-3.0). 
 
 
 
File name: “Bala Baluk massacre by US troops.jpg.” 
Copyright information: Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 [CC-BY-SA-3.0 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)] (Wikimedia Commons). Author: Rawa77. 
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File name: “Wounded Minsk blast 2.jpg.” 
Copyright information: Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 [CC-BY-SA-3.0 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)] (Wikimedia Commons). Author: Anton 
Motolko. 
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Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy – Cognitive Empathy Scale (Reniers et 
al., 2011) 
 
Instructions: please indicate your level of agreement concerning the following statements. 
 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly 
disagree 
Slightly 
disagree 
Slightly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Perspective Taking 
1. I can easily work out what another person might want to talk about. 
2. I can tell if someone is masking their true emotion. 
3. I can sense if I am intruding, even if the other person does not tell me. 
4. I am good at predicting how someone will feel. 
5. I am good at predicting what someone will do. 
6. I am quick to spot when someone in a group is feeling awkward or uncomfortable. 
7. I can pick up quickly if someone says one thing but means another. 
8. I can easily tell if someone else is interested or bored with what I am saying. 
9. I can easily tell if someone else wants to enter a conversation.  
10. Other people tell me I am good at understanding how they are feeling and what they 
are thinking. 
 
Online Simulation 
11. I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision. 
12. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I was in their place. 
13. When I am upset at someone, I usually try to “put myself in their shoes” for a while. 
14. I always try to consider the other fellow’s feelings before I do something. 
15. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from 
their perspective. 
16. I can usually appreciate the other person’s viewpoint, even if I do not agree with it. 
17. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the “other guy’s” point of view 
(reversed). 
18. Before I do something I try to consider how my friends will react to it. 
19. I find it easy to put myself in somebody else’s shoes. 
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APPENDIX D 
Differentiation of Self Inventory – Short Form (Drake et al., 2015) 
Instructions: These are questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about yourself and 
relationships with others. Please read each statement carefully and decide how much the 
statement is generally true of you on a 1 (not at all) to 6 (very) scale. If you believe that an 
item does not pertain to you (e.g., you are not currently married or in a committed 
relationship, or one or both of your parents are deceased), please answer the item according 
to your best guess about what your thoughts and feelings would be in that situation. Be sure 
to answer every item and try to be as honest and accurate as possible in your responses. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at all 
characteristic 
of me 
   
 Very 
characteristic 
of me 
 
1. I tend to remain pretty calm even under stress. IP1 
2. I usually need a lot of encouragement from others when starting a big job or task. FO-
R1 
3. No matter what happens in my life, I know that I’ll never lose my sense of who I am. 
IP2 
4. I tend to distance myself when people get too close to me. EC-R1 
5. When my spouse/partner criticizes me, it bothers me for days. FO-R2  
6. At times my feelings get the best of me and I have trouble thinking clearly. ER-R1 
7. I’m often uncomfortable when people get too close to me. EC-R2 
8. I feel a need for approval from virtually everyone in my life. FO-R3 
9. At times, I feel as if I’m riding an emotional roller-coaster. ER-R2 
10. There’s no point in getting upset about things I cannot change. IP3 
11. I’m overly sensitive to criticism. ER-R3 
12. I’m fairly self-accepting. IP4 
13. I often agree with others just to appease them. FO-R4 
14. If I have had an argument with my spouse/partner, I tend to think about it all day. ER-
R4 
15. When one of my relationships becomes very intense, I feel the urge to run away from 
it. EC-R3 
16. If someone is upset with me, I can’t seem to let it go easily. ER-R5 
17. I often feel unsure when others are not around to help me make a decision. FO-R5 
18. I’m very sensitive to being hurt by others. ER-R6 
19. My self-esteem really depends on how others think of me. IP-R5 
20. I tend to feel pretty stable under stress. IP6 
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APPENDIX E 
Secondary Traumatic Stress Scale (Bride et al., 2007) 
 
Instructions: The following is a list of statements made by persons who have been impacted 
by their work with traumatized clients. Read each statement, then indicate how frequently the 
statement was true for you in the past month. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Rarely Occasionally Often Very 
Often 
1. I felt emotionally numb. 
2. My heart started pounding when I thought about my work with clients. 
3. It seemed as if I was reliving the trauma(s) experienced by my client(s). 
4. I had trouble sleeping. 
5. I felt discouraged about the future. 
6. Reminders of my work with clients upset me. 
7. I had little interest in being around others. 
8. I felt jumpy. 
9. I was less active than usual. 
10. I thought about my work with clients when I didn’t intend to. 
11. I had trouble concentrating. 
12. I avoided people, places, or things that reminded me of my work with clients. 
13. I had disturbing dreams about my work with clients. 
14. I wanted to avoid working with some clients. 
15. I was easily annoyed. 
16. I expected something bad to happen. 
17. I noticed gaps in my memory about client sessions. 
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APPENDIX F 
Therapist Response Questionnaire – Underinvolved/Disengaged and Overinvolved/Special 
Subscales (Tanzilli et al., 2016) 
 
Directions: Please read each statement and select the response that best describes your 
overall reaction to the traumatized clients you have treated over the past month. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
true 
A little 
true 
Somewhat 
true 
Mostly 
true 
Very true 
 
Overinvolved Countertransference 
1. I disclose my feelings with my traumatized clients more than with other clients. 
2. I tell my traumatized clients I love him/her/them. 
3. I self-disclose more about my personal life with my traumatized clients than with my 
other clients. 
4. I call my traumatized clients between sessions more than my other clients. 
5. I look forward to sessions with my traumatized clients. 
6. I end sessions overtime with my traumatized clients more than with my other clients. 
 
Underinvolved Countertransference 
7. I begin sessions late with my traumatized clients more than with my other clients. 
8. I feel bored in session with my traumatized clients. 
9. My mind often wanders to things other than what my traumatized clients are talking 
about. 
10.  I don’t feel fully engaged in sessions with my traumatized clients. 
11. I watch the clock with my traumatized clients more than with my other clients. 
  
  
190 
 
 
VITA 
 Leslie Stapley Taylor was born on July 3, 1993 in Lawrenceville, Georgia. She 
earned her high school diploma at Brookwood High School in 2011, and went on to graduate 
from the University of Georgia in 2015 with a Bachelor of Science in Psychology, emphasis 
in Neuroscience. In August 2015, she began her studies at the University of Missouri-Kansas 
City (UMKC) to pursue her Ph.D. in Counseling and Health Services Psychology under the 
tutelage of Nancy Murdock, Ph.D. She was awarded her M.A. in Counseling and Guidance 
en route to her Ph.D. in May 2018.  
While at UMKC, she worked as a graduate research assistant with the UMKC Office 
of Institutional Research, served as Co-Chair and Treasurer for the UMKC Student Affiliates 
of Seventeen organization, assisted in teaching the Psychology of Trauma and Methods of 
Counseling courses, and worked part-time as a family violence therapist with a local non-
profit intimate partner violence agency. During her doctoral career she was awarded the 
UMKC School of Education Endowment Research Grant, the UMKC DaLee Fund Research 
Grant, and she was awarded the UMKC Women’s Council Graduate Assistance Fund Award 
twice. Her predoctoral psychology internship was at the Memphis VA Medical Center under 
the Clinical Psychology emphasis from August 2020 thru July 2021.  
Mrs. Taylor is a member of the American Psychological Association and has served 
as the Program Representative for the National Student Affiliates of Seventeen, the Program 
Representative for Div. 43, The Society for Couple and Family Psychology, and served on 
Div. 43’s Student Leadership Committee. To date, she has co-authored four articles 
published in refereed journals. She has twelve presentations at national conferences. 
 
